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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INEQUALITY
Yueyuan Ma
Jeremy Greenwood
This thesis studies the impact of policy changes and technological progress on economic
growth and inequality.
The first chapter studies the impact of intellectual property rights protection policies on
firms’ boundary and innovation choices, and economic growth. This chapter shows specialization patterns of US firms in the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically: 1) Firms, especially
innovating ones, decreased the number of industries in which they produce. 2) Small
firms increased innovation intensity while large firms decreased it. A new hypothesis is
proposed, highlighting the role of pro-patent reforms that make firms’ innovations more
tradable. An endogenous growth model with firm heterogeneity is developed. Calibrating the model suggests that increasing tradability of innovations can explain 25% of the
decrease in firms’ number of industries and 58% of the reallocation of innovation activities. It results in a 0.64 percent point increase in the annual economic growth rate.
The second chapter explores how the rise of digital advertising technology affects consumption, leisure, and welfare of high- and low-income consumers. An informationtheoretic model is constructed where free media goods complement leisure and are financed by two types of advertising that inform consumers about the prices of goods–
traditional and digital. Calibrating the model shows that the increasing provision of free
media goods, due to the rise in digital advertising, boosts consumer welfare significantly.
It also leads to more leisure. The increase in leisure is more pronounced for low-income
consumers vis-à-vis the high-income ones.
The third chapter studies the role of the venture capital (VC) industry in shaping wealth
iv

inequality and mobility in the United States. This chapter develops a model where households endogenously choose entrepreneurship entry and the source of external funds (bank
or VC). The model can quantitatively match the wealth distribution in the United States.
Calibrating the model generates that the VC sector: 1) increases the wealth share of the top
0.1% households by 1 percent points and the wealth share of the top 1% households by 2.1
percent points, 2) increases the probability that the households at the bottom 99% move to
the top 1% after a generation by 1.4 percent points.
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CHAPTER 1
S PECIALIZATION IN A K NOWLEDGE E CONOMY
This chapter is based on work published in Yueyuan Ma. Specialization in a knowledge
economy. Available at SSRN 4052990, 2022 (Ma (2022)).

1.1

Introduction

Profiting from innovation is vital for the survival of innovating firms and therefore economic growth. However, it is not always easy to monetize innovation using a firm’s own
production. First, ideas are random and are not always matched with a firm’s production.1
Second, the firm may lack the ability to mass-produce its innovation output.2 Solutions to
these problems within the firm include: spanning a large number of industries to raise the
opportunity of utilizing new inventions; doing innovation only when the firm can produce
and commercialize new inventions.
Using the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) from the Census Bureau that covers all
US firms with paid employees, this study provides novel evidence of trends in the 1980s
and 1990s contradictory to what the solutions suggest.3 Specifically,
1) US firms narrowed their production scopes, i.e., the number of industries in which they
produce. The scope shrinkage was driven mainly by innovating firms.
2) Innovation shifted from large firms (firms with mass production) to small firms.
1 Akcigit et al. (2016) provides evidence that firms may generate new inventions that are far away from the
firms’ primary line of business. In this case, the inventions have less value to the firms.
2 For example, RC Cola was a small beverage company that introduced the first cola in a can and the
first diet cola. However, it quickly lost the advantage to Coca-Cola and Pepsi. De Havilland, the world’s
first commercial jet airliner, invented the Comet I jet 2 years before Boeing introduced the 707. However, de
Havilland was not able to capitalize its early invention. For more examples, please see Teece (1986)
3 Any views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the U.S. Census Bureau. The Census
Bureau’s Disclosure Review Board and Disclosure Avoidance Officers have reviewed this information product
for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information and have approved the disclosure avoidance practices
applied to this release. This research was performed at a Federal Statistical Research Data Center under FSRDC
Project Number 2125 (CBDRB-FY21-P2125-R8940; CBDRB-FY21-P2125-R9239).

1

In other words, innovation and production became separated and were specialized in by
different firms. This study then asks: What are the driving forces of the observed specialization, and how do they affect economic growth?
This paper proposes a new hypothesis to answer the questions above, highlighting the role
of the pro-patent reforms in the 1980s and 1990s that allowed the trading of innovation output between firms on the patent market. To assess the new hypothesis in explaining the
specialization choices of US firms and economic growth, an endogenous growth model
is built with potential mismatches between innovation and production and firm heterogeneity in the ability to monetize new inventions through production. Then, the model is
calibrated to rich firm-level data from the LBD, R&D data from the Survey of Industrial
Research and Development (SIRD), and patent data from the US Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO). The model suggests that increasing tradability of innovation output can
explain 25% of the contraction in production scope and 58% of the shift of innovation activities. It leads to a 0.64 percent point increase in the annual economic growth rate. Finally,
exploiting regional and firm-level differences in exposure to the reforms, difference-indifference and triple-difference analyses confirm causality from the pro-patent reforms to
firms’ production scope shrinkage.
Here is a complete summary of the hypothesis. The pro-patent reforms in the United States
in the 1980s and 1990s strengthened intellectual property rights protection and therefore
made firms’ innovation output more commodified and tradable. Trading of innovation
output on the patent market allowed firms to sell the new inventions that fell outside of
their production scope and buy inventions that could be utilized by their production; thus,
making firms’ production scope contribute less to the value of their innovation. This explains why innovating firms sharply decreased production scope in the 1980s and 1990s
(Fact 1). Small firms have limited ability to monetize innovation through their own production. The increased chances of selling innovation output on the patent market benefited
them more and incentivized them to increase innovation effort. Large firms could rely on

2

small firms’ innovation by purchasing patents on the market and therefore decreased innovation effort. This explains why innovation activities shifted to small firms (Fact 2).
The pro-patent reforms are part of the major policy changes implemented by the US government to confront the intensified global competition in the 1970s and early 1980s. The
reforms consist of several pro-patent policies that include, but are not limited, to: an extension of patentability to genetic engineering and software, which became two of the
most patented fields afterward; the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) that vastly increased the success rate of patent holders in legal disputes; longer
effective patent terms for a majority of inventions. These policies affect the tradability of
innovation output in two ways. First, stronger intellectual property rights protection incentivizes firms to patent their inventions instead of hiding them as secrets. Trading of
patents is subject to fewer information frictions compared to trading of secrets. Second,
firms with new inventions can extract more value in the trading process since stronger
patent protection reduces the probability of other firms stealing the inventions. Evidence
of the effect of these policy changes is rising volumes of patent trading activities. Using
the Patent Assignment Dataset (PAD) from the USPTO, the share of patents ever traded
increased from 30.9% at the beginning of the 1980s to 44.1% at the end of the 1990s.
Other possible explanations are also considered for the observed specialization patterns.
First, the US government introduced a R&D tax credit in 1981 as part of the strategies to increase the competency of US firms in the global market. The effective federal subsidy rate
increased from 5% before the 1980s to 24% in the 1990s, as documented in Akcigit et al.
(2018). Combined with the booming patent trading market, the R&D tax credit may have
benefited small firms more as their R&D expense to domestic sales ratio grew to be higher
than large firms’ after 1985. Therefore, the credit may have amplified the shift of innovation to small firms. Second, the cost structure of production may have changed over time
that directly affected firms’ production scope. Recent papers [Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg
(2019), De Ridder (2019)] argue that the rise of information technology increases the fixed
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cost for firms to enter new industries but decreases the marginal production cost after
entry. This may explain the observed shrinkage of production scope. Third, good ideas
may be getting harder to find, as argued by Bloom et al. (2020). This may have pushed
innovating firms to focus efforts on narrower fields of research and therefore production.
To evaluate the roles of the new hypothesis, as well as the aforementioned possible explanations in the specialization patterns and economic growth, a structural model is built
with endogenous decisions of production scope and innovation effort. Distinct from existing theories about specialization, the model in this paper takes into account potential
mismatches between innovation output and production. A key tradeoff that an innovating firm faces when choosing its production scope is that larger scope raises the probability
that the firm’s innovation output is better matched with its production, and therefore, increases the firm’s ability to monetize its inventions; but at the same time, larger scope
increases the management cost of the firm. The patent trading market provides another
channel for firms to benefit from their innovation besides production, but is subject to
search frictions. The pro-patent policies increase the matching efficiency and bargaining
power of patent sellers on this market, and therefore, change the relative importance of
production and trading in monetizing innovation. The effects are heterogeneous for small
and large firms. Small firms have limited production scope and benefit more from the
market channel by being patent sellers; large firms have broader scope and benefit from
buying patents from other firms. The model entertains other explanations. The R&D tax
credit rate, production cost structure, and the importance of new ideas are incorporated
into the analysis.
The developed model is first calibrated to fit the period when the patent reforms just began (1981-1985) using the LBD, the SIRD, and the USPTO patent datasets. Key calibration
targets include production scope, the R&D expense-to-domestic sales ratio of large and
small firms, the share of patents traded, and the economic growth rate. Then, the model
is recalibrated to fit the post-reform period (1996-2000), allowing changes in parameters
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relevant to the new hypothesis and the three alternative explanations. The direction of
changes in these parameters is not constrained in the recalibration process, except for the
R&D tax credit rate, which is taken from the US data. Comparison of parameter values
in the two periods confirms the prior notions. There was an increase in the matching efficiency of the patent trading market, an increase in patent sellers’ bargaining power, higher
costs of producing in multiple industries, and less importance of new ideas. A decomposition exercise is conducted to explore the contribution of each possible explanation by
looking at the changes in the key moments due to each relevant parameter. The decomposition shows that increasing tradability of innovations can explain 25% of the observed
production scope decrease and 58% of the reallocation of R&D activities. The remaining
part of specialization is primarily due to changes in production cost structure. Increasing
tradability of innovations results in a 0.64 percent point increase in the annual growth rate,
which makes it the main driver of economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s.
A firm’s growth can depend on either its own innovation or other firms’ innovation through
patent purchasing. To explore the relative importance of these two channels, their contributions to growth are calculated for both the large and small firms. The result shows that
the share of growth due to own innovation decreased sharply from 57.6% to 31.3% for
large firms, while slightly from 2.9% to 2.3% for small firms. These changes reflect the fact
that the growth of firms increasingly relied upon other firms’ innovation, and this reliance
was more salient for large firms.
Besides adjusting production scope, firms may also target their innovation to their production to improve matching between the two. One measure of the targeting behaviors
of the innovation process is the share of basic research in total R&D spending. Since basic
research is defined as “an activity aimed at acquiring new knowledge or understanding
without specific immediate commercial application or use,” lower basic research share
implies more targeted innovation.4 Using the Survey of Industrial Research and Devel4 This

is the definition of basic research in the Survey of Industrial Research and Development (SIRD).
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opment (SIRD) collected by the Census Bureau and the NSF, this paper finds that basic
research’s share increased in the period when firms’ production scope narrowed, implying
that firms’ innovation activities became less targeted. To check whether the new hypothesis can explain this trend, the baseline model is extended to include two types of innovation, basic and applied research, that differ in R&D costs, the probability of matching
a firm’s own production scope, and the importance of their output. Similar decomposition exercises are undertaken for the extended model. The result shows that increasing
tradability of innovations can explain nearly all (90%) of the increase in the share of basic
research. The intuition is that basic research benefits more from patent trading as its output is harder to be utilized by the firm’s own production. So, firms are willing to make
their innovation process less targeted when trading is available without worrying about
their inability to monetize innovation.
Finally, this study uses regional and firm-level differences in exposure to the pro-patent
policies to test whether the reforms are causes of the contraction in firms’ production scope.
The fraction of lawsuits invalidating the patents involved in legal disputes varied much
across the twelve regional circuit courts before the establishment of the CAFC in 1982, as
pointed out by [Henry and Turner (2006) and Han (2018)]. This implies a large variance in
attitudes towards intellectual property rights across different regions. The establishment
of the CAFC significantly lowered the regional invalidation rates and made them more
uniform. So, regions with a higher invalidation rate before the CAFC experienced a larger
increase in the strength of patent protection. Using a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, firms in regions with a higher pre-CAFC invalidation rate decreased production
scope more. Furthermore, genetic engineering and software were two of the most controversial fields of patentability in the 1970s. However, shortly before the establishment of
the CAFC, the Supreme Court approved patentability in these two fields in two landmark
cases, setting precedents for future cases. Therefore, these two fields experienced the most
increase in patent protection strength and consistency in regional decisions afterward. The
share of firms’ employment in these two fields before 1982 is used as a proxy for the ex6

posure to the change in patent protection. With a Triple-Difference (DDD) approach, a
finding is that firms with higher exposure shrank production scope more. These empirical
results confirm causality from the patent reforms to more focused production.
Related Literature
This paper is closely related to the literature on the impacts of patent trading and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. The structural model in this study is based upon
Akcigit et al. (2016), which analyzes how the propinquity between a firm’s and its patent’s
technology class affects the value of the patent to the firm, and how a patent trading market
alleviates the problem of technology mismatch. This paper extends this work in a variety
of directions to address firms’ specialization decisions. First, production scope is introduced in the model, which is endogenously chosen by a firm according to the tradability
of its innovation output. Second, firm size matters for the impact of market trading. Size
affects the expected value the firm can extract from new ideas through production and determines whether a firm benefits more from buying or selling patents. Third, the model is
calibrated to production scope and innovation effort choices of large and small firms in the
data to explore the role of the pro-patent policies in the specialization wave in the 1980s
and 1990s. Other literature about the trading of knowledge [Eaton and Kortum (1996),
Cabral (2018), Perla et al. (2021)] studies the impact of technology adoption on firms’ innovation and growth but not the effect on firm boundaries. Most discussions about the
influence of IPR protection focus on the tradeoff between innovation incentives and inventors’ monopoly power [Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1990), Mukoyama (2003),
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012)]. Some empirical studies suggest that the strength of the
patent system facilitates the disintegration of the innovation industries by allowing trade
in knowledge [Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Arora and Merges (2004), Arora and Ceccagnoli
(2006), Gans et al. (2008), Han et al. (2020)].5 However, as mentioned by Hall and Harhoff
(2012), research in this area is still limited. There have been few systematic theoretical and
quantitative analyses about the role of IPR protection in firms’ specialization decisions.
5A

summary of the relationship between patents and innovation can be found in Moser (2013).
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Theoretically, this paper contributes to the specialization literature by incorporating a new
form of friction that determines firm boundaries between innovation and production. Following the wisdom of Coase (1937), a comparison between market transaction costs and
firms’ internal organization costs determines the scope of a firm. The literature about specialization has studied various forms of external and internal costs. Williamson (1985)
considers problems of incomplete contracts. Klein et al. (1978) and Grout (1984) raise
the “hold-up problem" in relation-specific investment. Grossman and Hart (1986) and
Hart and Moore (1990) emphasize the role of ownership in determining firms’ boundary.6 Menzio (2021) explains product specialization by buyers’ ability to locate sellers.
DeCanio and Frech III (1993), Atalay et al. (2014) and Braguinsky et al. (2020) study the determinants and effect of vertical integration and diversification. Grossman and Helpman
(2002), Boehm and Oberfield (2020), and Bostanci (2021) discuss factors that affects firms’
outsourcing decisions. Some papers [Chiu et al. (2017), Baslandze (2016), Han (2018)] focus
on frictions in the innovating sectors, but none of these papers considers how mismatches
between innovation and production affects firms’ specialization choices.
Empirically, this research is related to the recent debates about US business dynamism.
Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg (2019) find that the gap between the number of industries of a
top firm and that of an average firm is smaller in 2013 compared to 1977. They explain
these changes by introducing a new technology that raises the fixed costs but lowers the
marginal costs of production in the service industry. Related arguments about technological changes are in Aghion et al. (2019), De Ridder (2019) and Autor et al. (2020). Inspired
by their research, the current study explores the specialization patterns more thoroughly
by looking at the number of industries per firm for all years from 1978 to 2016. Findings
are that all firms experienced a drop in the number of industries, and this drop was mostly
driven by firms that performed R&D activities. Furthermore, the drop started in the early
1980s but stopped before 2000. These observations direct the attention of this paper to
policy reforms regarding intellectual property rights. The quantitative analysis of this pa6A

summary of the literature on firms’ boundary can be found in Holmstrom and Roberts (1998).
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per supports the roles of both the increasing tradability of intellectual properties and the
change in production cost structure. Besides, the observation of scope shrinkage complements the findings that the aggregate concentration of US firms was stable (White (2002)),
but the within-industry concentration increased (Autor et al. (2020)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the specialization patterns observed in the data. Section 1.3 introduces the pro-patent policies in the 1980s and
1990s. It also shows evidence of a rising patent trading market. Section 1.4 constructs an
endogenous growth model that includes potential mismatches between innovation output
and production scope. Section 1.5 calibrates the model to key data moments and decomposes the specialization phenomena to effects of possible explanations. Section 1.6 extends
the model to include basic and applied research. Section 1.7 exploits the changes of patent
policies in the early 1980s to empirically examine the causality from the pro-patent reforms
to firms’ shrinkage of production scope. Section 1.8 concludes.

1.2

Specialization Patterns

This section exhibits the trends of production scope and R&D intensity of US firms. The
datasets involved are the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) constructed by the US
Census Bureau;7 the Survey of Industrial Research and Development (SIRD) collected by
the US Census Bureau and the National Science Foundation (NSF); the Patent Data Project
(PDP) collected and cleaned by the NBER.
The LBD covers the universe of business establishments with paid employees in the U.S.
It has a consistent 6-digit NAICS code constructed by Fort et al. (2016) for each establishment and each year. This study uses the firm ID variable that identifies the ownership of
each establishment to aggregate the number of the 6-digit NAICS codes of each firm and
defines it as the production scope of a firm. Information about firms’ patenting activities
comes from the PDP. It records all patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
7 Description

of this dataset can be found in Jarmin and Miranda (2002).
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from 1976 to 2006. A firm is classified as an innovating firm if it has ever been granted a
patent between 1976 and 2006. The SIRD provides detailed industrial R&D information of
a nationally representative sample of non-farm firms. Using the sample weights in the survey, the Census Bureau and the NSF calculate countrywide statistics each year and publish
them on the Industrial Research and Development Information System (IRIS). The ratio of
a firm’s R&D cost (excluding the federal funded part) to its net domestic sales is used by
this study as a proxy for the firm’s R&D intensity.

1.2.1

Production Scope

Figure 1.1 shows the average production scope of US firms with paid employees from 1978
to 2006 by whether they have ever issued a patent recorded by the PDP (innovating firms
vs. others).8 The scale for innovating firms is shown on the left y-axis, while the scale
for other firms is shown on the right. Innovating firms produced in 3.07 6-digit NAICS
industries on average at the beginning of the 1980s. This number experienced a sharp
decrease by one-third to around 2.05 at the end of 1990s and then rebounded slightly after
2000. Other firms’ production scope also decreased, but to a much lesser extent.

Figure 1.1: Trend of Production Scope by Innovating Activities

One potential reason for the more significant drop in the scope of innovating firms is that
8 The data point for the year 2002 is omitted because, in the version of the LBD data available to the author
of this paper, there is a problem in the scope statistics in 2002. Economists from the Census Bureau confirm
that the newest version does not have the problem.
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they are usually larger. To control the firm size, a regression of firms’ production scope is
run each year on a dummy variable of whether the firm is innovating or not, employment,
and their interaction. Then the predicted production scope of innovating and other firms is
calculated based on the estimated parameters when fixing the employment level at 20 and
1000, respectively. As shown in the two panels of Figure 1.2, at both employment levels,
innovating firms shrank production scope more than other firms. Therefore, the decrease
in production scope is more salient for innovating firms even when firm size is controlled.

(a) 20 Employees

(b) 1000 Employees

Figure 1.2: Trends of Production Scope with Fixed Firm Size

1.2.2

Innovation Intensity

Figure 1.3a displays the R&D intensity of US firms by size. Here, a firm is defined as a
small or medium if it has no more than 999 employees, while a large firm has at least 1000
employees. As shown in Figure 1.3a, the R&D expense-to-domestic sales ratio of small and
medium firms started to surge after 1980, and the rising trend stopped after 2000. On the
other hand, the ratio of large firms slightly decreased at the same period.9 These diverging
trends suggest that small and medium firms became more focused on innovation, while
large firm became more focused on non-innovation activities. To exclude the impact of
9 As

a robustness check, I also plot the number of citation-weighted patent numbers per employee for the
two groups of firms, as shown in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
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changes in domestic sales of the two groups of firms, the ratio of total R&D spending
by large firms to total R&D spending by small and medium firms is plotted, as shown
in Figure 1.3b. This ratio started to drop after the early 1980s and stabilized after 2000,
indicating that small and medium firms conducted a larger share of R&D activities. As
firm size is an essential determinant of firms’ production and commercialization, but not
R&D activities (Adams (1970), Moen (1999)), the two panels of Figure 1.3 suggest that firms
spent more efforts on areas where they had comparative advantage.10

(a) R&D Intensity by Size

(b) Total R&D Expense Ratio

Figure 1.3: Trends of R&D Activities

1.3

Policy Reforms and the Patent Market

The two decades (the 1980s and 1990s) that witnessed the specialization wave described in
the previous section also experienced important policy reforms in the United States. In the
1970s, the innovation activities in the U.S. were thought to fall behind other industrialized
countries (Meador (1992)), so a series of policies were adopted to stimulate innovation and
boost economic growth. Besides introducing the R&D tax credits at the federal level in
1981, the US government adopted a series of pro-patent reforms starting at the beginning
of the 1980s that strengthened the protection of intellectual property rights. The US legal
environment towards patents became increasingly positive in the following two decades
10 In

the following sections, this paper will call all the non-innovation activities as production. Therefore,
production indicates all activities that are complementary to innovation.
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until some counterbalancing new policy developments at the end of the 1990s. This paper
will focus on three major pro-patent policies in the 1980s and 1990s, as summarized by
Gallini (2002), and discuss how they are related to the trading of innovations.

1.3.1

Patent Policies

Extension of Patentability to Genetic Engineering and Software. The US Supreme Court’s
decision in 1980 in the case between Diamond and Chakrabarty approved the patentability
of genetically engineered bacteria. The 1981 decision in Diamond v. Diehr affirmed patent
protection of software. Bioengineering and software became two heavily patented areas
afterward. The overall patent applications and issuances both doubled between 1980 and
2000 after a long stable phase before 1980.
Creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Before 1982, legal disputes
of patents were heard at district courts or regional appellate courts, which did not have
consistent enforcement of the patent law across regions. The establishment of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982 provided centralized patent jurisdiction.
More importantly, it largely increased the success rate of patent holders in legal disputes
(Henry and Turner (2006), Han (2018)). As shown by Figure 1.4, the fraction of lawsuits
that invalidated the patents involved plummeted after the change in the court system.
Longer Patent Terms for Most Inventions. In 1984, The US government passed the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, which allowed time spent on premarket testing and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval process to be restored
from the term of the patent for up to five years. In 1994, the patent law replaced a 17-year
patent term from the issuance date with a 20-year term from the application date. Since the
gap between application and issuance is generally less than three years, this policy change
increased the duration of a majority of patents.
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Figure 1.4: Fraction of Lawsuits Invalidating the Patents

1.3.2

Relationship to Trading of Innovation Output

The pro-patent policies affect the trading of innovations along two dimensions. First,
stronger intellectual property rights protection encourages inventors to patent their inventions and, at the same time, disclose the information of their inventions, as required by the
patent law. Information disclosure helps to overcome a major friction in the patent trading
process–a lack of information about the value of the transacted products. Therefore, the
trading efficiency increases. Second, the pro-patent policies reduce the chance of stealing
and ensure patent holders extract justified values from their innovations.
Evidence of increasing tradability of innovations is a rapid growth of the patent trading
market in the 1980s and 1990s. Combining the Patent Assignment Dataset (PAD) with the
LBD,11 this paper calculates the citation weighted fraction of patents granted to US firms
in each year that have ever been traded through sales or merger & acquisitions (M&A).12
As shown in Figure 1.5, in the early 1980s, only about 30.9% of patents had been transacted. This fraction climbed to around 44.1% at the end of the 1990s and plateaued af11 The PAD is collected by the USPTO. It maintains as much as possible a complete history of claimed inter-

ests in a patent. Marco et al. (2015) has a complete introduction and shows various statistics of this dataset.
12 The graph of the fraction not weighted by citations delivers very similar patterns.
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ter 2000.13 This rise was primarily due to early transactions, as shown by Figure A.2
in the Appendix. Besides patent transactions, patent licensing activities also ballooned
after 1980, as indicated by the rising trends of licensing fees and royalties presented in
Arora and Gambardella (2010). Therefore, the increase in patent transactions shown in
Figure 1.5 should be viewed as a lower bound of the estimated increase in patent trading.

Figure 1.5: Fraction of Patents Involved in Trading

1.4

Model

To explore the driving forces of the observed specialization phenomena and their effects
on economic growth, a model is constructed in this section. In the model, there are possible
mismatches between a firm’s innovations and its production. Firms endogenously choose
their production scope, R&D intensity, and whether to buy or sell innovation output on
the patent market. The patent market is subject to search frictions, the efficiency of which
and the bargaining power between buyers and sellers depend on the legal environment towards patents. There are two types of production ability, which reflect firms’ comparative
advantage in innovation or production. Firms with a high production ability can extract
higher value from new inventions through production and, on average, have larger size.
13 The

trends are very similar for patent sales and M&A.
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Decisions of different types of firms are affected differently by the strength of patent protection, R&D tax credit rates, production cost structure, as well as the importance of new
ideas.

1.4.1

Setup

There is a unit measure of firms in this economy, and each is exogenously and uniformly
centered at a point on the industry circle shown in Figure 1.6. The industry circle contains
all the industries in the economy and is assumed to have a radius of

1
2π .

At the beginning

of each period, a firm chooses its production scope (ω)–the set of industries in which it
will produce goods and sevices. Figure 1 shows an example of a firm that is centered at
the top of the circle and chooses the arc ω as its production scope14 . The absolute value
of ω, |ω |, stands for the number of industries the firm produces in and will be used in the
following analysis. As the model only focuses on the symmetric equilibrium, the location
of the center turns out to be irrelevant to firms’ decisions.

Figure 1.6: Schematic Diagram

A firm goes through two major stages of operation after the scope is determined: innovation and production. The key assumptions of the model are twofold. First, the location of
the innovation output cannot be entirely controlled by the firm, and therefore it may not
necessarily fall inside the firm’s production scope. The firm cannot adjust its scope after
the innovation stage. Second, the firm can only utilize the innovation output that matches
14 Whether

the set of industries is connected is not assumed ex-ante, but will be solved from the model
based on assumptions that will be unfolded later.
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its production scope. Between the two stages, firms can trade innovations on the patent
market subject to a search and matching process. They can sell the innovation that is useless to them and buy patents that match their production scope. The pro-patent policies
have two impacts on patent trading. 1) They increase the matching efficiency of the patent
trading market by improving information disclosure. 2) They raise the bargaining power
of the patent sellers by enhancing protection for patent holders.15
Each firm in this economy is characterized by production ability (m) and an innovation
level (z). The production ability has two statuses, high (m H ) and low(m L ). The transition

q HH q HL 
of statuses across periods is subject to a Markov process, Qmm′ = 
. In the
q LH q LL
stationary distribution, the shares of firms that have high and low production ability are
respectively α H and α L . The innovation level is updated in each period according to the
law of motion,
z′ = z + γ(1( RD∈ω ) + B)z,
where

(1.1)

1(RD∈ω) is an indicator of whether the firm’s innovation output falls inside of its

production scope;

B is an indicator of whether the firm buys a patent that matches its

scope. It is assumed that: 1) At most one idea can be implemented in each period, so,

1(RD∈ω) and B are exclusive. 2) Whenever a firm has an in-scope innovation, the firm uses
it in its own production.16 γ is a constant lock-step growth of the innovation level. z is the
employment-weighted average innovation level of the economy, defined by the following
equation,

RR
z=

mzdF (m, z; z)
,
αH mH + αL mL

15 In

(1.2)

this paper, patenting an innovation is free, so all new inventions are patented. The strength of the
exclusive legal rights embodied in a patent is subject to policy changes.
16 This is equivalent to an assumption that the value of applying an in-scope innovation in a firm’s own
production is higher than that of selling it to other firms, regardless of the firm’s production ability. The model
calibration result justifies the equivalent assumption, an explicit expression of which is shown in equation A.25
in the Appendix.
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where F (m, z; z) is the joint distribution of production ability and innovation levels among
all firms at the end of the previous period. The timing of events in each period is as follows:

1(RD∈ω) realizes

m, z

R&D with i

Choose ω

z′ realizes

Search ideas

Production

Figure 1.7: Timeline

A firm starts a period with newly realized production ability and the innovation level
inherited from the end of the previous period. It chooses the production scope ω according
to an increasing and convex management cost function in the number of industries,
C e (ω; z) = µ|ω |1+ι zζ/(ζ +λ) /(1 + ι), ι > 0.

(1.3)

After the scope is chosen, the firm begins to do R&D. This innovation process has a success
rate of i, which is endogenously determined by the firm and also subject to an increasing
and convex cost function,
Ci (i; z) = χi1+ρ zζ/(ζ +λ) /(1 + ρ), ρ > 0.

(1.4)

Both the management and innovation cost functions rise with the economy-wide innovation level, z.
Whether the innovation process succeeds realizes then, together with the location of the
output. The output is useful to the firm’s own production only if it locates inside the scope.
Firms that fail to innovate search on the patent market as potential buyers. At the same
time, firms that successfully innovate, but the innovation output is useless, also search on
the market, as both potential buyers and sellers. They want to sell the useless patent at
hand and buy a patent that matches their production scope. It is assumed that each seller
and buyer have one unit of search effort. Sellers spend their whole effort searching at the
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location of their patents; buyers evenly distribute their effort over their production scope.
For any arc, d, on the industry circle, this paper denotes the total search effort on the arc
by sellers and by buyers respectively as ns (d) and nb (d). The total number of matches on
the arc is subject to the function,
M(ns (d), nb (d)) = ϕns (d)ν nb (d)1−ν ,

(1.5)

where ϕ represents the matching efficiency of the market and is exogenously affected by
patent policies. The odds of a successful match for a potential seller can be expressed as

s = lim ϕ
|d0 |→0

n b ( d 0 )  1− ν
.
n s ( d0 )

(1.6)

where d0 is the neighborhood that spans symmetrically around the location of the seller’s
patent. Since the model will only focus on the symmetric equilibrium, the location of the
patent is not tracked. The odds of a successful match for a potential buyer depend on a
function of the arc it searches over,

b(ω ) = ϕ

ns (ω ) ν
.
nb (ω )

(1.7)

Finally, the new innovation level of the firm realizes according to the law of motion in (1.1).
At the production stage, a firm maximizes its overall profit by choosing capital and labor
in each industry within its production scope. The production function exhibits decreasing
return-to-scale with regard to capital and labor. Capital is hired at the rental rate r̃, and
labor is hired at the wage rate w. It is assumed that goods in different industries are perfect
substitutes and industries are symmetric. Denote the capital and labor in each industry
respectively as k and l. The firm’s optimization problem at the production stage is
π (ω, m, z′ ; z) = max(mz′ )ζ (|ω |k )η (|ω |l )λ − r̃ (|ω |k ) − w(|ω |l ).
k,l
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(1.8)

1.4.2

Consumer Preference

A representative household in this economy maximizes the following lifetime utility,
∞

∑ βt

t =0

c ( t )1− ϵ
.
1−ϵ

(1.9)

where c(t) is consumption in period t, β is the discount rate of the future, and ϵ is the
degree of risk aversion of the household. The household owns and rents capital to all the
firms in this economy, which generates both a profit and a risk-free rate of capital return,
1
r,
1
r

in each period. The depreciation rate of capital is δ. So, the rental rate of capital, r̃, is

− 1 + δ. The household also provides one unit of labor to firms, from which it earns a

wage rate w(t).

1.4.3

Firm Decisions

This section solves firms’ decisions in backward order. At the final production stage, the
first-order condition derives
mz′ η 1+ ηζ λ λζ
( )
( ) ;
|ω | r̃
w
′
mz η ηζ λ 1+ λζ
l (ω, m, z′ ; z) =
( ) ( )
.
|ω | r̃
w

k(ω, m, z′ ; z) =

(1.10)
(1.11)

It is straightforward that the total amount of capital |ω |k (ω, m, z′ ; z) and the total amount
of labor |ω |l (ω, m, z′ ; z) a firm hires do not depend on the production scope. So does the
total profit, which equals to
η η λ λ
π (m, z′ ; z) = mz′ (1 − η − λ)( ) ζ ( ) ζ .
r̃
w

(1.12)

The independence of total input and output on the production scope implies that firms
either span a wide range of industries but only touch on each of them, or focus on a narrow
range of industries and deepen production in them. This independence is consistent with
observations in the data, that US firms deepened production in fewer industries without
20

changing much the total employment. The average employment of US firms was similar
between the beginning of the 1980s and the end of the 1990s, even though the average
number of industries was much lower at the latter period.17
The decision of R&D expenses is equivalent to determining the success rate (i) of innovation, as there is a one-to-one mapping between the two. Denote the value of a firm before
the R&D decision as D (ω, m, z; z), taking the production scope as given. This value can be
expressed as
D (ω, m, z; z) = max{iX (ω ) [π (m, z′ ; z) + rEV (m′ , z′ ; z′ )] +
{z
}
|
i
Innovate within ω

(1 − iX (ω )) [b(ω )(π (m, z′ ; z) − pb (m, z; z) + rEV (m′ , z′ ; z′ ))] +
|
{z
}
Buy an idea within ω

(1 − iX (ω )) [(1 − b(ω ))(π (m, z; z) + rEV (m′ , z; z′ ))] +
|
{z
}
No idea within ω

i (1 − X (ω ))

sps
|{z}

−(1 − σ)Ci (i; z)},

Sell an idea

(1.13)
where the function X (ω ) is the probability that the firm’s innovation output falls inside its
production scope, ω. It is assumed that the closer an industry is to the firm’s core business
(center), the larger the probability the firm’s inventions match that industry and generate
values to the firm.18 As will be shown in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.2.1,
it is optimal for firms to span symmetrically around their center. It is also assumed that
X (|ω |) = ξ |ω |ψ with ξ > 0 and 0 < ψ < 1 if ω spans symmetrically around the firm’s
center.19 In the following analysis, X (|ω |) will denote the relationship between the withinscope probability and the length of the production arc, given that the arc is symmetric
17 To be more specific, the average employment of US firms first decreased in the 1980s and then rebounded

in the 1990s. The levels at the start and the end were similar.
18 This assumption is supported by the empirical findings in Akcigit et al. (2016) that the propinquity between a patent’s technology class and the firm’s main line of business positively affects the value of the patent
to the firm.
19 As will be shown in Table 1.3 in the quantitative analysis, the empirical estimation of X (| ω |) is consistent
with this assumption.
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around the firm’s center.
D (ω, m, z; z) consists of five components, the first four of which describe the benefit of
innovation in four different scenarios, while the last one of which is the innovation cost
when the R&D tax credit rate equals to σ. The first scenario happens when the firm’s
innovation is successful, and the output falls within the firms’ production scope. So, the
probability of this scenario is iX (ω ). The firm then updates its innovation level according
to the law of motion described in (1.1). π (m, z′ ; z) is the profit in the current period with
the updated innovation level (z′ ). rEV (m′ , z′ ; z′ ) is the discounted future value of the firm
at the beginning of the next period. The second and third scenarios happen when the firm
does not develop useful innovation output through its own R&D process, either because
the innovation fails or because the innovation output does not match the firm’s production
scope. The firm then searches on the patent market as a potential buyer. With probability
b(ω ), the firm matches with a patent seller. It buys the patent at a price pb (m, z; z) and
updates its innovation level with the patent. With probability, 1 − b(ω ), the firm cannot
find a seller, and therefore, its innovations level remains the same as at the beginning of
the period. The fourth scenario happens when the firm’s R&D process succeeds, but the
output falls outside the firm’s own production scope. In this case, the firm searches on
the patent market as a potential seller. With probability s, the firm matches with a buyer
and sells its innovation output at a selling price denoted as ps . Since the model assumes
that the patent expires in one period, the firm that does not manage to sell its patent in the
current period will have to dump it and earn nothing from its innovation.
The determination of the buying price of a patent, also the transaction price, is through
Nash bargaining, which can be described as follows,
pb (m, z; z) =
arg max pθb [π (m, z′ ; z) + rEV (m′ , z′ ; z′ ) − pb − (π (m, z; z) + rEV (m′ , z; z′ ))]1−θ .
pb

(1.14)
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The buyer and seller choose the transaction price (pb ) to maximize the product of their
surplus. The surplus of the seller is simply the price, as the seller will earn nothing if the
patent is not sold. The surplus of the buyer is the difference between the firm value with
updated innovation level minus the payment and the value with the original innovation
level. θ denotes the bargaining power of the seller in the transaction. Note that the surplus
of the buyer depends on the buyer’s types, and therefore, so does the transaction price.
At the R&D stage, firms do not know what type of buyers they will meet if they have a
useless innovation to themselves and want to sell it on the market. So, ps should be the
expected price in transactions with all potential buyers. The distribution of types of potential buyers on the market is denoted as G (m, z; z′ ) and will be determined endogenously
in the equilibrium. The selling price can be expressed as

ps (z) =

Z Z

pb (m, z; z)dG (m, z; z).

(1.15)

The decision of the production scope at the beginning of each period is based on the tradeoff between the benefit and cost. The production scope, on the one hand, affects the ability
that a firm monetizes its innovation output, and on the other hand, determines the management difficulty. The optimal scope solves the following problem,
V (m, z; z) = max D (ω, m, z; z) − C e (ω; z),
ω

(1.16)

where C e (ω; z) is the management cost function as introduced in the model setup.

1.4.4

Equilibrium

This paper focuses on a symmetric-balanced-growth-path (SBGP) equilibrium, where the
employment-weighted average growth rate of the innovation level in the economy, g, is a
constant, and the ratio of the average innovation level of firms with high production ability
to that of firms with low production ability is a constant. The variables in this equilibrium

23

can be expressed as functions of the model parameters and are displayed in the following
proposition. The proof of the proposition is unfolded in Appendix A.2.1.
Proposition 1 (Symmetric Balanced Growth Path). There exists a symmetric balanced growth
path of the following form
1. The employment-weighted growth rate of the aggregate productivity defined by,

RR ′
R R ′ ′′
m z dF (m′ , z′ )/
m dF (m′ , z′ )
RR
g= R R
,
mz′ dF (m, z)/
mdF (m, z)

(1.17)

is a constant.
2. The interest factor r = β/gϵζ/(ζ +λ) ; the rental rate on capital r̃ = gϵζ/(ζ +λ) /β − 1 + δ.
3. The odds of a successful match for a potential buyer, b(ω ), and for a potential seller, s, only
depend on the total number of patent buyers and sellers, i.e., b(ω ) = ϕ( nnbs )ν , s = ϕ( nnbs )1−ν .
4. The production scope of each firm spans symmetrically around the center, and the length of the
scope depends only on the production ability of the firm, i.e., |ω (m, z; z)| = Ω(m).
5. The R&D success rate does not depend on the firm’s innovation level, z, or the economy-wide
innovation level, z, i.e., i (ω, m, z; z) = i (ω, m).
6. The value function V (m, z; z) is linear in z̃ and z̃, i.e., V (m, z; z) = v1 (m)z̃ + v2 (m)z̃, where
z̃ = z/zλ/(ζ +λ) , z̃ = zζ/(ζ +λ) .
7. The number of buyers of both types (nbH , nbL ) and the number of sellers (ns ) are
nbH = α H (1 − i∗ (ω ∗ (m H ), m H ) X (ω ∗ (m H ))), nbL = α H (1 − i∗ (ω ∗ (m L ), m L ) X (ω ∗ (m L )));
(1.18)
ns = α H i∗ (ω ∗ (m H ), m H )(1 − X (ω ∗ (m H ))) + α L i∗ (ω ∗ (m L ), m L )(1 − X (ω ∗ (m L ))). (1.19)

8. The buying price and the expected selling price of a patent is

pb (m, z; z) = θ ( Am +
ps (z) =

r
gλ/(λ+ζ )

E[v1 (m′ )|m])γz̃;

n
nbH
pb (m H , z; z) + bL pb (m L , z; z),
nb
nb
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(1.20)
(1.21)

where A is a constant.
The intuition of the matching rate of a potential buyer only depending on the total number
of buyers and sellers is that firms are endowed with the same unit of search effort and have
to dilute their effort at each point of the arc they search over. Therefore, although firms
with different production scope have different chances of getting an in-scope idea if their
innovation succeeds, they have equal opportunity to get an idea on the market. On the
other hand, the matching rate of a potential seller is also the same for all firms, as on each
point of the industry circle, there are equal number of buyers and sellers.
The R&D success rate does not rely on individual and aggregate innovation levels because
both the benefit and the cost of R&D depend only on the aggregate innovation level of
the economy and the aggregate level cancels out in the calculation. The irrelevance of the
R&D success rate with the innovation levels results in the production scope only relying
on firms’ production ability.

1.4.5

Relevant Parameters for Specialization

According to the analysis in the previous section, changes in the patent trading environment, the R&D tax credit rate, production cost structure, and the difficulty to find good
ideas may be potential reasons for the observed specialization patterns. Parameters in the
model that correspond to these changes are listed here.
The matching efficiency of the patent market, ϕ, reflects information frictions in the trading
process. Policies that make inventions more commodified and visible on the market are
predicted to raise the matching efficiency. The bargaining power of patent sellers, θ, reflects
protection towards patent holders. In an extreme case where patents are not protected,
inventions can be easily stolen by other firms. Then sellers have zero bargaining power
and get nothing from trade, while buyers get all the surplus. Stronger patent protection
results in higher bargaining power of the sellers.20
20 More formally, there is a mapping between the invalidation rate of patents and sellers’ bargaining power.
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The R&D tax credit is directly captured by σ. A higher fixed cost of entering new industries
corresponds to a larger scale and elasticity parameters in the management cost function
(µ and ι in equation (1.3)). As the production function at the final stage is DRS to total
production factors and the total factors is the product of the number of industries and
factors in each industry, decreasing the number of industries raises the marginal benefit of
scaling production in each industry. This indirectly captures the decreasing marginal cost
of production in a industry after entry, as proposed in the previous literature. Finally, the
difficulty to find good ideas can be captured by the step size of new inventions (γ) and the
parameters (χ and ρ) in the R&D cost function.
How do the two parameters related to the new hypothesis, matching efficiency (ϕ) and
sellers’ bargaining power (θ), affect firms’ R&D intensity and production scope? Partial
equilibrium analysis of the model sheds some light on the direction and channels.

Impacts of the Matching Efficiency
According to the model solution (see proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.2.1), the success
rate of innovation given production scope can be expressed as
i∗ (ω, m) =

{

1
γ
[ X (|ω |) (1 − (1 − θ )b) B(m) +(1 − X (|ω |)) sθ (σH B(m H ) + σL B(m L ))]} ρ .
{z
}
|
{z
}
|
(1 − σ ) χ

−

+

(1.22)
where B(.) is a function of production ability with constants and aggregate variables. An
increase in the matching efficiency (ϕ) increases both the matching rate of potential buyers
(b) and potential sellers (s). Easier trading of patents for buyers decreases firms’ R&D
intensity as they can rely more upon other firms to do R&D (the first term in Equation
Denote the invalidation rate as d, which captures the probability that “buyers” get a patent for free from “sellers”. Then the expected transaction price of a patent becomes (1 − d) pb . Since in the solution of the Nash
bargaining problem, pb is θ times the surplus of the buyer, the expected transaction price with invalidation
rate, d, is then (1 − d)θ times the surplus. Therefore, a lower invalidation rate is equivalent to higher bargaining power of the sellers.
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(1.22)). On the other hand, firms can better monetize their innovation output when it
falls outside of their own scope and therefore have a stronger incentive to do R&D (the
second term in Equation (1.22)). The final direction of the effect will depend on which
force dominates.
Firms’ production scope is determined by the following equation,
X ′ (|ω |) i∗ (ω, m)[(1 − (1 − θ )b) B(m) − sθ (σH B(m H ) + σL B(m L ))]γ = µ|ω |ι .
{z
}
| {z } |
+/−

(1.23)

−

The right-hand side is the marginal cost of production scope, which is not affected by the
efficiency change. The left-hand side is the marginal benefit of production scope, which is
a product of marginal within-scope probability, the R&D success rate, and the difference
in the values of a within-scope and an out-of-scope successful R&D output. An increase in
ϕ has a direct negative effect through rises in b and s, capturing that easier patent trading
makes scope less relevant in determining the value of a firm’s successful invention (the
second term in Equation (1.23)). On the other hand, ϕ also indirectly affects the marginal
benefit by changing the success rate of invention. The direction of this indirect effect is
ambiguous according to the discussion on R&D intensity (the first term in Equation (1.23).
So, the overall effect of the market efficiency on production scope is ambiguous but is
positive only if there is a large increase in the R&D intensity.

Impacts of Sellers’ Bargaining Power
Unlike the matching efficiency, an increase in sellers’ bargaining power benefits the seller
at the cost of the buyer. Higher bargaining power of the seller increases the value of inscope innovation output (the first term in Equation (1.24)) because it becomes more costly
to buy patents from other firms. At the same time, it also increases the value of out-ofscope innovation output (the second term in Equation (1.24)) because it is more rewarding
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to sell patents to other firms. In both cases, firms are more encouraged to do R&D.
i∗ (ω, m) =

{

1
γ
[ X (|ω |) (1 − (1 − θ )b) B(m) +(1 − X (|ω |)) sθ (σH B(m H ) + σL B(m L ))]} ρ .
|
{z
}
|
{z
}
(1 − σ ) χ

+

+

(1.24)
Higher bargaining power of sellers leads to higher transaction prices of patents, which
has an ambiguous direct effect on the production scope (the second term in Equation
(1.25)). On the one hand, firms want to increase the likelihood that their innovation output matches their production as buying patents is expensive. On the other hand, having a
smaller scope is beneficial as out-of-scope innovation output can be sold at a higher price.
As for the indirect effect, the increase in the R&D success rate due to higher bargaining
power of the seller raises the benefit of having a larger scope (the first term in Equation
(1.25)). The overall effect is ambiguous, depending on which force dominates.
X ′ (|ω |) i∗ (ω, m)[(1 − (1 − θ )b) B(m) − sθ (σH B(m H ) + σL B(m L ))]γ = µ|ω |ι .
{z
}
| {z } |
+

1.5

(1.25)

+/−

Quantitative Analysis

The main goal of this section is to quantify the relative importance of the key drivers of
the specialization patterns and their effects on economic growth. In particular, this study
focuses on the four possible explanations: increasing tradability of innovations, the rise in
the R&D tax credit rate, changes in production cost structure, and changes in the scarcity
of good ideas. The quantitative analysis is undertaken in the following steps. First, the
parameters in the model are set to fit data moments in the initial balanced growth path
period, 1981-1985, when the policy changes just began. Then, the relevant parameters as
analyzed in Section 1.4.5 are changed to make the model fit the moments in the ending balanced growth path period, 1996-2000, with other parameters fixed in this process. Finally,
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changes in firms’ specialization decisions and the economic growth rate are decomposed
to the contribution of each relevant explanation.

1.5.1

Calibration

There are eighteen parameters, {η, λ, ϵ, β, δ, α H , α L , χ, σ, m H , m L , ν, γ, ρ, θ, µ, ι, ϕ}, a transition matrix Qmm′ , and a function, X (ω ), to be calibrated in the model. They are grouped
into three categories. The first category comes directly from a priori information, as shown
in Table 1.1. The capital and labor share (η and λ) are set respectively to be 0.28 and 0.57
(1/3 and 2/3 multiplied by a return to scale factor of 0.85). The profit share (ζ) is then 15%,
which is consistent with the discussion in Guner et al. (2008). The degree of risk aversion
for households (ϵ) is taken to be 2, a standard value in the literature. The discount factor
(β) is set as 0.99, such that the interest rate of the model economy is 7.5%, a reasonable
estimate for the early 1980s in the United States. The depreciation rate of capital (δ) is chosen to be 0.07, consistent with the US National Income and Product Accounts. The paper
defines firms of high production ability as those at the top 10% of the production ability
distribution; firms of low production ability as the rest. This division is to make the two
types of firms respectively represent the large and small firms defined earlier. Among all
innovating firms between 1981 and 2000, around 9.1% are large firms (firms with more
than 1000 employees). 55.1% of large firms turned out to be of high production ability,
while only 5.5% of small firms (firms with less than 1000 employees) have high production ability. Therefore, in the following analysis, firms of high and low production ability
largely correspond to large and small firms. The scale parameter in the R&D cost function
(χ) is normalized to be 1, which is irrelevant to the quantitative results. The reason of this
normalization is that the step size of innovation (γ), which will be calibrated to match data
moments, will adjust to any changes in χ. The R&D tax credit rate (σ) is set at the effective
level before 1980 as calculated by Akcigit et al. (2018).
Parameters in the second category are pinned down by direct estimation from the data, as
presented in Table 1.2. Estimation of firms’ production ability is based upon the solution
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Parameter
η
λ
ϵ
β
δ
αH
αL
χ
σ

Description
Capital share
Labor share
CRRA parameter
Discount factor
Depreciation rate
Share of high type
Share of low type
R&D cost, scale
R&D tax credit rate

Value
0.25
0.60
2.00
0.99
0.07
0.10
0.90
1.00
0.05

Identification
Guner et al. (2008)
Guner et al. (2008)
Standard
Interest Rate
NIPA
Imposed
Imposed
Normalization
Akcigit et al. (2018)

Table 1.1: Parameter Values from a Priori Information
of employment decisions in the model, l (m, z′ ) = mz′ [(αh mh + αl ml )z′ ]−1 . By taking the
natural logarithm of both sides, it can be shown that the logarithm of a firm’s employment
equals the summation of the logarithm of its production ability, the logarithm of the innovation level, and aggregate factors. This study uses the accumulated citation-weighted
patent stock as a proxy for a firm’s innovation level and uses the time and industry fixed effects as proxies for the aggregate factors. Then, the firm’s production ability can be backed
out from the residual term of the following regression,

ln(empijt ) = β 1 ln( patentstock ijt ) + β 0 + ut + v j + residualijt .
|
{z
}
| {z }
ln(z′ )

(1.26)

ln(m)

The regression sample is all the firms in the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) that
have ever been granted a patent recorded in the Patent Data Project (PDP). Therefore, it is
all the innovating firms. It spans from 1981 to 2000, covering both the initial and ending
balanced growth paths. The production ability of the high type (m H ) and low type (m L ) are
respectively estimated by the average production ability of firms at the top 10% and bottom
90% of the distribution. The transition matrix of production ability (Qmm′ ) is derived from
a maximum likelihood estimation.
The elasticity parameter (ν) in the matching function is estimated by running panel regressions of the number of patent transactions on the number of potential sellers and potential
buyers in different layers of industries (i.e., different numbers of digits of the NAICS code).
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Parameter
mH
mL

Description
Prod. ability of high type
Prod. ability of low type

Qmm′

Type transition matrix

ν
X (ω )

Matching function, exponent
Within-scope Probability

Value
24.43
0.70


0.872 0.128
0.017 0.983
0.70
e−4.443 ∗ |ω |0.7643

Identification
Regression
Regression
MLE
Regression
Regression

Table 1.2: Parameter Values from Direct Estimations
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of the matching function derives

ln(match_num jt ) = α0 + νln(seller_num jt ) + (1 − ν)ln(buyer_num jt ) + ut + v j + e jt ,
(1.27)
where seller_num is the number of firms whose patent has a technology class that does
not match any of the firm’s 6-digit NAICS industries. buyer_sum is the number of firms
that do not have an in-scope patent. Whether the technology class of a patent matches the
firm’s industries is based on the concordance developed by Silverman (2002).21 The results
are shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The value of ν is taken to be the average of the
estimates.
The within-scope probability function (X (ω )) is estimated as follows. Since it is optimal
for firms to produce in industries close to its main line of business (center), this paper assumes all firms do so and only estimates the relationship between a patent’s within-scope
probability and the number of industries of its inventor. The function form is assumed
to be X (|ω |) = ξ |ω |ψ . This paper groups firms with patents in the LBD by the number
of industries and regress the logarithm of the average fraction of patents that match their
firms’ production scope in each group on the logarithm of the industry number. As shown
by the following results in Table 1.3, ξ and ψ are respectively e−4.443 and 0.7643. The high
R-squared confirms that the function form assumed is appropriate.
21 Silverman’s concordance links the International Patent Classification (IPC) system to the U.S. Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) system. This study further links the SIC with the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS).
22 The number of observations is rounded to the nearest 50 to comply with the disclosure requirement of
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VARIABLE
Log(within-scope prob.)
Ln(num. of Industries)
0.7643***
(0.0134)
Constant
-4.443***
(0.0370)
Observations
15022
R-squared
0.9547
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.3: Relationship between Within-Scope Probability and the Number of Industries
The third group of parameters is disciplined by minimizing the sum of squares between
key moments in the data and the model predicted values jointly in the initial balanced
growth path (1981-1985). The economic growth rate is primarily affected by the step size
of growth driven by innovations (γ). The R&D cost-to-domestic sales ratio of firms with
high and low production ability are informative of both the elasticity of the R&D cost function (1 + ρ) and the bargaining power of sellers on the patent transaction market (θ). The
average industry numbers of firms with high and low production ability are directly determined by the scale (µ) and elasticity (1 + ι) parameters in the management cost function.
They are also indirectly influenced by sellers’ bargaining power (θ). The share of patents
ever transacted is closely linked with the scale parameter (ϕ) in the matching function. The
estimated values of the relevant parameters are shown in Table 1.4. It is worth noting that
both the R&D cost and management cost functions are convex, as assumed by the model,
although no restrictions are imposed in the estimation process. The model predicted moments are almost the same as in the data, as shown by Table 1.5, attesting the model fits
the economy well in the initial balanced growth path.

1.5.2

Recalibration to the Post-Reform Balanced Growth Path

As pointed out in Section 4.5, the set of parameters, {ϕ, θ, σ, µ, ι, γ, ρ}, corresponds to the
possible explanations for the specialization patterns. To match the post-reform (ending)
balanced growth path, this paper sets the new R&D tax credit rate as the actual effective
rate, 24%, in the 1990s. Other parameters in this set are recalibrated to make the model fit
the Census Bureau.

32

Parameter
γ

Description
Step size of innovation

Value
1.72

Identification
Growth rate

1+ρ
θ

R&D cost elasticity
Bargaining power

1.79
0.16

R&D cost/sales
ratio (H and L)

µ
1+ι

Management cost, scale
Management cost, elasticity

1.5E-4
3.31

Avg. number of
industries (H and L)

ϕ

Matching function, scale

0.19

Patent traded share

Table 1.4: Parameter Values from the Minimum Distance Estimation
Targets
Economic growth rate(1981-1985)
R&D cost/sales of H firms(1981-1985)
R&D cost/sales of L firms(1981-1985)
Avg. number of industries of H firms(1981-1985)
Avg. number of industries of L firms(1981-1985)
The share of patents transacted(1981-1985)

Data
3.05%
3.62%
2.83%
11.81
1.92
30.9%

Model
3.05%
3.62%
2.83%
11.81
1.92
30.9%

Table 1.5: Model Fit for Key Moments in the Initial Balanced Growth Path
the economic growth rate, R&D cost-to-domestic sales ratio, the average industry numbers
of firms with high and low production ability, and the fraction of patents ever transacted in
1996-2000. The value of parameters out of this set is fixed in the recalibration process. The
performance of the recalibration is displayed in Table 1.6, showing a good match between
the model and data.

Targets
Economic growth rate(1996-2000)
R&D cost/sales of H firms(1996-2000)
R&D cost/sales of L firms(1996-2000)
Avg. number of industries of H firms(1996-2000)
Avg. number of industries of L firms(1996-2000)
The share of patents transacted(1996-2000)

Data
3.34%
3.15%
6.71%
6.31
1.61
44.1%

Model
3.34%
3.15%
6.71%
6.31
1.61
44.1%

Table 1.6: Model Fit for Key Moments in Recalibration

Comparison between the initial and ending values of the parameters are displayed in Table
1.7. Although the direction of changes of these parameters is not restricted in the recali33

bration process, it turns out to be consistent with the original predictions. There is an
increase in the matching efficiency, ϕ, of the patent market and the bargaining power, θ,
of patent sellers, confirming decreasing market frictions and stronger protection towards
patent holders. The scale and elasticity parameters in the management cost function (µ and
ι) are larger, implying that the cost of producing in multiple industries is higher. The very
slight change in γ shows the value of a successful R&D output remains nearly the same,
while the decrease in ρ suggests that the success rate of R&D relies more on investment,
reflecting that the generation of good ideas is more investment intensive.

ϕ
θ
µ
1+ι
γ
1+ρ

Old Values
0.19
0.16
1.5E-4
3.31
1.72
1.79

New Values
0.27
0.22
1.7E-4
3.93
1.73
1.56
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Interpretation
Matching efficiency increase
Sellers’ bargaining power increase
Higher costs of large scope
More DRS to scope
Goods ideas rely more on
R&D investment

Table 1.7: Changes of Parameter Values

1.5.3

Decomposition

To gauge the contribution of each possible explanation, this paper sets the parameters that
govern each explanation at the ending steady-state value while others at the initial steadystate value. Hypothetical moments about specialization and economic growth are derived
in each case. Then the paper compares the hypothetical moments with the moments in
the initial balanced growth path. The difference between them measures the effect of each
mechanism. The decomposition process uses the following formula,
Mi (Θ81−85 , κ96−00 ) − Mi (Θ81−85 , κ81−85 )
,
Di,96−00 − Di,81−85

(1.28)

where Mi is the ith moment in the model and Di is the corresponding value in the data. κ is
the set of key parameters that correspond to each explanation. Θ represents all parameters
23 The

1
elasticity of the R&D success rate with respect to investment can be expressed as 1+
ρ.
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in the model except for κ. This formula isolates the contributions of the key parameters.
Table 1.8 presents the decomposition results. The first row displays the direction of changes
in the data regarding the average production scope, the R&D intensity of firms with high
and low production ability, the share of patents traded, and the economic growth rate.
The direction of changes predicted by the new hypothesis, increasing tradability of innovations, is consistent with the direction of all the real changes. Quantitatively, the new
hypothesis can explain 25% of the decrease in production scope; 232% of the decrease in
R&D intensity for firms with high production ability and 58% of the increase in R&D intensity for firms with low production ability. It is responsible for the bulk of (90%) the
rise in the trading share of patents and 221% of the rise in economic growth. Since the annual economic growth rate increases by 0.29 percentage points between the two periods,
changes in invention tradability lead to a 0.64 percentage points increase in growth. This
study lists the respective contribution of the matching efficiency and sellers’ bargaining
power, finding that the former is the main driving force. The R&D tax credit has little
explanatory power for the specialization patterns but significantly contributes to a higher
growth rate. Most of the remaining part of specialization is explained by the change in
production cost structure, although it has little effect on the patent trading activities and
contributes negatively to growth. Rarer good ideas contribute to a significant part of the
decrease in firms’ scope but are muted in explaining other dimensions of specialization.
The subsections below will discuss the effects of each mechanism in detail.

Increasing Tradability of Innovations
The effect of this mechanism on the specialization patterns is mostly driven by the rise in
the matching efficiency of the patent trading market. As analyzed in Section 1.4.5, both
the buyers and sellers get higher matching rates on the market. Higher chances of trading
decrease R&D incentives for potential buyers while increase R&D incentives for potential sellers. Since firms with high production ability benefit more from buying patents on
the market, the force that decreases R&D intensity dominates. Firms with low production
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Prod. Scope
-

R&D(H)
-

R&D(L)
+

Patent Trade
+

Growth
+

Patent Market (ϕ, θ)
Efficiency (ϕ)
Bargaining Power (θ)

25%
26%
-8%

232%
220%
11%

58%
15%
37%

90%
100%
-6%

221%
151%
45%

Tax Credit (σ)

7%

-265%

12%

-8%

137%

Production Cost (µ, ι)

63%

287%

25%

3%

-180%

Rare Good Ideas (γ, ρ)

43%

-273%

-32%

12%

-27%

Data

Table 1.8: Effects of Key Parameters
ability benefit more from selling patents to other firms. Therefore, the force that increases
R&D intensity dominates. The effect of the matching efficiency on production scope also
has two sides. On the one hand, the trading channel makes the scope less critical in determining the value of a firm’s innovation output, so there is a tendency to narrow the scope.
On the other hand, the scope becomes more important if the firm increases R&D intensity
due to the efficiency change. For firms with high production ability, the overall effect is
unambiguous because they decrease R&D intensity. For firms with low production ability,
as it turns out, the former force dominates. The fraction of patents traded is directly linked
to the matching efficiency. Therefore it can be explained to a large extent.
Higher economic growth comes from three sources. First, there are fewer wasted ideas as
innovation output that falls out of its inventor’s scope can be utilized through trading. Second, reduction in firms’ production scope decreases management cost. Third, innovation
activities are reallocated to firms with a comparative advantage.
The contribution of higher bargaining power mainly lies in the increase in the R&D intensity of firms with low production ability. This is consistent with the partial-equilibrium
analysis in Section 1.4.5 that higher transaction prices of patents raise the value of both
in-scope and out-of-scope innovation output and therefore increase R&D incentives. The
slight decrease of R&D intensity of firm with high production ability is mainly due to a
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general-equilibrium effect.

R&D Tax Subsidy
An increase in the R&D tax credit boosts the R&D intensity of both types of firms since the
innovation cost is lower. The effect on firms with high production ability turns out to be
more significant because these firms can better monetize innovation output through their
own production. Higher R&D intensity has a strong positive effect on economic growth.

Changes in Production Cost Structure
Changes in production cost structure can mainly explain the remaining part of the specialization patterns. A higher cost of producing in multiple industries directly shrinks firms’
production scope. Smaller production scope reduces the likelihood of matches between innovation and production, thus disincentivizing firms to do R&D. This explains the decline
in high-type firms’ R&D intensity. The slight increase in low-type firms’ R&D intensity is
mainly due to the general-equilibrium effect. This mechanism alone has minimal effects on
patent trading activities. It negatively affects growth as mismatches between innovation
and production increase, and more inventions are wasted.

Good Ideas are Harder to Find
As innovation becomes more investment intensive, there is a direct decrease in the incentive to do R&D. Then, successful R&D output becomes scarcer and more valuable. So,
firms with higher production ability (the ones that benefit more from R&D output) invest
more in innovation. This predicts a shift of R&D activities to firms good at production,
contradictory to the trend in the 1980s and 1990s. The decrease in firms’ production scope
is mostly driven by a significant decrease in the scope of firms with low production ability.
This is because those firms sharply reduce their R&D effort and get lower benefits from
expanding production scope. The change in the R&D cost function contributes negatively
to growth as idea generation is more costly than before.
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1.5.4

Implications for Growth

Firms’ growth has two engines–own innovation and others’ innovation. The patent trading market changes the relative importance of the two in the two balanced growth paths.
To gauge this change, this study calculates the share of contribution of each engine for
both types of firms. The results are shown in Table 1.9. In the initial balanced growth path,
57.6% of the growth of firms with high production ability comes from utilizing their own
innovations. The share decreased to 31.3% in the ending balanced growth path, implying
that these firms rely more on other firms’ R&D activities through buying patents on the
market. For firms with low production ability, the contribution of their own innovation
decreased slightly from 2.9% to 2.3%. In sum, all firms depended more on the market for
new ideas, especially for large firms.
Decomposition
Own R&D Others’ R&D
Old Eq. (81-85)
High-Type (Large Firms)
Low-Type (Small Firms)
New Eq. (96-00)
High-Type (Large Firms)
Low-Type (Small Firms)

57.6%
2.9%

42.3%
97.1%

31.3%
2.3%

68.7%
97.7%

Table 1.9: Decomposition of Growth

1.6

Discussion and Extension

Quantification of the baseline model shows that increasing tradability of innovations can
explain a sizable share of the decrease in production scope and the reallocation of R&D
activities. However, this new hypothesis may be subject to several challenges. First, the
direction of causality is not clear. It is possible that the more vibrant patent trading activities are the result of narrower production scope of firms, i.e., firms produce in fewer
industries due to changes in the cost structure and then have to depend on the market for
monetizing innovation as it becomes harder to match their innovation output with own
production. Second, the potential mismatch between innovation output and production
38

may not play an important role. Intellectual products may be similar to other goods in the
sense that the production process requires ingredients from other industries. Alleviation
of the incomplete contract problem in the ingredient trading process may also lead to more
transactions and contraction in production scope.
To check whether the new hypothesis holds in front of these challenges, this paper looks at
changes in the targeting behaviors of firms’ R&D activities. If the reverse causality is true, it
should be predicted that R&D becomes more targeted as the firm spans fewer industries. If
there is no mismatch between innovation and production, but only the incomplete contract
problem in the ingredient trading process for new inventions, the targeting behaviors in
the innovation process will experience no change. On the contrary, the new hypothesis in
this study predicts the R&D activities to be less targeted, as the type of R&D that is less
likely to match the firm’s own production benefits more from easier trading of intellectual
properties.

1.6.1

Data Patterns

The targeting behavior of the innovation process can be measured by the expense shares
of different R&D types-basis research, applied research, and development. They differ in
the probability of being applied to a specific production process. In the Survey of Industrial Research and Development (SIRD), basic research is defined as "the activity aimed at
acquiring new knowledge or understanding without specific immediate commercial application or use"; applied research is "the activity aimed at solving a specific problem or
meeting a specific commercial objective"; development is "the systematic use of research
and practical experience to produce new or significantly improved goods, services, or processes". Therefore, basic research has the broadest targets. This study uses the ratio of
basic research expense to basic plus applied research expense and the ratio of basic research expense to total R&D expense as proxies for firms’ targeting behaviors in R&D. A
higher share implies less targeting and broader R&D scope. Figure 1.8 shows the two ra-
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tios over the years24 . They both picked up at the beginning of the 1980s, and the rising
trends continued in the following two decades–the same period when the patent market
grew. The pattern of widening R&D scope in the 1980s and 1990s is also supported by
Akcigit and Ates (2019), in which the authors use the average length of patent claims as a
measurement of the R&D scope. This pattern suggests that the reverse causality and the
ingredient trading theory are insufficient to address the newly found specialization wave
in the knowledge economy.

Figure 1.8: Share of Research Spending

1.6.2

Model Extension

The baseline model is extended to study the impact of the new hypothesis on firms’ targeting behaviors in the innovation process. Now, firms choose the success rates (equivalent
to expense) of two types of research at the innovation stage–(a)pplied and (b)asic research.
The two types of research differ in three dimensions: 1) the scale and elasticity parameters
in the R&D cost function. (i.e., χb ̸= χ a , ρb ̸= ρ a ), 2) the probability of the innovation
output falling inside the firm’s own production scope (i.e., X b (.) ̸= X a (.)), and 3) the step
size of successful inventions coming from basic research and from applied research (i.e.,
24 Only data before 1998 is shown because statistics for 1998 and later years are not directly comparable to
statistics for 1997 and earlier years, according to the statement made by the SIRD.
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γb ̸= γ a ). Each firm is endowed with two units of search effort–one for basic research output and the other for applied research output. The innovation level of a firm is updated in
each period according to the following law of motion,
z′ = z +

∑

j∈{ a,b}

γ j (1( RD∈ω ) + B j )z,
j

(1.29)

where 1( RD∈ω ) is an indicator of whether the firm’s type-j (applied or basic) research outj

put falls inside its production scope.

Bj is an indicator of whether the firm can buy a type-j

(applied or basic) patent that matches its scope.
The new timeline is shown as follows. The following proposition holds. Characterization

1(RDa ∈ω) , 1(RDb ∈ω)

m, z realizes
Choose ω

R&D with i a , ib

z′ realizes

Search ideas

Production

Figure 1.9: Timeline–Extension
and proof of Proposition 2 are presented in Appendix A.2.3.
Proposition 2 (Symmetric Balanced Growth Path). There exists a symmetric balanced growth
path in the extended model.

1.6.3

Quantification of the Extended Model

To quantitatively evaluate the effects of the new hypothesis and the three other mechanisms on firm’s R&D scope, this paper calibrates the newly added parameters, {χ j , ρ j , γ j },
and the two probability functions, X j (.), where j is an indicator of basic or applied research, in the following way. The ratio of the step sizes,

γb
γa ,

is set to be consistent with

Akcigit et al. (2021). The probability functions are estimated by the same method as the
estimation of X (.) in the baseline model, except that the regression is run on two separate
samples–patents from basic research and patents from applied research or development in
the SIRD. The scale parameter of the applied research cost function (χ a ) is normalized to
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be 1. The scale parameter of the basic research cost function (χb ), the step size of applied
research (γ a ), and the two elasticities (ρ a , ρb ) are pinned down together with {ϕ, θ, µ, ι} in
the original calibration. Two additional moments are added–the share of basic research
expense in total R&D expense respectively for firms with high and low production ability. All the other parameters are disciplined by the method used to calibrate the baseline
model, and the decomposition method is the same as before. A more detailed description
of the calibration process and performance is shown in Appendix A.3.2.
Basic R
+

Prod. Scope
-

R&D(H)
-

R&D(L)
+

Patent Trade
+

Growth
+

Patent Market (ϕ, θ)
Efficiency (ϕ)
Bargaining Power (θ)

101%
26%
56%

29%
29%
-6%

205%
194%
7%

55%
10%
39%

93%
102%
-5%

227%
149%
51%

Tax Credit (σ)

32%

7%

-257%

12%

-6%

132%

Production Cost (µ, ι)

−17%

66%

223%

20%

2%

-155%

Rare Good Ideas (γ j , ρ j )

−35%

23%

-168%

-17%

9%

-82%

Data

Table 1.10: Effects of Key Parameters

Table 1.10 presents the explanatory power of the four mechanisms in the targeting behaviors of innovation and the other moments shown in the baseline calibration. As shown
by the first column, increasing tradability of innovations is responsible for all (101%) of
the increase in the share of basic research. The R&D tax credit also contributes to part
of the increase. In contrast, changes in production cost structure make innovation more
targeted. The reason is that when firms span fewer industries due to higher fixed costs,
they also narrow R&D scope to improve matching between innovation and production.
The increasing difficulty to find good ideas also leads to a contraction in R&D scope. The
impacts of the mechanisms on other moments are very similar to the results in the baseline
model, confirming the robustness of the previous conclusions.
In sum, the rise in the share of basic research spending provides evidence of the impor-
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tant role of potential mismatches between innovation and production in explaining the
observed specialization wave.

1.7

Empirical Analysis

This section empirically tests whether there is causality from the pro-patent reform to US
firms’ shrinkage of production scope. The main idea is to exploit the regional and firmlevel differences in the exposure to policy changes and check whether they lead to different
extents of the drop in scope. Two policies are used in the empirical analysis. 1) The establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982. 2) Extension of
patentability to genetic engineering and software in 1980 and 1981. More details about
these policies and the empirical strategy will be unfolded, then the results will follow.

1.7.1

Institutional Background

The US federal court system has three main layers: district courts, circuit courts, and the
Supreme Court of the United States. All patent-related cases are heard initially at one of
the ninety-four district courts across the country. If there are challenges to the decisions,
the case can be appealed to one of the circuit courts. Since the Supreme Court rarely hears
patent-related cases, the circuit courts usually have the final say on those cases.
Before 1982, twelve circuit courts divided the country into different regions. Attitudes towards patents in the circuit courts had a significant discrepancy. Therefore, decisions of
district courts under different circuit courts varied much in the first place. The second
column of Table 1.11 shows the fraction of lawsuits invalidating the involved patents in
district courts of different regions from 1940 to before 1982. The legal environment towards patents was stable in this period. For example, the Third Circuit is headquartered
in Philadelphia and has appellate jurisdiction over district courts in Delaware, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania. On average, 74% of the cases heard at these district courts invalidated
the patents, suggesting weak protection towards patent holders in the region. In contrast,
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district courts under the Tenth Circuit Court located in Denver had an average of 27%
invalidation rates, implying the patent protection was stronger in this region.
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). It has nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals involving patent laws. So, decisions of district courts
can be appealed to not only the twelve regional circuit courts but also the CAFC. The CAFC
held a more positive view towards patents and had a much lower invalidation rate in its
final decisions. Therefore, the decisions of district courts became lower and more uniform
across different regions in the first place, as shown in the third column of Table 1.11.
Circuit Court
Boston
New York
Philadelphia
Richmond
New Orleans
Cincinnati
Chicago
St.Louis
San Francisco
Denver
Atlanta
DC

Invalidation rate
Before After
0.64
0.18
0.58
0.28
0.74
0.32
0.47
0.26
0.36
0.20
0.60
0.30
0.54
0.30
0.49
0.33
0.51
0.29
0.27
0.22
0.41
0.28
0.59
−25

Table 1.11: Patent Invalidation Rates in District Courts under Different Circuit Courts
The establishment of the CAFC was exogenous to the district courts and resulted in stronger
protection of patents, as shown in Figure 1.4 in Section 3.1. More importantly, the impact
on the decisions of district courts varied across regions. Regions that had a higher patent
invalidation rate before 1982 were affected more strongly by the CAFC. Although there are
forum shopping behaviors, firms are more likely to bring their lawsuits to the district court
that is in charge of the area in which they are located due to home-field advantage (Moore
(2001)). Therefore, the regional differences in the change of patent protection in courts can
be transmitted to firms located in different regions. If patent protection is one of the causes
of the contraction in production scope, then it is predicted that firms in regions with higher
25 The

circuit court of DC has too few observations after the CAFC era.
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invalidation rates before 1982 experienced a larger decrease in production scope.
Precedents of court decisions in patent-related legal disputes often determine the patentability of similar objects afterward. Genetic engineering and software are two of the most
controversial fields of patentability in the 70s. In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled in the
case between Diamond and Chakrabarty that genetically engineered bacteria involved in
the case could be patented. This ruling was viewed as a turning point for the biotechnology industry in the following decades. In 1981, the decision of the Supreme Court in the
dispute between Diamond and Diehr that software was not precluded from patentability also had a profound impact on court decisions afterward. These two landmark cases
happened just before the establishment of the CAFC, making these two used-to-be controversial fields experience the most reduction of inconsistency among different regions.
This leads to another dimension of difference in firms’ exposure to policy shocks. Firms
with a higher share of production in these two fields were more likely to be affected by
the increasing uniformity of court decisions. It is predicted that the establishment of the
CAFC led to a more significant shrinkage of production scope for these firms.

1.7.2

Estimation Strategy

The following Difference-in-Difference (DiD) regression explores whether regional differences in the change of patent protection led to different extents of contraction in firms’
production scope,

ln(indist ) =αi + β ∗ invalc,pre ∗ postt + γXist + µt + ϵist ,

(1.30)

where the dependent variable, indist , is the number of 6-digit NAICS industries of the firm
i in the LBD. s is the state of its headquarters before the year of the CAFC establishment.
The headquarter is measured by the state where the firm has the most employment. t is the
year of the observation. The main explanatory variable is an interaction between invalc,pre ,
the patent invalidation rate of the circuit court, c, that the state, s, belongs to prior to
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the CAFC era, and a dummy variable, postt , that indicates whether the year is before or
after the establishment of the CAFC. The control variables, Xist , include the log of firm’s
employment, the effective federal and state corporate income tax rates, and R&D tax credit
rates calculated by Wilson (2009), and the log of state-level real GDP. Firm-fixed effects,
αi , and year-fixed effects, µt , are also included in the regression to exclude permanent
cross-firm and time differences. The coefficient of interest, β, captures the relationship
between the differential changes in firms’ production scope and the differential changes in
the strength of patent protection across regions.
Firm-level differences add another dimension of difference in the exposure to patent protection. The following Triple-Difference (DDD) regression tests whether firms with a higher
exposure decreased production scope more,
ln(indist ) =αi + β 1 ∗ high_treati ∗ invalc,pre ∗ postt + β 2 ∗ invalc,pre ∗ postt +

(1.31)

β 3 ∗ high_treati ∗ postt + γXist + µt + ϵist ,
where high_treati is the firm’s share of employment in the NAICS code 541710 (Research
and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences)26 and 511210 (Software
Publishers) prior to the CAFC. The rest of the variables are the same as defined earlier.
The other interaction terms are omitted in the fixed effects. β 1 captures the differential
impact of the change in patent protection for firms in the most controversial industries
versus others; β 2 shows whether the influence of the CAFC only concentrates on the two
industries or stretches to more general industries.
The standard errors are clustered at the circuit court region by the post dummy level in
both specifications.
26 Bioengeering

is embodied in this code.
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1.7.3

Sample Description

The sample of the regression analysis is the innovating firms in the LBD that existed before
or in 1982, the year of the establishment of the CAFC. The requirement of existence before
the reform is to avoid endogeneity issues induced by changes of firms’ headquarters due
to the policy change. The sample period is from 1976 to 1989, 7 years before and after the
reform.27 Summary statistics of the main variables are presented in Table 1.12.28

Sample
Observations
Number of Industries
Employment
Emp. Share (Highly Treated)
Pre-CAFC Invalidation Rate
Real GDP
Effective Federal Tax Rate
Effective State Tax Rate
Federal R&D Tax Credits
State R&D Tax Credits

All
268000
3.066
1187
0.02101
0.5375
144000
0.4105
0.07406
0.01443
0.000607

Mean
Post=0
131000
3.074
1187
0.01987
0.5381
127200
0.4335
0.07325
0.004603
0.000175

Post=1
136000
3.058
1187
0.0221
0.5369
160200
0.3883
0.07484
0.02388
0.001023

Standard Deviation
All
Post=0
Post=1
268000
131000
136000
6.722
6.952
6.494
9670
10780
8467
0.1337
0.129
0.138
0.1082
0.1082
0.1083
115000
95460
129100
0.0434
0.01645
0.04934
0.02676
0.0279
0.02558
0.01145 0.007372 0.004747
0.003604 0.002553 0.004343

Table 1.12: Summary Statistics of the Regression Sample
The number of industries per firm experiences a decrease before (Post=0) and after (Post=1)
the CAFC, while the average employment remains at nearly the same level. The average
share of employment in the two highly treated industries is around 2%. The average invalidation rate across different regions is 53.75%.29 There is a drop in the federal corporate
income tax rate and a rise in both the federal and state-level R&D tax credits.

1.7.4

Regression Results

The regression results of Equation 1.30 that exploits regional differences in the change of
patent invalidation rates are displayed in Table 1.13. The first two columns insert the post
27 1976 is the earliest year of the LBD, so the longest period this study can explore before the establishment
of the CAFC is seven years. This study also runs the same regressions on the samples of six years and five
years before and after the reform. The results are very similar.
28 The number of observations is rounded to the nearest 1000 to comply with the disclosure requirement of
the Census Bureau.
29 There is very little change in this rate before and after the CAFC because both of them are at the pre-CAFC
level.
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dummy in the regression instead of the year-fixed effects; the last two columns control the
year-fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) control the state-level characteristics compared to
columns (1) and (3). In all of the columns, there are negative and significant coefficients of
the interaction term, implying that firms located in regions with a larger change in patent
protection strength experience a larger drop in production scope. The magnitude of this
coefficient is quite stable across the columns with different control variables.
Dependent Variable

Ln(Number of Industries)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Invalidation Rate*Post
-0.0326** -0.0332**
-0.0281**
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.013)
Ln(Employment)
0.0899*** 0.0893***
0.0894***
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Post
0.0218***
(0.007)
Ln(Real GDP)
-0.00487
-0.0332**
(0.012)
(0.014)
Effective Federal Tax Rate
0.272***
-1.462***
(0.036)
(0.508)
Effective State Tax Rate
0.234*
-0.689**
(0.132)
(0.278)
Federal R&D Tax Credits
0.532***
-10.27**
(0.137)
(3.697)
State R&D Tax Credits
-0.068
-0.0807
(0.141)
(0.127)
Year-fixed Effects
NO
NO
YES
YES
Firm-fixed Effects
YES
YES
YES
YES
Observations
268000
268000
268000
268000
R-squared
0.944
0.944
0.944
0.944
Standard errors are clustered in the circuit court region by the post dummy
level, shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1)
-0.0326**
(0.014)
0.0888***
(0.007)
0.0196**
(0.008)

Table 1.13: DiD Regression Results

Estimation of Equation 1.31 that includes firm-level differences in exposure to the policy
change is displayed in Table 1.14. Again, The first two columns insert the post dummy in
the regression instead of the year-fixed effects; the last two columns control the year-fixed
effects. Columns (2) and (4) control the state-level characteristics compared to columns (1)
and (3). The negative and significant coefficient of the triple interaction term suggests that
firms in the highly treated industries (bioengineering and software) are more affected by

48

the establishment of the CAFC. It is worth noticing that the coefficient of the interaction
term between the invalidation rate and the post dummy is still significantly negative, although the absolute magnitude is slightly lower than in Table 1.13. This shows that the
impact of the CAFC is not concentrated in only the two highly treated industries but instead covers more general industries.
Dependent Variable

Ln(Number of Industries)
(2)
(3)
(4)
High_treat*Invalidation Rate*Post
-0.132*
-0.132*
-0.128*
(0.069)
(0.069)
(0.069)
Invalidation Rate*Post
-0.0301** -0.0307**
-0.0257*
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.013)
High_treat*Post
0.0833*
0.0833**
0.0829*
(0.041)
(0.040)
(0.040)
Ln(Employment)
0.0899*** 0.0893*** 0.0894***
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Post
0.0202***
(0.007)
Ln(Real GDP)
-0.00514
-0.0337**
(0.012)
(0.014)
Effective Federal Tax Rate
0.271***
-1.464***
(0.037)
(0.509)
Effective State Tax Rate
0.235*
-0.688**
(0.132)
(0.279)
Federal R&D Tax Credits
0.534***
-10.35**
(0.136)
(3.697)
State R&D Tax Credits
-0.0677
-0.0808
(0.142)
(0.128)
Year-fixed Effects
NO
NO
YES
YES
Firm-fixed Effects
YES
YES
YES
YES
Observations
268000
268000
268000
268000
R-squared
0.944
0.944
0.944
0.944
Standard errors are clustered in the circuit court region by the post dummy level,
shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1)
-0.134*
(0.069)
-0.0301**
(0.014)
0.0840**
(0.040)
0.0888***
(0.007)
0.0180**
(0.008)

Table 1.14: DDD Regression Results

1.7.5

Placebo Tests

It is possible that the differential changes in the number of industries across regions and
firms are due to some pre-trends instead of the policy impact. To check whether there are
pre-existing trends, this study runs the same regressions in Equation 1.30 and 1.31 on the
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pre-CAFC sample (1976-1982). All variables are defined as the same as before, except the
post dummy. Now, the post dummy equals zero if the observation year is before or in
1979; equals one if after 1979.30 If there are pre-trends, β in Equation 1.30 and β 1 and β 2 in
Equation 1.31 should still be significantly negative. However, as shown in Table A.5 and
Table A.6 in the Appendix, they are either positive or tiny in absolute magnitude. None of
them is significant, showing that the differential changes in production scope are not due to
pre-existing trends. Therefore, the empirical results in this section can be viewed as proof
for causality from stronger protection of intellectual property rights to firms’ shrinkage of
production scope.

1.8

Conclusion

This study finds novel patterns of firm specialization in the US Census data that started
in the early 1980s and ended in the late 1990s. 1) Firms narrowed down their production
scope. This phenomenon was more pronounced for innovating firms. 2) Small firms increased R&D intensity while large firms decreased it. The same period also witnessed a
growing patent trading market after a series of pro-patent policy reforms that strengthened
the protection of intellectual property rights.
A new hypothesis is proposed to explain the observed phenomena–increasing tradability
of intellectual properties makes production scope less critical in determining the value of
a firm’s innovation output. An endogenous growth model is developed to examine the
roles of the new hypothesis and three other possible explanations–the increase in R&D tax
credit, changes in production cost structure, and rising scarcity of good ideas. The developed model is calibrated to small and large firms’ production scope and innovation intensity, the fraction of patents traded, and the economic growth rate. Four major conclusions
can be drawn from the quantitative results. First, increasing tradability of innovations
accounts for at least 25% of the production scope decrease; 58% of the reallocation of in30 This

study also tries other ways of segmenting the pre-CAFC sample. The results are similar.

50

novation activities. Second, the remaining part of specialization is mostly due to changes
in the production cost structure. Third, increasing tradability of innovations leads to a
0.64 percent point increase in growth rates, which makes it a primary driving force of the
economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Fourth, large firms’ growth relies more on R&D
activities of other firms.
This paper also finds in the data that the R&D activities of US firms became less targeted in
the 1980s and 1990s. The baseline model is then extended to include two types of research
that differ in the probability of matching the inventor’s production scope. Quantitative
results of the extended model show increasing tradability of innovations can explain 101%
of the decrease in the R&D targeting behavior.
Using the regional and firm-level differences in the exposure to patent policy changes in
the early 1980s, this paper provides empirical support for causality from patent protection
to contraction in firms’ production scope.
The findings of this paper suggest that innovation and production become more separate
when protection towards intellectual property rights is stronger. Firms with high production ability used to be also innovation-intensive. Now, innovation activities depend less
on the production side. A potential extension is to allow firms to endogenously choose
their production ability at some costs. Mirroring the result that firms with high production
ability choose to do less innovation, it is predicted that firms with high innovation levels
will spend fewer resources in improving their production ability. This may provide a new
explanation for the phenomenon found in Pugsley et al. (2019) that high-growth startups
("gazelles") have grown less rapidly in size since the mid-1980s.
An important policy implication of this paper is that strengthening intellectual property
rights protection has an impact that is often neglected–reducing mismatches between innovation and production through a market approach. This approach provides a strong
engine for economic growth, as evidenced by the pro-patent reform adopted by the US
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government to deal with global competition in the 1970s. Therefore, increasing patent
protection can be viewed as a potential policy tool to boost the economy in the future.
An increasing amount of literature tries to explain the slowdown in the US business dynamism after the 2000s. Although this paper focuses on the 1980s and 1990s, it may
provide some possible explanations for what happened in the 2000s. First, the counterbalancing patent policies in the 2000s may have stifled the trading of innovation output
between firms. This is partly evidenced by the findings in Akcigit and Ates (2021) and
Olmstead-Rumsey (2019) that knowledge diffusion slowed down in the 2000s. Second, the
monopoly power of big buyers and big sellers on the patent market may also have grown
when the patent protection became stronger. Since firms depended more on the market for
innovation in the early 2000s compared to the early 1980s, the increasing monopoly power
may be more harmful to economic growth. It will be interesting to include market power
in the analysis and study the optimal strength of patent protection.
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CHAPTER 2
‘Y OU W ILL :’ A M ACROECONOMIC A NALYSIS OF D IGITAL A DVERTISING
This chapter is based on joint work with Jeremy Greenwood from the University of Pennsylvania and Mehmet Yorukoglu from Koc University published in Jeremy Greenwood,
Yueyuan Ma, and Mehmet Yorukoglu. ‘You will:’ a macroeconomic analysis of digital
advertising. Available at National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021 (Greenwood et al.
(2021)). I contribute to part of the model construction and most of the quantitative analysis.

2.1
2.1.1

Introduction
The Question

Free media goods are everywhere. Think about Facebook, Google, Google Maps, Pandora, Twitter, Wikipedia, YouTube, and apps for dating, dieting, exercising, playing guitar,
meditation, inter alia. Often these products are financed through advertising or the sale
of marketing information for advertising purposes. Digital advertising has two benefits.
First, digital advertising costs less than traditional advertising. Second, it can be targeted
better to consumers who might actually purchase the product. As a result it might spur
competition among firms resulting in lower prices. As with traditional advertising, digital
advertising provides free goods. It does so in spades. Since media goods are not sold,
they do not directly show up in the national income accounts. Additionally, advertising
expenditure is deducted off of firms’ profits and consequently does not show up as a final expenditure in the national income accounts in the same way as physical investment
spending does. Also, even if GDP is adjusted for such things, GDP and welfare are not the
same thing; think about the welfare benefit of vaccines versus their cost.
To address this question a modernized variant of Butters’s information-based advertising
model is used (Butters (1977)). New theoretical results are presented. Quantitative analysis of the prototype model is undertaken to illustrate its real world potential. Numerical
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analysis is also used to explore properties of the model that can’t be analyzed analytically.
Since the prototype model’s structure is simple, and the facts drawn upon to illuminate
the framework are limited, this is somewhat an exercise in theory ahead of measurement.
Significant hot rodding has to be done to bring Butters (1977) framework up to speed for
the task at hand. First, the framework is modified to allow for both digital and traditional
advertising. Both types of advertising permit firms to convey information about products
and prices to consumers, as in Butters (1977). Firms choose how much digital and traditional advertising to do. This decision depends on the relative cost effectiveness of these
two information delivery mechanisms. Second, advertising is associated with the provision of free media goods. To incorporate the free provision of media goods, and distinct
from Butters (1977), a fully-fledged consumer sector is added. Consumers choose which
varieties of goods to consume, based on the advertised prices they receive, and how much
leisure to enjoy. Free media goods are taken to complement leisure in utility, in the sense
of Edgeworth and Pareto. Third, consumers differ by their income, while in Butters (1977)
they are all the same. Unlike Butters (1977), the maximum prices that consumers are willing to pay are endogenously determined as a function of the economic environment. These
prices change as the economy evolves. A competitive equilibrium with digital and traditional advertising is characterized. As in Butters (1977), a distribution of prices emerges
for a given product. This distribution differs from Butters (1977) due both to differences in
consumers’ incomes and the endogeneity of choke prices.
The resulting competitive equilibrium is not efficient, unlike Butters (1977), for two reasons. To start off with, free media goods are underprovided. Additionally, both digital and
traditional adverts are sent to individuals who can’t afford to buy the good at the advertised price. This wastes resources. The second-best tax-cum-subsidy policy that overcomes
these inefficiencies in an informationally-constrained world is fully characterized. A version of the model is also considered where advertising can be directed toward only those
customers who may buy the product. This is another advantage of digital advertising.
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Once again, the free media goods distributed with advertising are underprovided.
The developed model is calibrated using data on price markups, the ratio of advertising
expenses to consumption expenditure, the ratio of spending on digital relative to traditional advertising, the click-through rate for digital advertising, the college premium, and
the time spent on leisure by non-college- and college-educated individuals. This is something Butters (1977) could not have done at the time of his research. The welfare gain
from the introduction of digital advertising is computed. In the baseline setting the difference between digital and traditional advertising lies in the former’s cost advantage and the
amount of free media goods delivered. A hybrid model is presented later where digital advertising is directed and traditional advertising undirected. In both settings the provision
of free media goods boosts consumer welfare significantly. It also leads to more leisure,
since media goods and leisure are complements in utility. The increase in leisure is more
pronounced for the non-college educated vis à vis the college educated. The gain in utility
from the rise in leisure is largely offset by a decline in regular consumption because people
earn less now. The analysis suggests that affluent consumers may finance a disproportionately large share of the cost of media goods because they purchase goods at higher prices.
Yet, the move toward digital advertising may benefit affluent consumers more because it
stimulates price competition at the higher price end of the goods market relative to the
lower end.

2.1.2

The Rise of Digital Advertising

Advertising has been around for eons. Babylonian merchants employed barkers who advertised their wares by shouting out. The Romans used signage outside of stores to sell
wares; a bush signified a wine shop. Painted notices on the walls of bathhouses in Pompeii
told of upcoming exhibitions. Marshall (1920) (p. 271) noted that “A single prominent position in a great thoroughfare promotes the sale of many various things.” After the arrival
of the printing press came newspapers and then magazines. Benjamin Franklin published
advertisements in his newspaper, the Pennsylvania Gazette. He is credited with publishing
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in 1741 the first magazine ad in the United States in the short-lived The General Magazine
and Historical Chronicle, for all the British Plantations in America.
Advertising became an industry in the 19th century. N.W. Ayer & Son was founded in
Philadelphia in 1869. It sold complete advertising campaigns for businesses. It is credited
with slogans such as “A diamond is forever” used by De Beers. A typical early 20th century
magazine ad is displayed in Figure 2.1. Direct mail advertising started in 1872 with Aaron
Montgomery Ward who launched a one page catalog, which was quickly followed by the
Sears Catalog.

Figure 2.1: A 1919 toothpaste ad in the Saturday Evening Post magazine for S.S. White
Dental Manufacturing Co. Source: Ad*Access, Duke Digital Repository.
Things changed rapidly in the 20th century with the advent of new technologies. Radio
advertising started in the 1920s. In 1922 the first paid radio ad ran in New York City
to promote the sale of apartments. It cost $50 for 50 minutes of airtime. The first paid
television ad was for Bulova watches. It was broadcast in 1941 before a baseball game
between the Brooklyn Dodgers and Philadelphia Phillies. Television advertising expanded
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with the introduction of cable tv in the 1950s. MTV introduced music videos that were
really just commercials for music artists. Additionally, channels were started that were
devoted to advertising, such as HSN and QVC.
The information age began in the 1970s. A descendent of direct mail advertising is email
marketing. This started in 1978 with an ad sent by Digital Equipment Corporation via the
Arpanet to 400 DEC computer users. It didn’t really take off until the 1990s when many
people started to use the internet through outlets such as Microsoft’s Hotmail that offered
free email starting in 1996. Last, online advertising started in the 1990s. The first clickable
ad was on Hotwired.com in 1994, then the online version of Wired magazine–see Figure 2.2.
It was part of AT&T’s “You will” campaign that prognosticated about the future in the
information age. The ad enjoyed a click-through rate of 44 percent and cost AT&T $30,000
for three months.

Figure 2.2: The first clickable ad, part of AT&T’s “You Will” campaign. Source: The Atlantic,
2017.
The composition of advertising spending changed as new vehicles for delivering ads cropped
up, as Figure 2.3 shows. Ads in newspapers and magazines declined with the arrival of
TV. Digital advertising rose with the advent of the information age. It’s interesting to note
that advertising’s share of GDP has remained roughly constant in the postwar period at
around 2 percent.
Online advertising is dominated by two giants, Facebook and Google. Google was founded
in 1998 and Facebook in 2004. The ad revenue earned by these two companies (and Amazon) is shown in Figure 2.4 (right panel). Google’s ad revenue shot up from around $70
million in 2001 to $135 billion in 2019. Likewise, Facebook’s ascent is equally dramatic,
rising from roughly $2 to $70 billion between 2010 and 2019. The first search engine was
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Figure 2.3: Advertising in the United States, 1935-2019. Advertising has consistently
amounted to approximately 2 percent of GDP. Its composition has seen dramatic changes;
however, as new mediums for communicating emerged. Sources: Douglas Galbi and
AdAge.
Archie, created in 1990. Alan Emtage, its creator, developed an indexing technique that allowed Archie to catalogue “freely available or Public Domain documents, images, sounds
and services on the network.” Yahoo! Search was the first popular search engine, arriving
in 1995. The next decade saw the rise of Google Search, which yielded better search results
using an iterative algorithm that ranked web pages on the number of websites that linked
to them and the ranking of these websites.
The first social media website is generally attributed to Six Degrees, founded in 1997. The
name was based on the idea that people are linked to each other by six, or fewer, social
connections. People could create profiles and “friend” each other. It had around 3.5 million
users at its pinnacle. Things took off with the creation of MySpace in 2003. Between 2005
and 2008 it was the largest social media site in the world with over 100 million users per
month. After 2008 Facebook dominated the social media world. Facebook had 2.5 billion
monthly users in 2019.
A breakdown of online advertising revenue by format is also displayed in Figure 2.4 (left
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panel). Online search is the dominant vehicle for digital advertising, followed by social
media. Google inserts online ads into its products, such as Google Search, using a payper-click pricing model. The search advertising cost per click was $0.69 in 2019. Google
Search handled 5.4 billion search requests per day in 2019. Moving up from the third to
the second position displayed by Google Search’s results leads to a 31 percent increase in
traffic. Advertisers pay for location. Apparently, only 0.78 percent of Google users make
it to the second page of search results. The return on various mediums of advertising is
presented in Figure 2.5, right panel. Digital search has the highest return in terms of sales
per dollar spent on advertising. The left panel illustrates that spending by advertisers
closely tracks the amount of time that consumers spend on the mediums.

Figure 2.4: Right panel, ad revenue earned by Amazon, Facebook, and Google, 2001-2019.
Left panel, distribution of U.S. online advertising revenue by format, 2017 and 2018. Source:
statista.
A lot of digital content is provided for free via advertising. Think about the free goods just
from Google: Chrome, Google Search, Google Maps, Gmail, Google Drive, YouTube, etc.
Figure 2.6 shows the number of apps available in Google Play Store. In 2019 this was a
whopping 2.8 million. Interestingly, consumers spend little for these products. Less than
14 percent of Google users spent more than $10 per digital media in the Google Play Store,
as the left panel illustrates.

59

Figure 2.5: Right panel, the return per dollar of advertising by medium in the United States
for 2017, measured as a cash multiple, 2001-2019. Left panel, U.S. advertising spending vs
time spent by consumers by medium, 2018. Source: statista.

2.2

A Brief Review of the Advertising Literature

Advertising has been part and parcel of economic life for a long period of time, as Figure
2.3 suggests. Until the second part of the twentieth century, however, economists paid
little attention to advertising. The economic analysis of advertising can be traced back to
insightful work by Marshall (1920). This subject area has flourished since then.31
At a time when competitive equilibrium and full information were the fundamentals of
economic thinking, economists struggled with the question of why consumers would respond to advertising. Two views emerged. The first one holds that advertising is persuasive, altering consumers’ tastes and creating brand loyalty. Not surprisingly, according to
the persuasive view, advertising has no real value to consumers. It can have important
anti-competitive effects, resulting in increased economic concentration. Marshall (1920)
(p. 304 and 306) noted that “much of the modern expenditure on advertising is not constructive, but combative,” and that “advertisements which are mainly combative generally
involve social waste.”
The second view holds that advertising is informative. According to this perspective, mar31 Bagwell

(2007) provides a detailed survey of the literature, so only a capsule summary is given here.
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Figure 2.6: Right panel, applications in the Google Play Store, 2009-2019. Left panel, money
spent by U.S. consumers on Google digital media products in 2017, presented in cumulative distribution form. Source: statista.
kets are characterized by imperfect consumer information that leads to inefficiencies. Here,
rather than being a problem, advertising emerges as a remedy offered by the market.
Clearly, according to the informative view, advertising promotes competition. Marshall
(1920) (p. 305) also thought that advertising could be constructive by “the assistance,
which they afford to customers by enabling them to satisfy their wants without inordinate
fatigue or loss of time, would be appropriate, even if the business were not in strong rivalry
with others.” He noted that “exceptionally constructive are all those measures needed for
explaining to people generally the claims of some new thing, which is capable of supplying
a great but latent want.”
In the approach taken here advertising is informative. The foundation of the informative
view of advertising was laid by Ozga (1960) and Stigler (1961). They saw price dispersion
as a reflection of consumer ignorance and advertising as a valuable source of information
for consumers that results in a reduction in price dispersion. Telser (1964) significantly
advanced the theoretical and empirical foundations for the informative view, concluding
that advertising is a sign of competition and is an important source of information for the
consumers. Following these lines, Butters (1977) offered the first equilibrium analysis of
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advertising in a multi-firm model. He showed that advertising in equilibrium is efficient.
Stegeman (1991) extended Butters (1977) work with the assumption that consumers’ valuations of products are heterogeneous. He demonstrated that informative advertising is
then inefficient.32
Extending Butters (1977) model to an economy where firms have differing levels of productivity, Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu (2008) studied how improvements in advertising technology affect industry equilibrium. In related work, Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu (2012) analyzed how advertising technology affects firm dynamics. They showed that entry, exit,
and volatility in firm size and value, increase as advertising technology improves. The
equilibria in both models are efficient. Along the same lines, Gourio and Rudanko (2014)
studied the role in firm and industry dynamics that the customer acquisition process has
through marketing.
Incorporating advertising into macroeconomic frameworks is relatively new. Using a
macroeconomic model, Hall (2014) argued that the cyclical behavior of advertising provides revealing information about the behavior of macroeconomic wedges over the cycle. In more recent work, Perla (2019) builds a model where consumers learn about firms
slowly through a network of connections between consumers and firms that endogenously
evolves through the life cycle of an industry. The implications of advertising for firm dynamics and economic growth through its interaction with R&D investment at the firm level
are analyzed by Cavenaile and Roldan (2019). They provide empirical evidence supporting substitution between advertising and R&D using exogenous changes in the tax treatment of R&D expenditures across U.S. states.Rachel (2021) argues that the rise of leisure
goods provided by advertising has an adverse impact on welfare. As leisure rises the
amount of labor going into R&D declines. This stifles growth. Both Cavenaile and Roldan
32 Digital advertising was not around at the time of Stegeman (1991) paper. Like Butters (1977), he did not
have a fully fleshed-out consumer sector, which wasn’t needed for their analyses. The latter is important for
the current inquiry for two reasons. First, consumer behavior changes as the economy evolves due to technological progress in advertising and, second, tastes need to be specified for the welfare analysis. Additionally,
Stegeman (1991) did not present the optimal tax-cum-subsidy policy that renders the advertising economy
efficient. Last, he did not take the model to data; calibration was in its infancy at the time of his research.
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(2019) and Rachel (2021) take a branding approach to advertising, as opposed to the information approach here. Advertising benefits firms by either influencing consumer tastes or
as a direct input into production. It operates by allowing a firm to get a leg up on a competitors, so it has the counterproductive element to it in the flavor of Marshall (1920). In
neither paper is there digital-specific technological progress in advertising or heterogenous
consumer types. Last, Dinlersoz et al. (2021) incorporate the interaction between advertising and trademarks in a macroeconomic model to study the impact of trademarking on
product quality, the reallocation of resources across firms, and welfare.

2.3

Setup

The analysis starts with the case of undirected advertising and then turns to directed advertising.33 The modifications required to the setup to analyze directed advertising are
minimal. To this end, consider an economy with three types of goods; namely, generic
consumption goods, media leisure goods, and leisure. At most a unit measure of varieties
of regular consumption goods can be produced. There is free entry into the production of
each variety of regular goods, i ∈ [0, 1], subject to incurring a fixed cost of r. To sell its
product a regular goods producer must advertise to potential customers, which is costly.
Advertising can be done in two ways. The first way is through traditional advertising.
The second way is via modern online advertising. A potential customer receives ads for
a variety in a random manner. A producer of regular good i is free to set the price, pi ,
that it wants. This can differ across variety-i producers because consumers will vary in the
advertised prices that they randomly received in their information sets.
Ads are delivered via media goods, which are provided to consumers for free. There are m
33 The

setup is static. Adding dynamics would greatly complicate things–see for instance Dinlersoz et al.
(2021). Clean theoretical results would be difficult to obtain. The static setup is probably not much of a
drawback for the question at hand, however, since issues such as the entry of new products and growth are
abstracted from. For new products the buildup of information over time might be important. The rise of
digital advertising has been very rapid, implying that any transitional dynamics would need to operate at a
fast clip. Also, the depreciation rate on advertising is high, somewhere between 30 and 50 percent, so treating
it as a flow rather than a stock is not a great violation for the question entered here.
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media goods available. Media goods have a click-through rate that represents the number
of ads that the good will deliver. The supply of media goods, m, is determined by the
amount of advertising that firms want to do. The cost of providing these goods is absorbed
as an advertising expense.
Turn now to the consumer/worker. Regular good-i must be consumed in the discrete
quantity ci ∈ {0, 1}. An individual might not consume the full spectrum of regular goods
because either they didn’t receive an ad for a good or because they couldn’t afford them at
the advertised price. Media leisure good-j is consumed in the discrete quantity m j ∈ {0, 1}.
Since media leisure goods are free, the consumer will enjoy the full spectrum of what is
currently available. There is a unit mass of people. Each person is indexed by a talent level
τ ∈ {τ, τ }, where τ = 1 < τ. The fractions of the population with τ and τ are denoted
by t and 1 − t. A person with ability level τ = τ is unskilled and earns the wage rate 1. A
skilled person, τ = τ, earns the wage τ, but must incur a fixed education cost, e, in terms
of time. In other words, the wage rate for unskilled labor is the numeraire, which implies
that all goods prices are measured in terms of unskilled labor. An individual has one unit
of time that they can split between working in the market, h, leisure, l, and education, e. As
will be seen, the education cost operates to make the skilled work more than the unskilled,
since the former must recover their investment in human capital.
Preferences are given by

θ ln(

Z v
0

(1 − θ )
ci di ) +
ln[κl ρ + (1 − κ )(
ρ

Z m
0

m j dj)ρ ], with ρ < 0,

(2.1)

where v and m demarcate the set of available regular and media goods. These preferences
are well defined even when particular varieties of consumption goods are not consumed.
Media goods can be mixed with leisure to generate utility; i.e., they are leisure goods. For
example, you must spent time to enjoy an online game. The fact that regular consumption
goods are aggregated linearly is not a undue restriction. Consumption within a variety
is indivisible and hence there is no intensive margin of consumption. The consumer de64

cides whether or not to consume an extra variety, which is a continuous decision. Total
consumption for a person moves smoothly as in the standard macroeconomic model.
The assumption that ρ < 0 implies that leisure, l, and leisure goods, the m j ’s, are EdgeworthPareto complements in utility–in other words, the cross partial in utility is positive. The
idea is that more leisure goods increase the marginal utility of leisure. Therefore, you
will want more leisure at the margin. The notion of leisure complementing goods is in
Greenwood and Vandenbroucke (2005) and Kopecky (2011). Kopecky (2011) suggests the
decline in the price of leisure goods encouraged the elderly to spend a larger fraction of
their life in retirement. Aguiar et al. (2021) use this notion to argue that part of the recent
decline in hours worked by young males is due to the advent of recreational computing.
Kopytov et al. (2020) find that declining recreation good prices can account for much of
the increase in leisure in both the United States and across the world, due to their complementarity with leisure.
Last, the individual’s budget constraint is given by

Z v
0

pi ci di = τh(τ ) ≡



 τ (1 − l − e), skilled;

 1 − l,

(2.2)

unskilled,

where, with some abuse of notation, in this context pi represents the minimum price for
good i that the consumer/worker has in his information set and h(τ ) is the hours worked
by a type-τ person.

2.4

Regular Goods Firms

Firms can freely enter into the production of any variety of regular goods subject to a fixed
cost of r (in units of unskilled labor). Suppose that there are v active varieties of goods
with n firms producing each variety for a total of vn firms in the economy. The quantities v
and n will be determined in equilibrium by the fact that firms must earn zero profits. Any
variety of regular goods can be produced by a firm according to the constant-returns-to65

scale production
o = h/γ,

(2.3)

where o is the output of the good and h is the amount of labor employed. The unit cost of
producing a good is γ.
The constant returns to scale assumption is standard in macroeconomics. Unlike the standard model in macroeconomics, however, the number of firms producing a variety will be
determinate, due to the information friction. In fact, with increasing returns there could be
many firms producing the same variety. On this, even in the current setup average production costs decline with sales due to the presence of the fixed cost. High volume firms will
supply consumers at low prices while low volume ones will sell at higher prices. The fact
that firms can sell at different prices is discussed below. The simple production structure
adopted permits new theoretical results to be obtained, which is important when crossing
uncharted territory.
To sell its product at time price p, a firm must reach out to customers, which involves
advertising.34 Ads are delivered through media goods, which can be distributed through
either a traditional or digital vehicle. Let at and ad represent the number of traditional and
digital ads that are sent out by the firm. To generate at traditional ads a firm must provide
t media goods that each has a click through rate of ζ < 1; i.e.,

at = ζt.

(2.4)

The cost (measured in terms of unskilled labor) for traditional advertising is

A( at ) = ϕaαt = ϕ(ζt)α , with α > 1.

(2.5)

34 This is a key distinction between a Butters-style advertising model and a directed search model. In a
directed search model there is no friction associated with providing consumers information about posted
prices. Additionally, unlike a directed search model, in an advertising model a firm can supply all customers
who want to buy its product. In a directed search model customers queue up to buy a product from a firm with
limited selling capacity. Thus, a customer can only expect to purchase the good with some probability. So, the
friction here concerns the prices that consumers have in their information sets and not whether a consumer
will be able to buy a good from the firm at the posted price.
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Likewise, digital ads are distributed via digital goods provision. A digital good has a
click-through rate of ψ < 1. So, d digital goods will deliver a flow of ads, ad , according to

ad = ψd.

(2.6)

A(qad ) = ϕ(qψd)α ,

(2.7)

The cost of producing ad digital ads is

where q is a technology factor reflecting the cost advantage of digital advertising. As q declines, digital advertising becomes more efficient relative to traditional advertising. Additionally, if digital advertising can directed to consumers who possibly will buy the product,
then this offers a potential advantage over traditional advertising–directed advertising is
turned to in Section 2.12. These cost functions imply that there is decreasing returns in advertising. This is a feature of the data, according to Bagwell (2007). When the click-through
rate is low a lot of free content will have to be provided to achieve a given impact from
advertising. As will be shown in Section 2.10, the click-through rate of digital advertising
is lower than traditional advertising, implying that digital advertising will provide more
free media goods per advertising message noticed by consumers.
Because consumers will differ in the ads that they have in their information sets, firms do
not have to charge the same price. This information friction allows firms to charge a price
higher than its marginal production cost, γ. Let p represent the lowest profitable price in
equilibrium and likewise p denote the maximum profitable one. Now, a firm is free to
charge any price p such that p ≤ p ≤ p. The higher the price, the less likely the firm will
make a sale. The set of viable equilibrium prices, P , is characterized later in Proposition 2.
Since there is free entry into a variety, it must transpire that a firm will earn the same profit
at any price, p ∈ P .
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2.4.1

Advertising

Let S( p) = Pr( SALE | p) be the probability that an ad at price p will generate a sale for the
firm. This probability is exogenous for a firm and is unpacked later. The firm chooses its
advertising strategy to maximize its profits at price p. So, its advertisements solve
Π( p; q) ≡ max{( p − γ)( at + ad )S( p) − A( at ) − A(qad )}.
at ,ad

(2.8)

Here the term p − γ represents the firm’s unit profits (excluding advertising costs) while

( at + ad )S( p) is the firm’s total sales. Its advertising costs are A( at ) + A(qad ). The firstorder conditions for at and ad are

( p − γ)S( p) = ϕαatα−1 and ( p − γ)S( p) = ϕαqα aαd −1 .

(2.9)

The common lefthand side of these expressions is the expected profit (or marginal benefit)
from sending out an extra ad. The righthand sides represent the marginal costs of an extra
traditional or digital ad. Clearly, the marginal cost of digital advertising increases with its
cost factor, q.
Proposition 1. (Advertising) All firms do the same amount of traditional, at , and digital advertising, ad , even when charging different prices for their products, p ∈ P . Digital advertising decreases
with its cost factor, q.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.1.
To understand the logic underlying the proposition, note that in equilibrium a firm is free
to pick any price it desires. So, expected unit profits, ( p − γ)S( p), must be constant across
equilibrium prices. Suppose not. Then firms with higher values for ( p − γ)S( p) would
make more than firms with lower values because the former could always do the same
amount of advertising as the latter.
If the marginal benefit is constant across prices, then from (2.9) so must be the marginal
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costs. This implies that at and ad are invariant across prices, p. Finally, from the above
first-order conditions for at and ad , it is immediate that

at = [

( p − γ)S( p) 1/(α−1)
( p − γ)S( p) 1/(α−1)
]
and ad = [
]
= qα/(1−α) at ,
αϕ
qα αϕ

(2.10)

or equivalently

at = [

( p − γ)S( p) 1/(α−1)
( p − γ)S( p) 1/(α−1)
]
and ad = [
]
,
αϕ
qα αϕ

(2.11)

where the second line follows from the proposition. If there are n firms producing each
variety, then the total number of adverts per variety, a, is
a = n( at + ad ) = n(1 + qα/(1−α) )[

2.5
2.5.1

( p − γ)S( p) 1/(α−1)
]
.
αϕ

(2.12)

Pricing
Advertised Price Distribution

Consumers receive ads randomly, without any targeting by firms–targeting is discussed
in Section 2.12. Assume that there is a much larger mass of consumers vis à vis firms
and that no consumer receives more than one ad from the same firm. Let a represent the
number of ads for a variety per consumer in the economy. The number of ads, i, that a
consumer receives will be distributed according to a Poisson distribution e−a ai /i!.35 Now,
35 To see this, imagine an economy with a discrete number of consumers, c, who are flooded with

ac ads per
variety. The probability that a consumer will receive i ads is distributed according to the binomial distribution

(

1
1
ac
)( )i (1 − ) ac−i ,
i
c
c

(2.13)

where 1/c is the chance that a consumer gets an ad (success) and 1 − 1/c are the odds that they won’t (failure).
ac
Out of a set of ac ads there are (
) ways each event could happen. Finally,
i
lim (

c→ ∞

1
1
ac
)( )i (1 − ) ac−i = e−a ai /i!.
i
c
c
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(2.14)

let P( p) = Pr( PRICE ≤ p) be the fraction of ads for a variety that have a price less than or
equal to p. The function P( p) is characterized later in Proposition 3.
Suppose a firm sends an ad to a consumer offering to sell the good at price p. The odds of
a consumer with i other ads having no price lower than p are [1 − P( p)]i . Even when the
firm’s price p is the lowest one in the consumer’s information set, the person may not buy
the good because it is too expensive. Let I ( p; τ ) = 1 denote the situation when a type-τ
consumer buys the firm’s good at price p and I ( p; τ ) = 0 when not. It then follows that
the probability of an ad with price p to a consumer will generate a sale, given that the
consumer may have received i = 0, 1, 2, · · · other ads, is given by36
Three prices play a central role in the analysis; namely, the minimum price in the economy,
p, the maximum price at which the unskilled will buy, p(τ ), and the maximum price at
which the skilled will purchase, p. The minimum price is determined by technological
considerations while the maximum prices also depend upon the outcome of the consumer
problems for the unskilled and skilled, an important distinction from Butters (1977). The
determination of p and p is discussed now with the specification of p(τ ) following shortly
after. Consider a firm that chooses to charge the minimum price, p. All the ads that this
firm sends out will result in purchases by consumers, implying S( p) = 1. Since there is
free entry into the production of any variety, this firm will earn zero profits. Hence,
Π( p; q) − r = 0.

(2.15)

Solving this equation gives
p=[

r (α−1)/α
]
+ γ,
Υ(q)

(2.16)

= ∑i∞=0 ( ai /i!) xi = [1 + ax + ( ax )2 /2! + ( ax )3 /3! + · · · ], which
implies that ds/dx = [ a +
+
+ · · · ] = as. Therefore, (1/s)ds/dx = a so that s = e ax . Now, let
∞
i
i
x = 1 − P( p) to get ∑i=0 ( a /i!)[1 − P( p)] = e a[1− P( p)] , from which the desired result follows.
36 To go from the first to the second line, set s

a2 ( ax )

a3 ( ax )
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where
Υ(q) ≡ (1 + qα/(1−α) )ϕ1/(1−α) (α1/(1−α) − αα/(1−α) )
1
1
= (1 + qα/(1−α) )( )1/(α−1) ( )α/(α−1) (α − 1) > 0.
ϕ
α
(See the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B.1.1 for guidance.) The minimum price,
p, is determined solely by technological factors. As a consequence so is the amount of
traditional, at , and digital advertising, ad , that each firm does, a fact that follows from
(2.11) in conjunction with S( p) = 1.
Since a firm is free to pick any price it must be the case that
Π( p′ ; q) = Π( p′′ ; q), for any p′ and p′′ ∈ P .

(2.17)

Proposition 1 states that all firms do the same amount of advertising. Therefore,

( p′ − γ)S( p′ ) = ( p′′ − γ)S( p′′ ),

(2.18)

or equivalently
′

′′

( p′ − γ)e−aP( p ) [tI ( p′ ; τ ) + (1 − t) I ( p′ ; τ )] = ( p′′ − γ)e−aP( p ) [tI ( p′′ ; τ ) + (1 − t) I ( p′′ ; τ )].
(2.19)
Turn to the firm that charges the highest price, p. Only skilled consumers (τ = τ) who have
no other ads will buy the firm’s product. Therefore, S( p) = e−a (1 − t), because P( p) = 1
(i.e., all ads have a price lower than p). Therefore, evaluating the above expression at
p′ = p and p′′ = p gives
e−a (1 − t)( p − γ) = p − γ,
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(2.20)

so that the maximum price at which a skilled person buys a good is

p=

p−γ
e − a (1 − t)

+γ =

[r/Υ(q)](α−1)/α
+ γ.
e − a (1 − t)

(2.21)

Next, focus on the highest price that unskilled consumers can afford, p(τ ). At any higher
price there will be a discrete drop off in potential customers from 1 down to 1 − t. To
recover profits there must be a discrete jump up in the lowest price above p(τ ), denoted
by p↑ (τ ). Since there are no prices in between p(τ ) and p↑ (τ ) it transpires that P( p(τ )) =
P( p↑ (τ )), which is formalized later in Proposition 3. The prices at the left and righthand
sides of the jump must have equal profits, so that (1 − t)[ p↑ (τ ) − γ] = p(τ ) − γ, which
yields
p↑ (τ ) =

p(τ ) − γ
+ γ.
1−t

(2.22)

Now, there must be firms charging every price, p, in the set P = [ p, p(τ )] ∪ [ p↑ (τ ), p]. To
understand why, suppose to the contrary that there is a hole in one of the intervals. Firms
at the lower edge of the hole could increase profits by raising their price slightly, because
this will not affect the number of customers they have. The proposition below describes
the situation.
Proposition 2. (Pricing) For any variety of regular goods there are firms charging every price, p,
in the set P = [ p, p(τ )] ∪ [ p↑ (τ ), p]. Take the aggregate amount of advertising per variety, a, as
given. Then, both p and p are increasing in the entry cost, r, the marginal cost of production, γ,
and the cost of digital advertising, q. Last, the maximum price, p, is decreasing in the fraction of
individuals, 1 − t, who are skilled.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.1.
It’s probably obvious that an increase in the cost of doing business, as given by r, γ, and
q, will lead to the pricing set P =[ p, p(τ )] ∪ [ p↑ (τ ), p] shifting rightward, because given
the free-entry assumption firms must recover their costs. When there are more skilled
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consumers, 1 − t, it becomes more profitable to charge the maximum price, p, since the
odds of an ad landing on a skilled person increase. But, again, perfect competition will
drive the maximum price down so that firms earn zero profits.
Direct attention now to characterizing the distribution of prices in the set P = [ p, p(τ )] ∪

[ p↑ (τ ), p]. Using the fact that S( p) = 1 in equation (2.18) gives
( p − γ)e−aP( p) [tI ( p; τ ) + (1 − t) I ( p; τ )] = p − γ, for p ∈ P .

(2.23)

Since this equation must hold for all p in the pricing set, P , it traces out the function P( p).
Proposition 3. (Advertised Price Distribution) The cumulative distribution for prices, P( p),is
given by



for p ∈ [ p, p(τ )];
ln{( p − γ)/( p − γ)}/a,



P( p) = Pr( PRICE ≤ p) =
ln{[ p(τ ) − γ]/( p − γ)}/a,
for p ∈ [ p(τ ), p↑ (τ )];




 ln{(1 − t)( p − γ)/( p − γ)}/a, for p ∈ [ p↑ (τ ), p].
(2.24)
The associated density function reads



1/[ a( p − γ)] > 0, for p ∈ [ p, p(τ )];



P1 ( p) =
0,
for p ∈ [ p(τ ), p↑ (τ )];




 1/[ a( p − γ)] > 0, for p ∈ [ p↑ (τ ), p].

(2.25)

Proof. See Appendix B.1.1.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the cumulative distribution for prices. For subsequent use note that
P1 ( p) represents the fraction of ads offering to sell a variety at price p.
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Figure 2.7: The cumulative distribution functions for both advertised prices, P( p), and
transacted prices that obtain in the calibrated equilibrium for 2018–Section 2.10 discusses
the model’s calibration. It is not profitable for a firm to price in the open interval
p(τ ), p↑ (τ ) . The distribution function for advertised prices stochastically dominates the
one for transacted prices, because consumers buy at the lowest price in their information
set.

2.5.2

Number of Varieties

How many varieties, v, will be produced? Since there is free entry into the production
of any variety of consumption goods all possible varieties will be sold. If this wasn’t the
case, a producer could move into a variety where no one else is producing and earn supranormal profits because of the lack of competition in advertised prices. Individuals will not
consume all varieties, though. People won’t receive ads for some varieties and even when
they do get ads some varieties may be too expensive for unskilled consumers.
Proposition 4. (Number of Varieties) All consumption goods in the feasible set [0, 1] will be produced; i.e., v = 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.1.
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2.5.3

Maximum Price the Unskilled will Pay

What is the maximum price, p(τ ), at which an unskilled person will buy a good? To begin
with, since S( p) = 1, equation (2.18) also implies

S( p) =

( p − γ)
, for p ∈ P .
( p − γ)

(2.26)

Let B( p) = Pr( BUY ) represent that the probability that a consumer will buy at price p.
This is not quite the same as the probability that a firm will make a sale at price p, S( p),
because the latter averages over both types of consumers. The two probabilities are related
as follows:

B( p) ≡ Pr( BUY ) =



 S ( p ),

for p ∈ [ p, p(τ )];

(2.27)


 S( p)/(1 − t), for p ∈ [ p↑ (τ ), p].
For given variety, the odds of a purchase at price p by a consumer are P1 ( p) B( p). Since
there is a unit mass of varieties, a type-τ person’s budget constraint can be written as

a

Z p(τ )
p

pP1 ( p) B( p)dp = τh(τ ),

(2.28)

where h(τ ) is hours worked and p(τ ) denotes the time price of the most expensive good
the person will buy; i.e., p(τ ) = p(τ ), for τ = τ, and p(τ ) = p, for τ = τ. Equation (2.28)
pins down p(τ ). To see this, set τ = τ in (2.28) and perform the required integration, while
using (2.25) and (2.26), to obtain

a( p − γ){ln[

p(τ ) − γ
γ
γ
]−
+
}/a = 1 − l (τ ).
p−γ
p(τ ) − γ
p−γ

This equation determines p(τ ).
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(2.29)

2.6

Supply of Free Media Goods

By reference to (2.4) and (2.6), it is immediate that the quantity of media goods provided,
m, is given by
m = n(

p − γ 1/(α−1) 1 qα/(1−α)
a
at
+ d ) = n(
)
[ +
].
ζ
ψ
αϕ
ζ
ψ

(2.30)

Again, to obtain the requisite impact from advertising, the lower the click-through rate, the
higher will be the amount of free media good required to deliver the specified information.

2.7

The Consumer/Worker Problem

A consumer/worker’s optimization problem is to maximize (2.1) subject to (2.2) by the
choice of {ci }iv and l, for τ ∈ {τ, τ }. Focus on a generic type-τ worker and index the
regular goods from the lowest to the highest priced so that pi is increasing in i. Let c(τ )
signify the most expensive generic good consumed by the individual, which has the price
p(τ ). This also represents the person’s overall consumption of generic goods because
R c(τ )
c(τ ) = 0 ci di, as ci = 1 for i ∈ [0, c(τ )]. Now, from the budget constraint (2.2) it’s clear
that c(τ ) can be written as a function of a person’s productivity, τ, and hours worked, h(τ ).
So, write37
c ( τ ) = C ( h ( τ ), τ ),

(2.31)

C1 (h(τ ), τ ) = τ/p(τ ) > 0 and C2 (h(τ ), τ ) = h(τ )/p(τ ) > 0,

(2.32)

with

Using this fact, the consumer/worker’s maximization problem can be reformulated as

W (τ ) = max{θ ln[C (1 − l (τ ) − e; τ, e)] +
l (τ )

(1 − θ )
ln[κl (τ )ρ + (1 − κ )mρ ]}.
ρ

(2.33)

Rv
R c(τ )
that 0 pi ci di = 0
pi di = τh(τ ). To compute C1 (h(τ ), τ ), take the total differential of the above
equation while using Leibniz’s rule to get pc(τ ) cc(τ ) dc(τ ) = τdh(τ ) so that dc(τ )/dh(τ ) ≡ C1 (h(τ ), τ ) =
τ/p(τ ). A similar calculation gives the formula for C2 (h(τ ), τ ).
37 Note
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The generic first-order condition for the leisure of a type-τ person, or l (τ ), is:
τ
θ
c(τ ) p(τ )
| {z }

M ARGINAL C OST OF L EISURE

κl (τ )ρ−1
= (1 − θ )
, for τ ∈ {τ, τ }.
κl (τ )ρ + (1 − κ )mρ
|
{z
}

(2.34)

M ARGINAL B ENEFIT OF L EISURE

The righthand side of this equation is the marginal benefit from an extra unit of leisure.
It is increasing in the quantity of media leisure goods, m, since ρ < 0. The lefthand side
is the marginal cost of leisure. An extra unit of leisure leads to a drop in income for a
type-τ person. This causes a drop in regular consumption, c(τ ), of τ/p(τ ), where p(τ ) is
the price of the last regular good consumed. This is multiplied by the marginal utility of
regular goods, θ/c(τ ).
The upshot of this first-order condition is given by the proposition below.
Proposition 5. (Consumption/Leisure) An individual’s consumption and leisure satisfy the following properties:
1. Leisure, l (τ ), is increasing in the number of media leisure goods, m;
2. Regular consumption, c(τ ), is decreasing in the number of media leisure goods, m, and is
increasing in the level of skill, τ;
3. Work effort, h(τ ), rises with the cost of an education, e.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.1.
The first point follows from the fact that an increase in the number of media goods, m,
raises the marginal benefit of leisure, l (τ ), because the two goods are complements in the
utility function (i.e., ρ < 0). Next, the rise in leisure, l (τ ), is connected with a drop in
work effort, h(τ ), that reduces regular consumption, c(τ ). An increase in τ decreases the
marginal cost of regular consumption in terms of forgone leisure. Hence, regular consumption rises. The third result transpires because an increase in e raises the marginal cost of
leisure for any given level of hours worked, h(τ ), implying that regular consumption, c(τ ),
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will be lower. This property is important because it implies that if an education is costly
enough, then the skilled will work more than the unskilled. This allows the framework to
explain the recent rise in the unskilled’s leisure relative to the skilled’s.
Last, the overall consumption of generic goods by a type-τ person, c(τ ) for τ ∈ {τ, τ }, is
given by
c(τ ) = a

Z p(τ )
p

B( p) P1 ( p)dp [cf. (2.28)].

(2.35)

where again P1 ( p) B( p) represents the odds of a purchase at price p. Evaluating the integral
at τ = τ gives consumption for an unskilled person,

c(τ ) = a

Z p(τ )
p

p−γ
a ( p − γ )2

dp [using (2.25) and (2.26)]

= 1 − S( p(τ )).

(2.36)

The expression has an intuitive interpretation since 1 − S( p(τ )) represents the odds for
each variety of getting at least one advertised price less than or equal to p(τ ). Alternatively,
when τ = τ the formula yields a skilled person’s consumption,

c(τ ) = a[

Z p(τ )
p

p−γ

1
dp +
2
( p − γ)
1−t

Z p
p↑ (τ )

p−γ

( p − γ )2

dp]/a = 1 − e−a .

(2.37)

Here, 1 − e−a = 1 − S( p) is the probability of receiving at least one ad per variety.

2.8

Equilibrium

In equilibrium the labor market must clear. The labor-market-clearing condition reads
γ[tc(τ ) + (1 − t)c(τ )] + n[ A( at ) + A(qad ) + r]

(2.38)

= t[1 − l (τ )] + (1 − t)τ [1 − l (τ ) − e].
The lefthand side is the demand for labor. The first term, γ[tc(τ ) + (1 − t)c(τ )], is the
demand for labor originating from the consumption of regular goods. The second term
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represents the labor used in advertising and absorbed by the fixed costs associated with
entry for the n regular firms, n[ A( at ) + A(qad ) + r]. The righthand side is the supply of
labor from unskilled and skilled workers. This condition can be thought of as tying down
the number of entrants, n, into a variety of regular goods.
It’s now time to take stock of things.

Definition of an Equilibrium An equilibrium for the economy is defined by a solution for advertising, at , ad , and a, overall consumption, c(τ ) and c(τ ), the quantity of media goods consumed,
m, labor supply, l (τ ) and l (τ ), the number of firms producing a variety, n, and the prices of regular
goods, p, p, p(τ ), and p↑ (τ ), such that:
1. Advertising is done in accordance with (2.11) and (2.12), which determine at , ad , and a,
where S( p) = 1. These solutions depend on the values for n and p.
2. The minimum and maximum time prices for regular goods, p and p, are regulated by (2.16)
and (2.21), taking as given a.
3. The highest time price paid by an unskilled person, p(τ ), is described by the pricing equation
(2.29), assuming values for a, l (τ ), and p. The price for the skilled at the jump point, p↑ (τ ),
is determined by (2.22) as a function of p(τ ).
4. The quantity of media goods consumed, m, is given by (2.30), where the solution for m is
dependent on at , ad , and n.
5. The solution to the consumer-worker’s problem for c(τ ) and l (τ ) is governed by (2.34),
(2.36), and (2.37) for τ ∈ {τ, τ }, given p(τ ) and m. These solutions take as given a, m,
p, p(τ ), p↑ (τ ), and p(τ ) = p.
6. The labor market clears in accordance with (2.38), which gives the number of firms per variety, n, as a function of at , ad , c(τ ), c(τ ), l (τ ), and l (τ ).
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2.9

Efficiency of the Equilibrium

The competitive equilibrium is not efficient. This transpires for two reasons why the equilibrium is not efficient. First, ads offering to sell goods at high prices are being sent to
unskilled consumers that can never afford to buy them. This is a social waste of resources.
Second, when engaging in advertising, firms do not take into account how the introduction of free media goods benefits the consumer. So, there is an underprovision of media
goods.
The Pareto optima for the economy can be traced out by solving the following informationally-constrained planning problem, where ξ ∈ [0, 1] is the relative planning weight that is
being placed on unskilled individuals:

max



c(τ ),c(τ ),at ,ad ,n,l (τ ),l (τ )

ξtθ ln c(τ ) +

ξt(1 − θ )
at
a
ln{κl (τ )ρ + (1 − κ )[n( + d )]ρ }
ρ
ζ
ψ

+ (1 − t)θ ln c(τ ) +


(1 − t)(1 − θ )
at
a
ln{κl (τ )ρ + (1 − κ )[n( + d )]ρ } ,
ρ
ζ
ψ
(2.39)

subject to
1 − e−(at +ad )n − c(τ ) = 0,

(2.40)

and

t[1 − l (τ )] + (1 − t)τ [1 − l (τ ) − e] − tγc(τ ) − (1 − t)γc(τ ) − n[ A( at ) + A(qad ) + r] = 0.
(2.41)
An interpretation of this problem is that the planner is giving unskilled and skilled people
coupons in the amounts c(τ ) and c(τ ). Each coupon entitles a person to one good at the
store they go to. The total amount of coupons handed out is constrained by the resource
constraint (2.41). The advertisements give the locations of the stores that sell each variety.
Without an ad the consumer will not know where to buy a variety. The odds of getting at
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least one ad for any particular variety are 1 − e−(at +ad )n . So, equation (2.40) states that the
consumption for the skilled is constrained by the ads they receive.
The allocations from the informationally-constrained planning problem can be supported
in a competitive equilibrium using a tax-cum-subsidy scheme. The excessive amount of
advertising can be corrected by levying a fine on all advertising and providing a subsidy
for consumers on all goods sold. Specifically, consumers require a proportional price reduction, r, in the amount
r = 1 − γ/p(τ ),

(2.42)

and all advertising should be fined at the rate
f = rp(1 − t)e−(at +ad )n .

(2.43)

The underprovision of media goods can be rectified by providing a subsidy per media
good in the amount s, where

s=t

(1 − κ ) m ρ −1
(1 − κ ) m ρ −1
(
)
+ (1 − t) τ
(
) .
κ
l (τ )
κ
l (τ )

(2.44)

This is equivalent to subsidizing traditional and digital advertising at the rates s/ζ and
s/ψ. The above policy should be financed by lump-sum taxation in line with

ra[t

Z p(τ )
p

pP1 ( p) B( p)dp + (1 − t)

Z p
p

pP1 ( p) B( p)dp] + sn(

= tt(τ ) + (1 − t)t(τ ) + f n( at + ad ),

at
a
+ d)
ζ
ψ
(2.45)

where t(τ ) and t(τ ) are the lump-sum taxes levied on the unskilled and skilled. The way
these taxes are raised affects the economy’s income distribution.
Proposition 6. (Informationally-Constrained Efficiency) The solution to the informationallyconstrained planning problem (2.39) can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with the taxcum-subsidy scheme specified by (2.42), (2.43), and (2.44) that is financed by lump-sum taxation
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in accordance with (2.45).
Corollary 3. (Single agent economy) Suppose there is only one type of consumer/worker. Then
only a subsidy on media goods is required.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.2.
The intuition for the above tax-cum-subsidy scheme is this. The skilled consume more
varieties than the unskilled. A certain amount of advertising is required to effect this.
There is no need to do any extra advertising to support the unskilled’s consumption. So,
the last variety sold to an unskilled person should be priced at its marginal production cost
implying that (1 − r ) p(τ ) = γ, where r is the required proportional price reduction. When
determining how much advertising to do firms use the price p instead of the subsidized
price (1 − r ) p, where the latter reflects the value of the good to a consumer. Since p > (1 −
r ) p there is propensity toward too much advertising. This is corrected by fining advertising
in general at the rate f .
Firms neglect the fact that media goods are valuable to consumers. Therefore, they under provide them. This is rectified by subsidizing media goods. The subsidy, s, is just
an expenditure-weighted average of each group’s marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and media goods, as can be seen from (2.44). The marginal rates of substitution reflects how much an extra media good is worth to a person in terms of leisure. For a skilled
person a unit of leisure is worth more than for an unskilled person, as reflected by τ. Last,
the click-through rate specifies how efficient advertising is.
Last, the solution to the planner’s problem in a world with full information can obtained
undertaking the maximization in (2.39) while dropping the information constraint (2.40).
This can be supported as a competitive equilibrium where all goods are sold at the marginal
cost so that p = γ. A lump-sum subsidy to firms is needed to cover their fixed costs, r. The
cost of this would have to be financed by lump-sum taxation on consumers.

82

2.10

Calibration

In order to simulate the model, values have to be assigned to the following parameters: θ,
κ, ρ, m, γ, α, ϕ, ζ, ψ, q, r, τ, e, and t. Most of the parameter values are unique to this study.
The strategy is to pin down parameter values by using data on markups, the advertisingto-consumption ratio, the click-through rate, the hike in the ratio of spending on digital
versus traditional advertising, the college premium, and the step up in the time spent on
leisure by non-college- and college-educated individuals.
Some parameter values can be set straightforwardly. The unskilled in the model are taken
to be the non-college educated. They represent 65 percent of the population. In United
States the income of college graduates is 1.98 times that of the non-college educated. The
productivity of college graduates in model, τ, is set to match this fact. Thus, τ is determined by the condition

INCOME RATIO

= 1.98 =

τ [1 − l ( τ ) − e]
.
1 − l (τ )

(2.46)

Accordingly, t = 0.65 and τ = 2.35. The click-through rate on digital advertising is very
low, roughly 2.5 percent. This dictates setting ψ = 0.025. The choice of some parameters
are normalizations. On this, γ and ϕ control the units that output and advertising are
measured in. Hence, γ = ϕ = 1.
The rest of the parameter values are selected by targeting a set of stylized facts. The long
and short of the calibration procedure is this–a detailed explanation is provided in Appendix B.2. The model’s calibration is divided into two parts; viz, the firm side that determines the advertising parameters and a consumer side that pins down the preference
ones. These two parts are linked. On the firm side, an important parameter is the cost
elasticity for advertising, α. To calibrate this parameter, a markup of 7 percent for the average transacted price over marginal production cost is chosen–this number is taken from
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Basu (2019).38 As mentioned in the introduction, advertising has been roughly 2 percent
of GDP for the last 100 years. This leads to the following two restrictions on the calibration
exercise.

MARKUP

= 1.07 = E[ p]/γ
R p(τ )
Rp
pB( p) P1 ( p)dp + (1 − t) p(τ ) pB( p) P1 ( p)dp
p
]/γ,
= [ R p(τ )
Rp
B
(
p
)
P
(
p
)
dp
B
(
p
)
P
(
p
)
dp
+
(
1
−
t
)
1
1
p
p(τ )

(2.47)

and
A2C = 0.02 =

n[ A( at ) + A(qad )]
.
tc(τ ) + (1 − t)c(τ )

(2.48)

The markup is calculated using the transacted price distribution, shown in Figure 2.7.
The restrictions (2.47) and (2.48) are used to pin down a value for α, which governs the
marginal cost of advertising. The backed-out value for α is similar to the one used by
Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu (2012) to generate a reasonable equilibrium firm-size distribution. In fact, alternatively, if their value is used for α, then the model here would predict a
markup of 7 percent. These restrictions also determine the fixed entry cost, r.
The ratio of spending on digital to traditional advertising rose from 0.02 percent 2003 to
0.28 in 2018. These numbers are used to calibrate the rise in the relative efficiency of digital
advertising, or q, over this time period. Hence, the following condition is imposed on the
calibration exercise:




0.02, for 2003;



A(qad )
=
D2T =
0.07, for 2010;

A( at )



 0.28, for 2018.

(2.49)

When calibrating the firm side of the model, the labor allocations from the consumer side
are taken as given. Given these labor allocations, the firm-side calibration hits exactly the
three data targets given by (2.47), (2.48), and (2.49).
38 The size of price markups is controversial. The number used here is conservative: the larger is the price
markup, the bigger will be welfare gain from digital advertising.
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For the consumer side, the preference parameters θ, κ, and ρ, plus the parameter governing the cost of education, e, are chosen to match certain observations about leisure for the
non-college and college educated for the years 2003, 2010, and 2018. Additionally, these
observations are also used to infer a value for the click-through rate, ζ, on traditional advertising. This turns out to be much higher than the one for digital advertising. Thus, to
obtain a given number of messages read by consumers, digital advertising supplies more
free media goods than traditional advertising. (But, these media goods are less expensive
to produce.) Leisure is defined as all time spent on entertainment, social activities, relaxing, active recreation, sleeping, eating, and personal care; this definition corresponds with
Aguiar and Hurst (2007) (Table III, measure 2). The trend in leisure is charted in Figure 2.8.
Leisure for the non-college educate rose from 64.2 percent of time not working in 2003 to
65.4 in 2018. The increase for college graduates was from 60.7 to 61.1. In each year college
graduates enjoyed less leisure than the non-college educated. Galbi (2001) has noted that,
historically speaking, increases in discretionary time use are closely related to the waxing
in time spent on media. So, the figure also tracks the gain in leisure since 2003 accounted
for by the time consumed on media; namely, TV, radio, reading, movies, computers, and
games. The model is calibrated to 2003 levels of leisures and subsequent gains in leisures
linked with the increased time spent on media.
Since media goods are free their quantity is not recorded in the national income accounts.
The data on time spent not working, both over time and between the non-college and college educated, is used to infer the quantity of media goods. Since media goods and leisure
are Edgeworth-Pareto complements, an increase in the supply of the media goods should
lead to more time spent not working, ceteris paribus; recall Proposition 5. This type of
strategy

was

introduced

in

Goolsbee and Klenow

(2006)

and

followed

by

Brynjolfsson and Oh (2012). Things are more complicated here, though. The advent of
digital advertising also affects the prices of consumer goods, which will have an impact on
leisure as well.
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Figure 2.8: Leisure for the non-college and college educated. Also shown is the increase in
leisure since 2003 comprised by shifts in time spent on media (∆ Media). The bars for 2003
and the cross-hatched ones for 2010 and 2018 are used in the model’s calibration. Source:
American Time Use Survey.
Let LEISURE t (τ ) represent the leisure target for a type-τ person in year t. Then, formally
speaking, the parameter values in question solve

min

∑

∑

θ,κ,ρ,e,ζ τ =τ,τ t=03,10,18

[lt (τ ) − LEISURE t (τ )]2 ,

(2.50)

subject to (2.47), (2.48), and (2.49). The constraints take into account how the choice of
the preference parameters interacts with the firm-side calibration. The upshot from the
calibration procedure is displayed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.

2.11

Welfare

A person’s welfare, W (τ ), reads

W (τ ) = θ ln(c(τ )) +

(1 − θ )
ln[κl (τ )ρ + (1 − κ )mρ ], for τ ∈ {τ, τ },
ρ
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(2.51)

C ALIBRATED PARAMETER VALUES
Description
Identification

Parameter Values
Consumers
θ = 0.3499
κ = 0.0076
ρ = −4.9896
t = 0.65
τ = 2.3506
e = 0.0953
Firms
γ=1
r = 0.0028
Advertising
α = 3.0148
ϕ=1
q03 = 12.0920, q10 = 5.9132
q18 = 2.3302
ψ = 0.025
ζ = 0.4410

Consumption weight
Weight on leisure, CES
Elasticity of substitution
Low-type fraction
High-type productivity
Cost of skill

Data, Eq (2.50)
Data, Eq (2.50)
Data, Eq (2.50)
Data
Data
Data, Eq (2.50)

Marginal production cost
Entry fixed cost

Normalization
Data, Eqs (2.47) and (2.48)

Cost elasticity
Constant
Efficiency of digital adv.

Data, Eqs (2.47) and (2.48)
Normalization
Data, Eq (2.49)

Click-through rate, digital
Click-through rate, traditional

Data
Data, Eq (2.50)

Table 2.1: The parameter values that result from the calibration procedure.

D ATA TARGETS
Description
Income ratio
Markup, 2018
Advertising/consumption, 1919-2019
Digital/traditional advertising
2018
2010
2003
Leisure
Non-college, 2018
College, 2018
Non-college, 2010
College, 2010
Non-college, 2003
College, 2003

U.S. Data
1.98
1.07
0.022

Model
1.98
1.07
0.022

0.282
0.070
0.024

0.282
0.070
0.024

0.6523
0.6110
0.6501
0.6130
0.6412
0.6073

0.6520
0.6115
0.6505
0.6124
0.6411
0.6074

Table 2.2: The data targets used in the calibration exercise and the corresponding numbers
for the model. The calibration procedure hits the firm side numbers exactly while maximizing the model’s fit for leisure.
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where c(τ ), l (τ ), and m represent the allocations for consumption, leisure, and media
goods under some particular scenario. From this it is clear that any change in welfare
can be broken down into changes in c(τ ), l (τ ), and m. Now consider two different scenarios, A and B. In order to move to regime B a type-τ person living in regime A would have
to be compensated by boosting his regime-A consumption by the factor

EV (τ )

= e[WB (τ )−WA (τ )]/θ − 1.

(2.52)

That is, EV (τ ) measures a type-τ person’s equivalent variation.39

2.11.1

The Change in Welfare from 2003 to 2018

Between 2003 and 2018, advertising became more efficient. This had three effects. First,
consumers benefited from the introduction of new media goods.40 Second, leisure rose.
Third, the reduction in hours was associated with a decline in consumption. By how much
did welfare improve overall?
Table 2.3 shows the results. Welfare increased for the non-college and college educated by
2.5 and 2.7 percent, in terms of consumption. To attain this, the efficiency of digital advertising relative to traditional advertising rose (or q fell) at about 11 percent per year. For
both groups of individuals, there is a significant increase in welfare due to the expansion
of free media goods connected with digital advertising. The non-college educated realize
a significant gain in welfare from their rise in leisure. This occurs because media goods
and leisure are complements in utility; recall Proposition 5. The welfare gain from the increase in leisure is mostly offset by a decline in non-college educated consumption. The
college educated enjoyed a smaller improvement in welfare from the rise in leisure. Their
39 In

otherwords, EV (τ ) solves the equation
WB (τ ) = θ ln[(1 + EV (τ ))c A (τ )] +

(1 − θ )
ln[κl A (τ )ρ + (1 − κ )(m A )ρ ].
ρ

(2.53)

40 Marshall (1920) (p. 307) notes “the dependence of newspapers and magazines on receipts from advertisements. They are thereby enabled to provide a larger amount of reading matter than would otherwise be
possible ...”
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decline in consumption is negligible. The reduced work effort by the college-educated is
counteracted by a reduction in prices stimulated by increased competition. This estimate
of the improvement in welfare is not out of line with other work. Goolsbee and Klenow
(2006) calculate that the internet was worth somewhere between 2 to 3 percent of income
to the average consumer in 2005, but this could be as high as 27 percent depending on the
preferred specification. Greenwood and Kopecky (2013) place the welfare gain from the
introduction of personal computers at somewhere between 2 to 3 percent of GDP in 2004.
Brynjolfsson and Oh (2012) find, using the Greenwood and Kopecky (2013) method, that
the introduction of free media goods was worth about 5 percent of consumption in 2011.
The large boost in welfare generated by the free provision of media goods is not reflected
in GDP. First, GDP is not the same as economic welfare. One might think that adding the
implicit value of the free media goods to GDP would cure this problem. In particular, suppose that GDP is measured as pc c + pm m, where c is aggregate consumption, pc is the price
index for consumption, and pm is the implicit price index for media goods. Standard reasoning suggests measuring this implicit price by the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and media goods. This differs across the rich and the poor, so take an expenditureweighted average. It then turns out that pm = s, where s is given by equation (2.44). Doing
this would increase GDP by 7.8 percent in 2003, 1.3 percent in 2010, and 0.02 percent in
2018. This seems counter intuitive because m increased substantially over this time period,
so how could media goods contribution to GDP decline? But, as media goods increase their
implicit price falls. So, once again, GDP is not the same as welfare. For example, electricity
constitutes around 2 percent of expenditure yet Greenwood and Kopecky (2013) estimate
it has a compensating variation of 92 percent with there existing no equivalent variation;
i.e., it isn’t possible to give a person today enough income to compensate them for living
without electricity. Second, some researchers have suggested that advertising is an intangible investment and should be treated the same way as physical investment in the national
income and product accounts. This boosts GDP. Advertising spending is deducted from
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T HE I NCREASE IN W ELFARE FROM 2003 TO 2018
EV
Consumption Media Goods Leisure
Non-college 2.5% -2.43%
1.85%
3.00%
College
2.7% -0.03%
1.42%
1.22%
Table 2.3: The welfare gains from the expansion of free media goods arising from the advent of digital advertising. These welfare gains are decomposed into the effects that digital
advertising had on regular consumption, media goods provision, and leisure.
firm’s profits in the GDP accounts unlike physical investment spending.41 Corrado et al.
(2009) recommend counting (a portion of) advertising as an intangible investment in the
GDP accounts–McGrattan and Prescott (2010) express a similar view. This would increase
GDP by advertising’s share of GDP, or around 2 percent over the last century. This adjustment would be constant over this time period and would not reflect the welfare gain from
digital advertising–the ratio of advertising spending to GDP has been stable.
It’s dangerous to prognosticate about the future, but suppose, solely as a thought experiment, that technological advance in digital advertising continues until 2040 at the same
rate as between 2003 and 2018. From 2018 to 2030 the non-college educated would see
their welfare climb by an additional 1.7 percent, while the college educated would enjoy a
benefit of 4.1 percent. By 2040 the respective numbers would be 3.0 and 7.8 percent. The
cumulative welfare gains from 2003 on are shown in Figure 2.9. These welfare gains can
be broken down. The free provision of media goods see strong diminishing returns kick in
after 2018. The extra supply of free media goods increases welfare for the non-college- and
college-educated population by 0.05 and 0.04 percent for the 2018-2040 period. This is trivial compared with the gain between 2003 and 2018. Most of the hike in welfare over this
period derives from more generic consumption resulting from more intense price compe41 For

those not familiar with the issue, write the national income identity as
CONSUMPTION

+ INVESTMENT + ... = LABOR INCOME +

PROFITS

+ ... .

(2.54)

Advertising is not currently counted as a component of investment. Suppose alternatively that advertising
spending is added as a component of investment spending. On the lefthand side of the accounts, INVESTMENT
would then increase by ADVERTISING. On the righthand side, ADVERTISING is no longer deducted from
profits so that PROFITS increase by ADVERTISING. That is, advertising expenditure is now capitalized instead
of expensed. This retains a balance between the left- and righthand sides of the national income accounts
balance. GDP now increases by ADVERTISING.
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tition; for the two parties, the numbers are 3.2 and 12.8 percent. Interestingly, leisure drops
for both parties, which contributes welfare losses of 0.4 and 4.5 percent. The more precipitous loss for the college educated occurs because they realize a significant boost in their
effective real wage because of a drop in prices at the upper end of the price distribution.

Figure 2.9: Cumulative welfare changes for the non-college and college educated population. The dashed and dot-dashed portions of the lines show the extrapolations from 2018
to 2040. Over this future period the college-educated gain a lot in welfare from generic
consumption due to increased competition at the upper end of the price distribution. This
is partially offset by a decline in welfare because of a reduction in leisure motivated by the
rise in the return on working for the college educated.

2.11.2

Who pays?

Who is implicitly paying for the provision of free media goods? Specifically, does consumption by the upper end of the population help the lower end by stimulating the supply of free media goods? To begin with, the non-college share of advertising expenditure
is given by
t[1 − l (τ ) − γc(τ )] − tP( p(τ ))nr
.
n[ A( at ) + A(qad )]

(2.55)

The numerator is non-college income less the variable cost of their consumption, t[1 −
l (τ ) − γc(τ )], minus their prorated share of the fixed cost of production, tP( p(τ ))nr, where
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Non-college
College

S HARE OF T OTAL A DVERTISING C OSTS
Undirected
Directed
Share
Share/(Pop Share) Share
Share/(Pop Share)
27.04%
42%
39.50%
61%
72.96%
208%
60.50%
173%

Table 2.4: The fraction of the cost of free good provision paid for by the non-collegeand college-educated populations. The last two columns refer to the directed advertising model introduced in Section 2.12.
tP( p(τ )) is the share of advertised prices below p(τ ) that are sent to the non-college educated. This represents the slice of non-college income that is absorbed in advertising costs.
The denominator is aggregate advertising expenditure. By this metric the non-college educated pay 27 percent of the cost of advertising–see Table 2.4. Note that the non-college
educated represent 100 × t = 65 percent of the population, so the percentage share per person is only 42 percent. The college-educated pay more than their share because they buy
goods at higher prices where the markups are larger. Figure 2.10 plots advertising costs as
fraction of a firm’s revenue, or [ A( at ) + A(qad )]/[ p( at + ad )S( p)]. When the price is higher
the probability of making a sale, S( p), is smaller. The odds of a sale drop faster than the
price increases, so the cost of advertising is spread over a smaller amount of revenue.

2.11.3

Public Policy

By how much would welfare improve if the second-best tax-cum-subsidy scheme proposed in Section 2.9 was implemented? The upshot is presented in Table 2.5. Moving
to the informationally-constrained efficient equilibrium has a small welfare gain, worth
about 0.02 percent for the non-college educated and about 0.03 percent for the college educated. These are smaller than some of the magnitudes calculated in traditional welfare
analyses, such as Rees (1963) estimate of the welfare cost of labor unions, which he found
to be 0.13 percent of GDP. They are bigger than Lucas (1987) estimate of the welfare gains
from eliminating business cycles.
Implementing the informationally-constrained efficient equilibrium would require a fairly
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Figure 2.10: Advertising costs as a fraction of a firm’s revenue rise with the price charged.
I MPLEMENTING THE E FFICIENT E QUILIBRIUM
EV ,

Non-college
0.02%
-6.45%

College
r
f
s
Informationally Constrained
0.03%
5.9% 1.0% 0.00%
Full Information
16.27%
0
0
0

EV ,

t(τ )
1− l ( τ )

t(τ )
τ [1−l (τ )−e]

4.71%

3.23%

9.18%

-5.45%

Table 2.5: The tax-cum-subsidy policy needed to make the competitive equilibrium efficient and the welfare gains from doing so.
large intervention in the economy. The purchase of consumption goods would have to
be subsidized at 6 percent in order to align the marginal price paid by the non-college
educated to its marginal production cost. Advertising in general would face a small fine of
1.0 percent. Media goods provision would have to be subsidized at an insignificant rate to
compensate for the underprovision of media goods. Last, the lump-sum taxes required to
implement the program would amount to 4.71 percent of labor income for the non-college
educated and 3.23 percent for the college educated. While in the rarefied confines of the
model such a policy is desirable, this is unlikely to be the case in the real world especially
given the small welfare gain. The advertising equilibrium modeled is surprisingly close to
being efficient in an informationally-constrained economy.
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The second-best informationally-constrained equilibrium is still some distance away from
the first-best full-information equilibrium. To see this, the planner’s problem in a fullinformation world is solved using the same utility weights as in the informationallyconstrained problem, so as to keep things comparable. As can be seen, there is a big
utility gain for college-educated consumers and a loss for non-educated ones. In the fullinformation world, college-educated consumers benefit from a large drop in prices. This
effect is much smaller for non-college educated consumers and is offset by the lump-taxes
needed to cover firms’ fixed costs. Both parties work more, and so lose leisure, especially
the non-college educated. This reinforces the message made in Table 2.4 that in the competitive equilibrium with advertising the college-educated are paying a disproportionate
share of the cost of free media costs via the high markups on their consumption.
Lest anyone worries, clearly resources could be redirected away from the college-educated
toward the non-college educated that result in everyone being better off by a move to
the first-best equilibrium; i.e., the full-information planning problem could be resolved
placing more weight on the non-college educated. But, there is no way of implementing
the first-best equilibrium without a mechanism for costlessly getting price information to
consumers.

2.11.4

Growth in TFP

Suppose TFP changes. Would this change the results in a material way? The answer
is no. To address this question, let productivity in the production, advertising, and the
cost of entry grow in a balanced fashion at the gross rate g so that g = (1/γ′ )/(1/γ) =

(1/ϕ′ )/(1/ϕ) = r/r′ > 1. Additionally, suppose that the number of varieties, v, also expands at this rate implying v′ /v = g. Last, assume that there is technological progress in
the household sector that augments the benefit of leisure at rate g. Then, it can be shown
that, when there is no digital-specific technological progress, the economy will evolve
along a balanced growth path–the details are in Appendix B.3.1. Fernald (2014) calculates
that TFP in the U.S. economy grew at roughly 0.5 percent per year. So, set g = 1.005; as will
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T HE I NCREASE IN W ELFARE WITH G ROWTH IN TFP
EV
Consumption Media Goods Leisure
Non-college 10.5% 5.62%
1.85%
3.00%
College
10.9% 8.22%
1.42%
1.22%
Table 2.6: The welfare gains when there is growth in TFP.
be seen, the exact number isn’t material. Also, as before, assume that there is technological
improvement in digital advertising so that q03 > q10 > q18 , with the q’s calibrated in the
manner described in Section 2.10. The upshot is presented now. The full set of results for
the setting with growth in TFP are provided in Appendix B.3.1.
Not surprisingly when growth in TFP is allowed, the improvement in welfare for both the
poor and rich is much larger. Table 2.6 shows the results after technological progress in
the household sector is factored out. The welfare gain for both types of consumers is large,
10.5 and 10.9 percent. Most of the dividend in welfare comes from consumption growth.
Interestingly, the welfare gains accruing from the increase in leisure and media goods are
virtually identical to the results obtained for the baseline model.

2.11.5

Annoying Ads

Ads provide important facts for consumers; viz, prices, product specifications, and information about new goods. They can also be annoying. How much is an open question. In
a randomized experiment of its 35 million customers the music streaming service Pandora
found that as they increased the number of ads per hour less people tuned in and more
people signed up for the $4.99 per month ad-free version. An extra ad per hour led to a
2 percent drop in listeners and a 0.14 percent increase in paid subscribers. The increased
revenue from the paid subscription service, however, did not make up for the loss in ad
revenue. Only 30 percent of viewers for the video-on-demand service Hulu purchase the
$11.99-per-month no-commercials version versus the $5.99 ad-supported plan–undirected
TV and movie ads are probably the most disruptive form of advertising. In 2018 Hulu
earned $1.5 billion in ad revenue. Last, the opt-out rate on marketing emails is low, some-
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where between 0.2 and 0.5 percent. Industry is endeavouring to find the sweet spot between the amount of advertising and fee for service. Consumers love free goods and
services. The large networks built by Facebook, Google, and other tech giants allow for
the rapid diffusion of the information contained in advertising. It’s a profitable business
model for these tech companies to use free goods as a vehicle to distribute advertising.
How ads enter consumers’ preferences is an open question. Suppose that they just detract
from the enjoyment of media goods. Specifically, assume that they reduce the enjoyment
of a media good by the gross factor ξ. This is effectively a renormalization of the constant
term κ on media goods.42 Therefore, nothing changes in the above analysis and the welfare
gain from media goods can be thought of as purging the nuisance of ads. Alternatively,
perhaps consumers hate ads in their own right. In particular, subtract the disutility term
H (na) from preferences. All of the positive analysis done here still goes through unaltered.
The welfare analysis will change though. It would be difficult to parameterize the function H without a lot of additional information. Additionally, the evidence suggests that
consumers aren’t willing to pay much for ad-free content. Could companies pay people (a
negative price) to view ads? It might be hard to get the more affluent to view the ads for
a small negative price. Becker and Murphy (1993) suggest that consumers could sell their
“attention” to advertisers, but then just ignore the ads; therefore, there is a moral hazard
problem with negative pricing.

2.12

Directed Advertising

The information age allows advertisers to collect vast amounts of information on consumers. Digital advertising both collects and uses information to target potential buyers.
Suppose instead that advertising can be directed only toward those consumers who will
potentially buy the product, but that anyone can use the free media goods used to dissemRv
preferences as θ ln( 0 ci di ) + (1 − θ ) ln[κl ρ + (1 − κ )(ξm)ρ /β]/ρ. If β is a free parameter, then
setting β = ξ ρ shows that this is really a renormalization of the current setup. Without further information the
two scenarios are observationally equivalent.
42 Write
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inate the ads. In such a setting there is no point sending an ad with a very high price to
a consumer who can’t afford to purchase the good at this price. So, directed advertising
is more efficient than undirected advertising. It also is probably less annoying. To operationalize this idea the economy is split into two mutually exclusive spheres of economic
activity, one for each consumer type. A firm can decide which group of consumers to sell
to and at what price. These two spheres are only linked via the free-entry condition and the
provision of free media goods. A capsule summary of the revised setup is now presented.
First, the number of firms per variety in each sphere is different, denoted by nτ , for τ ∈

{τ, τ }. Within each realm firms solve an advertising problem of the form (2.8). Since
firms’ profits must be the same across groups and prices, all firms in the economy will do
the same amount of traditional and digital advertising, at and ad . Denote the total amount
of adverts within any variety for a group by aτ = nτ ( at + ad ), for τ ∈ {τ, τ }.
Second, each group of consumers faces their own advertised price distribution, Pτ ( p) for
τ ∈ {τ, τ }. This occurs because they are targeted separately. As before, let the maximum
prices for each group be represented by p(τ ) and p. For the non-college and college educated these prices respectively solve

[ p(τ ) − γ]e−aτ /t = p − γ and ( p − γ)e−aτ /(1−t) = p − γ.

(2.56)

The minimum price, p, is the same as in the equilibrium with undirected advertising because, as was mentioned, this price depends only on technological considerations. The
two advertised price distributions are

Pτ ( p) = Pr( PRICE ≤ p) =



 ln{( p − γ)/( p − γ)}t/aτ ,

for τ = τ;


 ln{ p − γ]/( p − γ)}(1 − t)/aτ , for τ = τ.
Neither price distribution exhibits a flat portion associated with a jump in prices.
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(2.57)

Third, there are separate resource constraints for each of the two spheres:

γc(τ ) + nτ [ A( at ) + A(qad ) + r]/t = 1 − l (τ ),

(2.58)

γc(τ ) + nτ [ A( at ) + A(qad ) + r]/(1 − t) = τ [1 − l (τ ) − e].

(2.59)

and

Last, the consumption of media goods, m, for both groups of individuals is given by

m = (nτ + nτ )( at /ζ + ad /ψ).

(2.60)

How would a move from a world where advertising is undirected to a world where it
is directed affect welfare? To conduct this experiment, the parameter values from the
benchmark economy are retained to keep things comparable. The results are somewhat
surprising–see Table 2.7. Welfare drops ever so slightly by 0.03 percent for the non-college
educated but moves up for the college educated by 5.05 percent. Media goods consumption falls insignificantly for both groups because now there is marginally less advertising
overall. This leads to a loss in welfare, ceterus paribus. The non-college educated reduce their leisure, because leisure and media goods are Edgeworth-Pareto complements
in utility. The college educated realize a large gain in welfare from increased consumption because price competition is stimulated at the upper end of the price distribution. For
the college educated the average price that they pay for goods drops by 4.6 percent. The
maximum price paid by the college educated falls by 11.8 percent.43 As can be seen from
the first-order condition (2.34) for the college educated, this amounts to an increase in the
college-educated real wage, τ/p, that stimulates work effort and discourages leisure. Figure 2.11 shows the shift in the transacted price distribution for the college educated. There
is virtually no impact on the transacted price distribution the non-college educated. Last,
43 On this, Argente and Lee (2021) and Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2017) examine price distributions.
They find that recent inflation hurt the poor more that the rich, hinting that this feature of the model might be
in data. More generally, Kaplan et al. (2019) compare the predictions of a price-posting model with the data.
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M OVE T OWARD D IRECTED A DVERTISING
EV
Consumption Media Goods
Non-college -0.03% 0.05%
-0.03%
College
5.05% 9.90%
-0.02%

Leisure
-0.05%
-4.40%

Table 2.7: The welfare gains from a move toward directed advertising.
note that the share of directed advertising paid for by the college educated drops–see Table
2.4.

Figure 2.11: The cumulative distribution functions for transacted prices under both directed and undirected advertising. The college-educated purchase from a much better
price distribution when advertising is directed. For the non-college educated the two
prices distributions are virtually identical.

2.12.1

Public Policy

The directed advertising economy is virtually efficient. A move to the informationallyconstrained efficient equilibrium leads to infinitesimal welfare gains of 0.003 and 0.001
percent for the non-college and college educated–see Table 2.8.
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S ECOND -B EST E FFICIENCY WITH D IRECTED A DVERTISING
EV ,

Non-college
0.003%

EV,

College
0.001%

r
0%

f
0%

s
0.008%

t(τ )
1− l ( τ )

t(τ )
1−l (τ )−e

0.10%

0.13%

Table 2.8: The tax-cum-subsidy policy needed to make the competitive equilibrium with
directed advertising (informationally-constrained) efficient and the welfare gain from doing so.

2.12.2

A Hybrid Model

It’s hard to know how much advertising is directed versus undirected. Here theory is
outpacing measurement. Given this void, suppose that all digital advertising is directed
while all traditional advertising is undirected. To model the extent of direction in ads,
imagine an economy with both types of consumers living in two separate spheres: directed
and undirected. The relative size of the population living in the directed sphere is targeted
so that it grows over time in accordance with the observed diffusion of digital advertising
in United States. Since the efficiency gain accruing from digital advertising derives from
the fact that it can be directed, the cost advantage of digital advertising is eliminated; i.e.,
qt = 1 for all t. The 2.5 percent click-through rate for digital advertising is retained.
The hybrid model is calibrated so that the average across spheres in 2018 for the price
markup, the advertising-to-consumption ratio, and the relative earnings of the collegeeducated match the data. Additionally, the average leisure time across spheres for workers
in 2003, 2010, and 2018 is also targeted. In the analogue to data matching problem (2.50) the
average price markup, the advertising-to-consumption ratio, and the relative earnings of
the college educated are added as targets. The estimated parameters are now α, r, θ, κ, ρ, τ,
e, ζ, and st (for t = 2003, 2010, 2018) where st is the relative size of the digital sector. The
results for the hybrid model are remarkably similar to the baseline model–see Appendix
B.3.2. Non-college-educated workers enjoy a welfare gain between 2003 and 2018 of 2.0
percent while for the college educated the number is 2.8. Notice that the skilled fare better
relative to the unskilled with the move toward digital advertising in the hybrid model.
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2.13

Conclusion

An information-based model is developed where firms must advertise to sell goods. There
are two modes of advertising; namely, traditional and digital. Advertising is executed via
the provision of free media goods. In the baseline version of the model, digital advertising
costs less than traditional advertising. It also delivers more free media goods per message
received by consumers. These media goods complement leisure in utility. Since there is
randomness in the ads that consumers receive, firms set different prices for the exact same
product. Hence, an equilibrium distribution of prices emerges. The advertising equilibrium is not efficient. First, free media goods are underprovided. Second, some advertising
is wasteful in the sense that ads are sent to consumers who can’t afford to purchase the
good at the posted price. A second-best tax-cum-subsidy policy that overcomes these inefficiencies is developed. Part of this policy involves subsidizing media goods provision
and taxing advertising.
The developed model is matched up with some stylized facts from the U.S. data; in particular, the average price markup, the ratio of advertising expenses to consumption expenditure, the click-through rate for digital advertising, the growth in the ratio of spending on
digital advertising relative to traditional advertising, the college premium, and the rise in
the time spent on leisure that was connected with media for both non-college- and collegeeducated people. Interestingly, the framework is consistent with the recent decrease in
hours worked for the non-college educated relative to the college educated. The provision
of free media goods via advertising is connected with a large increase in welfare. GDP is
not a good measure of welfare when new goods are introduced into an economy. Adding
an imputed value for the new media goods to GDP may not accurately reflect the gain in
welfare. Additionally, counting advertising as component of investment in the GDP accounts may not capture the benefit of the digital advertising revolution. College-educated
consumers pay a disproportionately large share of the cost of these media goods because
they purchase products at higher prices. They may benefit from the introduction of digital
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advertising, however, due to the expansion of price competition at the upper end of the
goods market relative to the lower end. The tax-cum-subsidy policy that overcomes these
inefficiencies associated with advertising has a small impact on welfare, which is swamped
by the welfare gain from the free provision of media goods.
The competitive equilibrium with undirected advertising is compared with one where advertising is directed toward consumers that might actually buy the product. There is a
slightly smaller supply of free media goods in the world with directed advertising because there is less advertising. This (negligibly) hurts those consumers who wouldn’t
have bought high-priced products in the economy with undirected advertising. It benefits
those consumers who bought high-priced goods in the economy with undirected advertising because now there is more price competition, which results in increased consumption.
A hybrid model is entertained where all digital advertising is directed and traditional advertising is undirected. After recalibrating, the hybrid model delivers similar results to the
baseline one. Compared with the baseline model the skilled fare relatively better than the
unskilled with the shift toward directed advertising.
An interesting extension of the model would be to see if it can mimic observed price distributions. If it can, then an advertising model is a viable alternative to search models.
Of particular interest is how the advent of digital advertising affected the observed price
distribution, especially the prices paid by the rich and poor.44 Doing this would probably
involve introducing further heterogeneity in consumers, both in tastes and incomes. Some
element of persuasive advertising might be needed. All this involves breaking new theoretical ground, gathering further facts on advertising and prices, and pushing the quantitative analysis forward. These are challenges, but the return could be high.

44 Footnote

43 mentions some suggestive work on this.
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CHAPTER 3
V ENTURE F UNDED E NTREPRENEURSHIP :

THE I MPACT ON

W EALTH

I NEQUALITY AND M OBILITY
This is joint work with Jinfeng Luo from the University of Pennsylvania. I contribute to
most of the model construction, data collection, and part of the quantitative analysis.

3.1

Introduction

It is well-known that the United States has experienced a sharp rise in top wealth inequality since the early 1980s. According to the World Inequality Database, the share of wealth
owned by the top 1% of US households increased from 23% in 1980 to 33% in 2007.45 Less
well-known is that there has also been an increase in mobility to the wealthiest since the
1980s. Kaplan and Rauh (2013) show that Americans on the Forbes 400 are less likely to
have grown up rich, but rather, have been born in upper-middle-class families and started
their own businesses, usually with some technology components.
There is a growing realization that entrepreneurship is the main driving force of wealth
concentration at the right tail.46

Since capital is essential in starting a business

(Evans and Jovanovic (1989)), the development of the financial market can influence households’ entrepreneurship entry, and therefore, wealth inequality. Decades after 1979 have
witnessed an upsurge of a new financial sector, the venture capital industry, since the US
Department of Labor explicitly allowed pension funds to invest in venture capital. This
supply shock boosted the total VC investment from roughly 303 million in 1970 to 54 billion by 2015 (both numbers are in 2009 dollars). The VC industry provides both expertise
and funding to entrepreneurs and has cultivated many “superstar" businesses.47 The share
45 Source:

World Inequality Database.
shown by Kuhn et al. (2016), 49% wealth of the wealthiest 1% families comes from business and nonfinancial assets. Diez-Catalan and Salgado (2017) shows that wealth concentration at the top is partly due to
increasing return from “superstar firms" to their starters and major owners.
47 The list of VC backed businesses includes, but is not limited, to: Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet,
46 As
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of public companies with VC involvement at the early stage increased from 0.1% in 1974
to 25% in 2015 (Gornall and Strebulaev (2015)).
Based on the observations above, this paper asks a question: How does the rise of the VC
industry affect wealth inequality and mobility in the United States?
To answer this question, this paper builds a model where households choose entrepreneurship entry and the source of external funds (bank or VC) based on project quality and
household wealth. Compared to a bank that only supplies funding, VC additionally offers synergy with entrepreneurship. The synergy can boost the revenue of the household
business, and the boosting effect increases with the project quality. On the one hand, VC
increases returns of high-quality businesses, contributing to the wealth accumulation of
successful entrepreneurs. On the other hand, VC allows entrepreneurship to depend more
on project quality compared to household wealth, and thus, promotes mobility. When calibrated to occupational transitions and entrepreneurs’ equity shares in the US data, the
model generates that the VC sector: 1) increases the wealth share of the top 0.1% households by 1 percent points and the wealth share of the top 1% households by 2.1 percent
points, 2) increases the probability that the households at the bottom 99% move to the top
1% after a generation by 1.4 percent points.
The model in this paper has three distinct features: 1) VC offers synergy with entrepreneurs
through unobservable effort, while entrepreneurs incentivize VC through a profit-sharing
contract. The contract specifies capital injection and the equity shares of the VC and the
household entrepreneur. Capital investment of VC is important to ensure sufficient effort, implying that expertise and funding must be combined if VC is involved. In another
word, a venture capitalist is not only a combination of a bank and a consulting firm. 2)
Household chooses VC involvement endogenously, and only those with high project quality select venture capital financing and enjoy their expertise. This is because the marginal
benefit from VC’s synergy is positively related to the quality of the business, while the
Facebook, Tesla, GitHub, Dropbox, Uber, Airbnb, Zoom, etc.
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marginal cost of VC financing is constant and higher than that of bank financing, due to
extra compensations to venture capitalists. 3) Internal capital of a business is more mobile for household entrepreneurs compared to outside funding, i.e., households can easily
withdraw their own money from their business when it fails, while the bank and VC cannot. This leads to a wedge in the cost of capital even when the business is incorporated
and protected by law in the case of default.48 The wedge thus creates a strong saving motive for households, in addition to the precautionary saving motive, which is particularly
relevant for entrepreneurs at the right tail of the wealth distribution.
To quantify the model, this paper use moments of microdata on households in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and firms in the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) to identify the core parameters. The model can generate income and wealth
inequality close to reality. It especially replicates the data feature that income and wealth
are concentrated at the top. The importance of the VC financing channel is quantified by
comparing the benchmark economy to an economy where VC financing is not available
to households. This paper finds that the wealth share held by the top 0.1% households
drops by 1 percent points and the wealth share held by the top 1% households drops by
2.1 percent points, showing that the venture capital industry increases top wealth inequality significantly. The key reason is that households with high idea quality get higher entrepreneurial returns from their businesses. This paper also finds that VC increases wealth
mobility to the top 1%, consistent with observations in the data. This effect is rooted in the
mechanism that the talented entrepreneurs not born in the wealthiest families can grow
assets faster with the help of VC.
Related Literature
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, to our knowledge, this paper is the first to
explore the effect of venture capital on wealth inequality and mobility. Current empirical
literature shows micro-level evidence that the synergy with entrepreneurship provided by
48 Entrepreneurs in this paper are defined as households that own and actively manage a business. This
definition rules out firm shareholders that provide only capital but no management effort.
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VC increases business efficiency [Gompers and Lerner (1999), Hellmann and Puri (2002),
Chemmanur et al. (2011), Puri and Zarutskie (2012), Bernstein et al. (2016)]. Therefore, this
paper incorporates both capital investment and expertise from VC into the analysis. Theoretically, there are works that model the VC contract with moral hazard [Casamatta (2003),
Schmidt (2003)], search frictions [Inderst and Müller (2004), Ewens et al. (2018)], or sorting
behaviors (Sørensen (2007)). Compared to the existing models, the profit-sharing contract
in this paper has an additional feature–the benefit from VC rises with the quality of the
business. On the macro side, Greenwood et al. (2017), Akcigit et al. (2019), and Opp (2019)
discuss the relationship between the venture capital sector and economic growth. However, none of the existing study on venture capital has related this new financial tool to
wealth inequality and mobility. This paper tries to fill this blank by including a VC sector
in a heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model with endogenous entrepreneurship
and funding choices.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on entrepreneurship, inequality and mobility. Most of the existing studies about their relationship focus on the roles of borrowing
constraints in entrepreneurs’ saving motives [Quadrini (2000), Meh (2005), Peter (2019),
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)]. They show that frictions in debt financing and the lack of
equity financing push entrepreneurs to save more than workers. This study generates
a wealth distribution close to reality even if entrepreneurs have full access to equity financing. It is highlighted that mobility of internal capital provides a strong saving motives for entrepreneurs. This motive is particularly relevant for incorporated businesses
and wealthy households that barely face borrowing constraints. More broadly, this paper is related to various mechanisms about the rising inequality [Benhabib et al. (2019),
Guvenen et al. (2021), Hubmer et al. (2021), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002)]. The
VC channel proposed by this paper adds to the existing explanations.
Third, this study also addresses the strand of literature about the impact of financial development in alleviating misallocation of talents. Both empirical findings [King and Levine
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(1993), Giné and Townsend (2004)] and theoretical analyses [Jeong and Townsend (2007),
Amaral and Quintin (2010), Greenwood et al. (2010), Buera et al. (2011)] show that technological advances in financing tools move funds from less productive firms to more productive ones. The rise of the VC industry can be viewed as a new financing technology
that enables expertise to be supplied together with capital investment. The model in this
paper generates that entrepreneurship depends more on business ideas and less on household wealth due to the emergence of VC. Therefore, funding of the economy migrates to
high-quality businesses.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 3.2 establishes a heterogeneous-agent general
equilibrium model with endogenous choices of entrepreneurship and funding sources.
Section 3.3 calibrates the model to match important moments of the data. It then does
counterfactual experiments to evaluate the role of venture capital in shaping wealth inequality and mobility in the United States. Section 3.4 concludes.

3.2

Model

To explore the impact of the VC industry on US wealth inequality and mobility through
entrepreneurship, we build a model with endogenous choices of occupation and funding
sources. In this model, households decide entrepreneurial entry (to an incorporated business) and external funds (from bank or VC) according to their household assets and their
idea quality. External financing is more costly than internal financing by using household assets, so, there is a higher saving motive for households who choose to become
entrepreneurs. Venture capital provides both financing and synergy with entrepreneurship through inserting effort. However, the effort of VC is non-contractable, and therefore,
needs to be incentivized by a profit-sharing contract. As will be shown, funding and synergy must be combined if VC is involved. The net benefit of VC financing exceeded that
of bank financing only when the household’s idea quality is high. Thus, only households
with good ideas will get VC involved.
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3.2.1

Demographics

The economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure one. Each household is infinitely lived and is endowed with one unit of labor. Households maximize the
following lifetime utility
∞

∑ βt

t =0

c ( t )1− γ
1−γ

(3.1)

where c(t) captures the flow of consumption in each period; γ governs the degree of risk
aversion; β is the discount rate of the future. Each period lasts for 10 years. At the beginning of each period, each household randomly draws a business idea, x, which can
be bad(x1 ), mediocre (x2 ), or good (x3 ). This idea quality determines the productivity of
the household’s business if it enters entrepreneurship. The transition process of the idea
quality is subject to a Markov chain. The household also draws a labor skill, θ, which determines the effectiveness of its labor supply. θ is governed by an AR(1) process across
periods:
1

log(θ ′ ) = ρlog(θ ) + (1 − ρ2 ) 2 ϵu, u ∼ N (0, 1)

(3.2)

where ρ is the persistency and ϵ is the standard deviation. Each unit of effective labor is
rewarded by a wage rate, w. Each household is endowed with assets, a, which evolve
endogenously according to the household’s consumption and saving choices. Household assets play two roles–smoothing consumption and building internal capital for entrepreneurship.

3.2.2

Timeline

The timeline of events in each period is shown as follows
A household enters each period with assets, a, newly realized idea quality, x, and labor
skill, θ. Then, the household chooses its occupation–being a worker or an entrepreneur. At
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( x, θ, a)

Survival info. realizes
occupation
&
contract

households
withdraw own
assets if fails

production
&
choose c, a′

Figure 3.1: Timeline
the same time, the household also selects the financing methods of its business if becoming an entrepreneur. It can either use household assets to finance its business internally,
or turning to external capital sources. The external sources include the bank and the VC.
The features of the two financing intermediaries will be discussed in detail in Section 3.2.4.
After capital is installed, the business experiences a survival shock, with an exogenous
survival rate of σ. Only successful businesses hire labor and produce, while failed business produces nothing. The household can withdraw its own assets from the business
if the business fails, while the outside capital providers cannot. This captures that internal capital is more mobile compared to external capital. Therefore, as will be shown later,
financing businesses internally is cheaper than doing it externally. This cost difference provides a strong motive for entrepreneurs to accumulate household assets. After production
occurs, the household chooses consumption, c, and assets of the next period, a′ .

3.2.3

Technology

Successful businesses produce output according to the following production function

y = xkη l λ , η + λ < 1

(3.3)

where x is the entrepreneur’s idea quality; k is the total capital of the firm from both the
internal and external sources; l is the amount of labor hired. As in Lucas Jr (1978), the
production function has decreasing return to scale in capital and labor. Therefore, there is
positive profits to business ideas. If VC is involved in entrepreneurship, it provides advice and expertise to the business through inserting an effort, v, which changes the firm’s
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production function. At the same time, there is a random synergy shock, ϵ, in the production process, making the VC’s effort non-observable and non-contractable. The production
function is then a function of the idea quality, VC’s effort, total capital and labor, and a random component–F ( x, v, k, l, ϵ). It is assumed that F ( x, v, k, l, ϵ) takes the following form,
y = F ( x, v, k, l, ϵ) = f (v)ϵxkη l λ ,
where f (v) = Zvϕ , ϵ ∈ [ϵ, ϵ̄], E(ϵ) = 1, ϕ < 1,

η
<1
(1 − λ)(1 − ϕ)

(3.4)

The effect of the expertise provided by VC is captured by f (v), which is an increasing
and concave function of VC’s effort. VC may not always boost the average productivity
of a business, as in the case where effort is too small. The value of v is determined by
the profit-sharing contract between the entrepreneur and the VC, and as will be shown
later, positively related to the amount of capital that VC inserts into the business. The
condition that

η
(1−λ)(1−ϕ)

< 1 is to ensure that the participation constraint is binding in the

VC contract, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.
Many firms in the economy are owned by shareholders instead of a single entrepreneur.
Shareholders of these firms only supply funding without playing any managerial role.
The production function of non-entrepreneurial firms can be represented by: Y = K α L1−α ,
where K and L are respectively the total capital and labor hired in these firms.

3.2.4

Credit Market

There are two financial intermediaries in the credit market: the bank and the venture capital (VC). They can both borrow at a risk-free rate r from household savings. As pension
fund is the main source of funding for venture capital, this assumption is not unrealistic.
The bank and venture capital only provides corporate loans but not personal loans. Therefore, households must have nonnegative assets at the beginning of each period. It is also
assumed that business ideas are built in the households entrepreneur, and thus, can not be
sold to venture capital.
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The bank can provide loans to entrepreneurs. The loans are defaultable as incorporated
businesses enjoy limited liability protection by law. The interest rate of bank loans is higher
than the risk-free rate, as it takes into account the possibility of business failure. The nonentrepreneurial firms can borrow at the risk-free rate from the bank since they do not
experience survival risks.
The venture capital can provide funding to entrepreneurs and hold equity stakes at their
businesses. It also hires venture capitalists to synergize with the entrepreneurs it finances.
Entrepreneurs who get VC funding sign a contract with the venture capital specifying the
amount of external capital from the VC, kVC , the amount of capital from the entrepreneur
if the business succeeds or fails respectively, k es and k e f , and the equity share of the VC in
the business, ζ. The equity share captures the share of revenue claimed by VC. To provide
expertise, v, VC needs to hire venture capitalists at the wage rate, w. The venture capital
faces an incentive constraint and a participation constraint. As will be proved, venture
capital gets zero profit in the optimal profit-sharing contract. This is consistent with the
finding by Hall and Woodward (2007) that the average excess return to the venture capital
industry after fee payment to venture capitalists is low.

3.2.5

Households’ Problem

Each household chooses occupation and financing methods according to its idea quality,
x, labor skill, θ, and assets, a. It maximizes the value of the following three cases:
V ( x, θ, ao ) = max{V 0 ( x, θ, a), V B ( x, θ, a), V VC ( x, θ, a}
| {z } | {z } | {z }
Worker

Bank

(3.5)

VC

V 0 ( x, θ, a) is the value of being a worker; V B ( x, θ, a) is the value of being an entrepreneur
with bank financing or only internal financing; V VC ( x, θ, a) is the value of being an entrepreneur with VC financing. The reason that the entrepreneur will not choose bank and
VC financing simultaneously will be unfolded in proposition 1. For all of the three cases,
the value function of the household is a combination of a current utility flow and the dis111

counted future value. The following subsections specify the value function in each case.

Worker
If the household chooses to become a worker, it gets labor income from its effective labor
supply, θ, and return to household assets at the risk-free rate. The household makes the
consumption and saving decisions at the end of each period. It is not allowed to leave debt
to the next period.
V 0 ( x, θ, a) = max
u(c) + βψEV ( x ′ , θ ′ , a′ )
′
c,a

s.t.

(3.6)

c + a′ = (1 + r ) a + wθ
a′ ≥ 0

Entrepreneur with Bank or only Internal Financing
If the household chooses to become an entrepreneur without VC involvement, it decides
the capital it borrows from the bank, k B , the assets it provides to the business in the cases of
success and failure respectively, k es and k e f , and the consumption and savings respectively
f

in the two cases, {ci , ai′ }i=s . k e f can be regarded as the remaining internal capital injection
after withdrawal.

V B ( x, θ, a) = max σ[u(cs ) + βψEV ( x ′ , θ ′ , a′s )]
k B ,k es ,k e f ,
f

{ci ,ai′ }i=s

+ (1 − σ)[u(c f ) + βψEV ( x ′ , θ ′ , a′f )]
s.t.

cs + a′s = π ( x, k B + k es ) + (1 + r ) a −
c f + a′f = (1 + r ) a − (r + δ)k e f
0 ≤k es , k e f ≤ a
k B , a′s , a′f ≥ 0
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(r + δ )
k B − (r + δ)k es
σ

(3.7)

In the case of success, the entrepreneur gets capital gains, π ( x, k B + k es ), from the business,
which depends on the total capital level of the business. More specifically, it is the net
revenue of the business after the labor cost is deducted, i.e.,

π ( x, k B + k es ) = max xl λ (k B + k es )η − wl
l

(3.8)

The household also gets returns from its safe asset, a. It has to pay capital cost for both
the external and internal funds. Since the capital borrowed from the bank cannot be withdrawn from the business as easily as the internal funds and thus is subject to a risk, the
cost of external capital is higher than that of internal capital. δ captures the depreciation
rate of all the capital. In the case of failure, the entrepreneur only gets returns from the safe
asset. It pays a cost to its remaining capital injection in the business after withdrawal. The
internal capital in the two cases are assumed to be nonnegative and not exceed the amount
of household assets at the beginning of the period.

Entrepreneur with VC Financing
If the household chooses to become an entrepreneur with VC involvement, it signs a profitsharing contract with the VC, specifying the capital provided by both sides, kVC , k es , and
k e f , and the equity share of the VC, ζ.49 In the case of success, the entrepreneurs gets the
remaining part of the (boosted) capital gains after the VC claims its share. It gets returns
from the safe assets, a, and has to pay for the cost of internal capital. In the case of failure,
it only gets returns from the safe assets, and pays for the internal capital after withdrawal.
The venture capital is subject to an incentive constraint ( IC ) and a participation constraint

( PC ). In the IC constraint, the venture capital chooses its effort by maximizing its net
expected profit. The PC constraint requires that the net expected profit of the VC should
be nonnegative. The net expected profit equals to the expected capital gains claimed by the
VC net of the capital cost and labor cost of hiring venture capitalist. The internal capital
49 The optimality of the profit-sharing contract can be justified by introducing unobservable entrepreneurial
effort. Here the model assumes the contract to take the form of profit-sharing to be close to the actual VC
contract.
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in the two cases are assumed to be nonnegative and not exceed the amount of household
assets at the beginning of the period.
V VC ( x, θ, a) =

max

kVC ,k es ,k e f ,ζ

σ[

Z

u(cs ) + βψEV ( x, θ ′ , a′s )dΦ(ϵ)]

f

{ci ,ai′ }i=s

+ (1 − σ)[u(c f ) + βψEV ( x ′ , θ ′ , a′f )]
s.t.

cs + a′s = (1 − ζ )[ f (v)ϵπ ( x, kVC + k es )] + (1 + r ) a − (r + δ)k es
c f + a′f = (1 + r ) a − (r + δ)k e f

(3.9)

( IC ) : v ∈ arg max σζ f (v̂)π ( x, kVC + k es ) − (r + δ)kVC − wv̂
v̂

( PC ) : σζ f (v)π ( x, kVC + k es ) − (r + δ)kVC − wv ≥ 0
0 ≤k es , k e f ≤ a
kVC , a′s , a′f ≥ 0

3.2.6

Stationary Equilibrium
f

The stationary equilibrium of this economy is described by allocations {c, a′ , {ci , ai′ }i=s ,
k B , kVC , ζ, k es , k e f } for households, {K, L} for non-entrepreneurial firms, prices {r, w} and
the joint distribution { D ( j, x, θ, a)}, where j is the occupation and financing choice of the
household, such that

1. Given prices, household allocations maximize V ( x, θ, a).
2. w, r are given by the marginal rate of production of the non-entrepreneurial firms.
3. Labor and capital markets clear.
4. The joint distribution { D ( j, x, θ, a)} is time-invariant.

3.2.7

Analysis of the Equilibrium

Two key decisions of the household are the occupational choice and the funding source
choice. They are both based on the household’s project quality and assets. This section
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theoretically analyzes the household’s decisions and the impact of VC. This paper first
rules out the case where household entrepreneurs get external funding from both the bank
and VC, as shown in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (VC is an Exclusive Partner). External financing either totally comes from the
bank or totally comes from the VC.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.1.
Proposition 1 implies that if there is VC involvement in the business, all the external funding should be provided by the VC. The intuition is that larger injection of capital provides
stronger incentives for VC to insert effort. Since the capital cost of VC and bank are the
same, letting VC supply more external capital increases the profit of the business. This
proposition justifies the separate cases of bank financing and VC financing in the household’s problem. In reality, VC funded firms barely borrow money from the bank. In other
words, VC is an exclusive partner of businesses. Therefore, what described in proposition
1 is consistent with the real world.
If VC is not involved in the household business, the capital investment of the entrepreneur
and lending from the bank can be solved analytically.

Proposition 2 shows that

entrepreneurs will use up their household assets before turning to the bank.
Proposition 2 (Priority of Internal Funding if VC is not Involved). If VC is not involved, entrepreneurs use internal capital first and borrow external funds from the bank only when household
assets are not sufficient.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.2.
The intuition of proposition 2 is that the marginal cost of internal capital is lower than
that of bank capital but the marginal benefits are the same between the two. Therefore,
households prefer to use their household assets to fund their business and only borrow
money from the bank when their household assets are not enough. As is shown in the
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Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) data, bank-funded entrepreneurs put a bulk share of their
household assets into their business, consistent with proposition 2.
If VC is involved in the business, entrepreneurs will reduce their share of investment in
the business. This is because capital inserted by VC has another role–incentivizing VC’s
effort. Although the cost of internal financing is still lower than external financing from
the VC, the household would like to ask the VC to have more “skin” in the game.
Proposition 3 (“Skin” in the Game of VC). If VC is involved, its capital investment has an additional role–incentivizing VC effort. Therefore, households include VC funding into their businesses
even if household assets are sufficient.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.3.
Proposition C.1.3 implies that household entrepreneurs have a large equity share in the
case of VC involvement compared to that of no VC involvement.50 Figure 3.2 shows the
relationship between entrepreneurs’ equity share in their businesses and their household
assets with and without VC involvement when the household’s idea quality is high. When
VC is not involved, entrepreneurs own all the business when they are wealthy enough;
when VC is involved, entrepreneurs ask VC to insert capital into the business even if they
are sufficiently wealthy to fund their business. The differences in entrepreneurs’ equity
shares are consistent with observations in the data.

3.3

Quantitative Analysis

This section presents the quantitative results of the model. The parameters in the model
are calibrated by targeting key data moments in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 (NLSY79) and the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS). Then, the model fit to the income distribution and wealth distribution in the US data is evaluated. In the end, a counter-factual
50 Although there is debt financing in the case of no VC involvement, a pseudo equity share can be calculated, which is the share of capital gains obtained by the household entrepreneur after paying back to the bank
in the case of success.
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Figure 3.2: Entrepreneur Equity Share by Funding Choice
analysis, quantifying the importance of the VC channel in wealth inequality and mobility,
is conducted. Understanding the role of VC in shaping wealth inequality and mobility is
potentially useful for policy designs of tax treatment on unconventional finance.

3.3.1

Calibration

The parameters in the model are calibrated in two ways.51 The first set of parameters are
determined either from the data without using the model, or from estimation of previous studies. The second set of parameters are chosen to match data moments with the
associated model generated counterparts. The discount factor, capital depreciation rate,
transition processes of labor skill and idea quality shown in the following tables are annual rate. Since each period lasts for 10 years in the model, the parameters are taken to the
tenth power.
51 The

current version of calibration assumes there is no synergy shock, i.e., ϵ always equals to 1.
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Table 3.1 shows parameters that are either from the literature or directly estimated. The
upper panel (A) lists the parameters directly taken from the literature. The risk aversion
parameter γ is taken to be 1.5, a value close to the study by Kasa and Lei (2018). Annual
capital depreciation rate δ is 6%, according to the National Income and Product Accounts.
The share of income that goes to capital for non-entrepreneurial firms, α, is 0.33, following
the estimation by Kaldor (1957). The capital and labor share for entrepreneurial firms
are 0.2805 and 0.5695 respectively, following Choi (2017), leading to the profit share of
business ideas equal to 0.15. The lower panel (B) lists the parameters directly estimated
from the data. The 10-year survival rate of business, σ, is set to be 0.40, as estimated by
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Business Employment Dynamics. Note that there is no
significant difference in the exit rate for firms with and without VC financing in the data.
The persistence and standard deviation of the transition process of labor ability, θ, are 0.95
and 0.3 respectively, from estimating the labor income process in the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).
Description
A. Literature
γ
CRRA parameter
δ
Depreciation rate
α
Capital’s share (Corporate)
η
Capital’s share (Non-Corporate)
λ
Labor’s share (Non-Corporate)
B. Direct Estimation
σ
Survival rate of business (10 yrs)
ρ
Persistence of labor skill
σθ Standard deviation of labor skill

Value

Identification

1.5
0.06
0.33
0.2805
0.5695

Kasa and Lei (2017)
US NIPA
Kaldor (1957)
Choi (2017)
Choi (2017)

0.40
0.95
0.3

BLS, BED
Persistence of labor income
Variance of labor income

Table 3.1: Parameter Values: Externally Calibrated

After fixing the parameters in Table 3.1, the remaining parameters are the annual discount
factor β, project quality vector x = {0, x2 , x3 } (x1 normalized to 0), project quality transition
matrix Mx , and the scale and elasticity of VC productivity boost function { Z, ϕ}. These
parameters are collected in Ω = { β, x, Mx , Z, ϕ}, and are jointly estimated via the method
of moments, minimizing the weighted distance between the model and data moments
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M (Ω) and M D


′ 
Ω̂ = min M D − M(Ω) W M D − M (Ω)
Ω

(3.10)

where the weight matrix W = I. Table 3.2 lists the data moments chosen and offers the
identification strategy. β is adjusted to achieve an annual interest rate of 4%. The x vector
controls the income differences among workers, non-VC-backed entrepreneurs and VCbacked entrepreneurs. Since most of the entrepreneurs are with mediocre idea quality, x2 ,
the value of x2 largely affects the entrepreneurs’ share in equilibrium; the quality of good
idea, x3 , determines the employment ratio between VC-backed businesses (businesses
with good ideas) and non-VC-backed businesses (businesses with mediocre ideas). So,
the entrepreneurs’ share and VC-to-non-VC employment ratio are used to pin down the x
vector. The idea transition matrix Mx is identified by the occupation transitions between
workers and entrepreneurs, estimated from the NLSY79, and between entrepreneurs with
different funding sources, estimated from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS). Z and ϕ are
key parameters to capture VC’s synergy effect and are pinned down carefully. The level
term in the productivity boost function, Z, is calibrated by matching the average synergy effect of VC in the model with the estimated effect of VC’s expertise on firms’ TFP
in the empirical literature (Chemmanur et al. (2011)). The elasticity term, ϕ, determines
how much capital should be injected by VC to ensure enough effort. So this parameter is
directly linked to the VC’s equity share in VC-backed businesses. Table 3.3 shows the performance of the calibration process (occupation transitions are exactly targeted and thus
omitted). Most of the moments predicted by the model are close to their counterparts in
the data.
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β
x

Description

Value

Identification

Discount factor
Idea quality

0.97
[0 1.74 3.71]

Interest rate
E share;
Emp. ratio (VC/B)



Mx

Quality Transition

Z
ϕ

Prod. boost, scale
Prod. boost, elasticity

0.97
0.27
0.15
1.19
0.03

0.03
0.73
0.51


1.89e − 4
0.002 
0.34

Occup. transition
Net effect of VC
VC Equity shares

Table 3.2: Parameter Values: Internal Calibrated

Moments
Interest rate
Entrepreneur share
Emp. ratio (VC/B)
Net effect of VC
Internal equity share (VC)

Data
0.4
8.2
58.14
18.5%
0.40

Model
0.4
6.3
58.43
19.2%
0.37

Identifying
β
x2
x3
Z
ϕ

Table 3.3: Calibration Performance

3.3.2

Model Fit

This subsection checks the model fit to untargeted moments in the US data. It will focus
on the stationary equilibrium where the interest rate is constant and is at its steady state
value of 4%.
This study first checks two untargeted moments–the wealth ratio between entrepreneurs
and workers and the share of VC-backed entrepreneurs among all entrepreneurs. The data
counterpart of the former comes from the NLSY79 and the later comes from the KFS. As
shown in Table 3.4, the model under-predicts the wealth ratio to some extent but matches
the VC share quite well.
Moments
Wealth ratio (E/W)
VC share (V/E)

Data
2.23
0.67

Model
1.45
0.72

Table 3.4: Model Fit: Untargeted Moments

Then, this study checks the model fit for the income and wealth gini coefficients and their
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distributions. Table 3.5 lists respectively the income and wealth gini coefficients, the share
of income and wealth owned by households in the top 0.1%, 1%, 10% and 50% of the
income and wealth distributions in both the model and the data. Note that the calibration
process does not target any moments on income or wealth distribution, so all the moments
shown in Table 3.5 reflect the model’s ability to fit the income and wealth inequality. For
income, the model overestimates the overall inequality by predicting a more concentrated
distribution at the right tail. For wealth, the model does an excellent job in predicting not
only the overall inequality (as shown by the exactly matched gini coefficient), but also the
wealth shares at nearly all of the quantiles studied.
In the model economy, households climb up the wealth ladder by either investing in riskfree bond or engaging in a business project. Because the internal capital is less costly
compared to external capital, wealthy households would not sharply decrease their saving
rate as the normal precautionary saving motive is fading. This mechanism makes the
entrepreneur stack more assets even at the top quantiles of the wealth distribution in our
model, and therefore, generates a wealth distribution with a thick right tail.
Moments (%)
Income gini
Percent income in top .1
Percent income in top 1
Percent income in top 10
Percent income in top 50
Wealth gini
Percent wealth in top .1
Percent wealth in top 1
Percent wealth in top 10
Percent wealth in top 50

Data
0.5
7.5
16.3
41.7
85.3
0.8
15.0
31.0
67.4
98.2

Model
0.7
9.1
27.3
62.1
91.5
0.8
10.7
30.4
68.9
95.6

Table 3.5: Model Fit: Income and Wealth Distribution

3.3.3

Counterfactual Analysis

This subsection conducts a series of counterfactual analysis to explore the contribution of
VC to the income inequality, wealth inequality, and wealth mobility. The analysis is based
on the stationary equilibrium of the model. This study simulates both the benchmark
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model and a version of the model where VC is not available to households, i.e., the VC
financing channel is shut down. The same set of parameters as described in section 3.3.1 is
used in the comparison.
Table 3.6 summaries the VC’s impact on the income distribution. If the VC channel is shut
down, the income gini coefficient decreases from 0.709 to 0.689, generating a difference
of 0.02. As we can see from the income shares of the .1%, 1%, 10% and 50%, the extra
inequality induced by the VC sector is mainly due to the income concentration at relatively
top shares. This is not surprising as only high quality, i.e. high x, projects are able to obtain
synergy effects of the VC sector.
The increasing income inequality at the right tail of the distribution is also shown in Figure
3.3, which plots the income Lorenz curves with and without VC financing. The blue one is
the income Lorenz curve generated by the model with VC, and the red one is the income
Lorenz curve generated by the model without VC. VC financing makes the Lorenz curve
steeper, especially among the high income population.
1

Model with VC: Gini=0.709
Model without VC: Gini=0.689

0.9

VC

No VC

Difference

Gini

0.709

0.689

0.02

Top .1

9.2%

8.4%

0.8%

Top 1

27.3%

24.4%

2.9%

Top 10

62.1%

59.3%

2.8%

Top 50

91.5%

90.8%

0.7%

0.8

share of income

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

share of population

Figure 3.3: Income Lorenz Curve

Table 3.6: Income Gini and Top Shares

Table 3.7 conducts a similar experiment for the VC’s impact on the wealth distribution.
The shutdown of the VC channel generates a decrease of the Gini coefficient by 0.015 (from
0.784 to 0.769). Similar to the income distribution, the VC channel also affects the right tail
of the wealth distribution most. For the top 0.1% households, shutting down the VC chan-
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nel reduces their wealth share by 1.0% (from 10.7% to 9.7%). For the top 1% households,
the effect is even stronger: the unavailability of VC financing reduces their wealth share
by 2.1% (from 30.4% to 28.3%). For the top 10% households, the decrease is 2.4%. For the
top 50% in total, the VC channel only has a minor effect.
Figure 3.4 plots the wealth Lorenz curves with and without VC financing. The blue one is
the wealth Lorenz curve generated by the model with VC, and the red one is the wealth
Lorenz curve generated by the model without VC. Similar to the income case, VC financing
makes the wealth Lorenz curve more steeper at the right tail.
1

Model with VC: Gini=0.784
Model without VC: Gini=0.769

0.9

VC

No VC

Difference

Gini

0.784

0.769

0.015

Top .1

10.7%

9.7%

1.0%

Top 1

30.4%

28.3%

2.1%

Top 10

68.9%

66.5%

2.4%

Top 50

95.6%

95.3%

0.3%

0.8

share of wealth

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

share of population

Figure 3.4: Wealth Lorenz Curve

Table 3.7: Wealth Gini and Top Shares

The analysis above shows that the VC sector is making both the income and wealth more
unequally distributed. Because of the synergy effect, the VC helps talented entrepreneurs
to get more business returns and accumulate more wealth, thus thickening the right tails
of the income and wealth distributions.
Furthermore, the VC channel also impacts the wealth mobility. By providing synergy
together with funding, the VC sector enables talented but non-wealthy entrepreneurs to
quickly grow their assets. When quantitatively solving the model, it is found that household wealth is an important determinant for households to become internally funded or
bank-backed entrepreneurs when their project quality is mediocre, but is less relevant in
the decision of becoming VC-backed entrepreneurs when their project quality is high. In
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another word, VC makes entrepreneurship depend more on project quality compared to
household wealth. Therefore, the chance of getting to the top 1% is higher in a economy
with VC financing for the bottom 99%.
Table 3.8 shows the transition probability from some selected wealth quantiles to the top
1% after a generation (30 years). For the bottom 95%, the chance to get into the top 1%
after a generation is almost negligible for both economies of our model. For the 95%-99%
quantiles, the VC channel moves the transition probability to the top 1% after a generation
from 7.23% to 8.61%. While at the same time the VC channel does not alter the probability
of the top 1% staying at the top 1% after a generation. For the time horizon of about one
generation, high project quality (smart ideas) shows low persistence. It is thus hard for the
bottom 95% to move into the top 1% as serial entrepreneurs. As a result, the VC effect on
mobility is mainly to raise the chance of the rich to become the very rich.
from
0-60%
60-90%
90-95%
95-99%
Top 1%

VC
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
8.61%
94.99%

No VC
0.00%
0.00%
0.03%
7.23%
94.99%

Difference
0.00%
0.00%
-0.03%
1.38%
0.00%

Table 3.8: Transition Probability TO Top 1%: 30 Years

3.4

Conclusion

The past few decades have witnessed a huge increase in the share owned by the top 1%
households. At nearly the same period, there has been a thriving venture capital industry
and a rise of fast-growing entrepreneurial businesses. Motivated by these facts, this paper
builds a novel model, connecting the venture capital sector with the wealth distribution in
a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari framework.
In the model of the paper, households endogenously choose entrepreneurship entry and
whether to get bank or VC financing according to their household wealth and project qual124

ity. Compared to bank financing, venture capital offers synergy to entrepreneurs. However, the effort of venture capitalists is unobservable, leading to a moral hazard problem.
This requires entrepreneurs to share profit with VC to maintain incentive compatibility.
The non-contractible nature of VC effort implies expertise and funding must be combined
if VC is involved, a feature that makes VC not equivalent to a bank and a consulting firm.
This feature not only well defines a venture capitalist, but also helps generate reasonable
equity shares of entrepreneurs in businesses with bank or VC financing. The equity shares
are also used to calibrate the synergy effect of VC.
Another distinct feature of our model is that we assume internal capital of a firm to be
more mobile for household entrepreneurs compared to outside funding, which leads to a
wedge in the cost of capital. This wedge thus creates a strong saving motive in addition to
the regular precautionary saving motive. By introducing this feature we avoid using the
standard borrowing constraints, where the amount of borrowing is a function of personal
savings, to generate wealth inequality. The advantage of this feature is twofold. First,
borrowing constraints are not so relevant for the venture capital backed businesses and for
the very wealthy households. Second, it generates much larger wealth mobility, making
the model better match the data.
Quantitatively, The model can match the income distribution, wealth distribution, and
entrepreneur shares by wealth in the United States. After calibrating the model to occupational transitions and entrepreneurs’ equity shares, a counterfactual analysis shows that
the VC sector: 1) increases the wealth share of the top 0.1% households by 1 percent points
and the wealth share of the top 1% households by 2.1 percent points, 2) increases the probability that the households at the bottom 99% move to the top 1% after a generation by 1.4
percent points. Overall, the VC sector increases inequality by increasing business returns
for successful entrepreneurs, and at same time increases mobility by allowing the talented
to climb to the top more easily. The effect of VC on the wealth distribution and mobility
found in this paper provides another perspective to evaluate this industry.
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APPENDIX A
S UPPLEMENTARY M ATERIAL FOR C HAPTER 1
A.1
A.1.1

Additional Figures
Another Measure of Innovation Intensity

The following figure shows the (citation-weighted) number of patents per employee for
small/medium firms and large firms. They both increased starting from the early 1980s,
but the increase was more salient for small/medium firms. The rising trends are partly due
to the extension of patentability, but the different slops of them reflect that small/medium
firms engaged in more R&D activities.

Figure A.1: Patents per Employee by Size

A.1.2

Timing of Patent Trading

Figure A.2 shows the timing of the patent trading. The blue, red, green, and yellow curves
display respectively the fraction of patents traded within four years before issuance, one
to five years after issuance, six to ten years after issuance, and more than ten years after
issuance. It should be noted that the descending trend of the yellow curve after 2000 is
due to the right censoring issue. Comparison of the four curves suggests that most of the
increase happened between 1980 and 2000, consistent with the timing of the pro-patent
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policy reforms; earlier transactions occurred more often, evidence that the patent trading
market has become more efficient.

Figure A.2: Fraction of Patent Traded by Gaps from the Grant Year

A.2
A.2.1

Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1

Proof. Denote the distribution of production ability and innovation levels among all firms
at the end of the current period as F (m, z′ ; z). Equation (1.11) implies that the labor market
clearing condition can be written as
λ
η η λ
( ) ζ ( )1+ ζ
w
r̃

Z Z

mz′ dF (m, z′ ; z) = 1.

(A.1)

Equation (A.1) can be transformed to
λ
η η λ
( ) ζ ( )1+ ζ (α H m H z′H + α L m L z′L ) = 1,
w
r̃

(A.2)

where z′H and z′L are respectively the average innovation level of firms with high production ability and that of firms with low production ability at the end of this period. They
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are defined by
1
z′ dF (m H , z′ ; z);
αH
Z
1
z′ dF (m L , z′ ; z).
z′L =
αL
Z

z′H =

(A.3)
(A.4)

The economy-wide average innovation level at the end of the previous period, z, can then
be expressed as

z=

αH mH zH + αL mL zL
.
αH mH + αL mL

(A.5)

Assume z grows at a constant rate, g, across periods. Then, the labor market clearing
condition can be further transformed to
λ
η η λ
( ) ζ ( )1+ ζ (α H m H + α L m L ) gz = 1.
w
r̃

(A.6)

The wage rate, w, can then be expressed as
ζ
η η
w = λ( ) ζ +λ [(α H m H + α L m L ) gz] ζ +λ ,
r̃

(A.7)

ζ

which implies that it grows at a rate of g ζ +λ . The total output and capital of the economy
ζ

also grow at g ζ +λ , since
Z Z

η η λ λ
Y (m, z′ ; z)dF (m, z′ ; z) = ( ) ζ ( ) ζ (α H m H + α L m L ) gz;
r̃
w
Z Z
η λ λ
η
K (m, z′ ; z)dF (m, z′ ; z) = ( )1+ ζ ( ) ζ (α H m H + α L m L ) gz,
r̃
w

(A.8)
(A.9)

ζ

where w grows at the rate g ζ +λ , z grows at the rate, g, and all the other parameters are
fixed.
A firm with production ability m and an innovation level z at the beginning of the period may or may not update its innovation level through R&D or trade. If it updates the
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innovation level, the profit of the current period is
η η λ λ
π (m, z′ ; z) = ζm( ) ζ ( ) ζ (z + γz).
w
r̃

(A.10)

η η λ λ
π (m, z; z) = ζm( ) ζ ( ) ζ z.
r̃
w

(A.11)

Otherwise, the profit is

Denote z̃ =

z
λ

, z̃ =

z ζ +λ

z
λ

. Plugging the expression of w in (A.7) into (A.10) and (A.11)

z ζ +λ

derives
π (m, z′ ; z) = Am(z̃ + γz̃), π (m, z; z) = Amz̃,
η

(A.12)

where A = ζ ( r̃ ) ζ +λ [(α H m H + α L m L ) g]− ζ +λ . So, the difference of firm profit with the upη

λ

dated and non-updated innovation levels is Amγz̃, which is not a function of the firm’s
current innovation level, z.
Next, a guess-and-verify procedure is used to derive the value of the firm at the beginning
of the period, V (m, z; z). Conjecture

V (m, z; z) = v1 (m)z̃ + v2 (m)z̃.

(A.13)

Then, the surplus of the firm if being a buyer in the Nash bargaining problem (1.14) is

[π (m, z′ ; z) + rEV (m′ , z′ ; z′ )] − [π (m, z; z) + rEV (m′ , z; z′ )] = [ Am + rE(v1 (m′ )) g− ζ +λ ]γz̃,
λ

(A.14)
which is not a function of the firm’s innovation level, z, either. Denote this surplus as
∆ψ(m; z) and use B(m) as an abbreviation for [ Am + rE(v1 (m′ )) g− ζ +λ ]. We have
λ

∆ψ(m; z) = B(m)γz̃.
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(A.15)

The price this firm has to pay if buying a patent from others can be expressed as (Point 8)

pb (m; z) = θ∆ψ(m; z) = θB(m)γz̃,

(A.16)

i.e., the buying price is the bargaining power of the seller times the trading surplus of the
buyer. It only depends on the production ability of the buyer and the aggregate innovation
level. The expected price this firm gets if selling a patent on the market depends on the
shares of searching effort from high-type buyers and low-type buyers. Since we focus on
a symmetric equilibrium, the shares are constants on any arc of the technology circle, i.e.,
n
nbH (d)
= bH , ∀d,
nb (d)
nb
where

nbH
nb

and

nbL
nb

(A.17)

are the share of potential buyers with high and low production ability.

The expected selling price can be expressed as

ps = θ

Z Z

∆ψ(m; z)dG (m, z; z) = [

n
nbH
B(m H ) + bL B(m L )]θγz̃.
nb
nb

(A.18)

To solve firms’ optimal innovation intensity, it is necessary to derive the expressions of
s and b(ω ) in problem (1.13). Consider any arc on the circle. Without loss of generality, Figure A.3 shows an arc d with length |d|. The total search effort by potential sellers
on d equals to the number of potential sellers that have a patent located inside d. On a
symmetric balanced growth path, sellers’ patents are evenly distributed on the circle. So,
ns (d) = |d|ns .

Figure A.3: Schematic Diagram
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Potential buyers that spend effort searching on d may have various scope. I classify these
buyers according to the length of their scope. For potential buyers with scope length equal
to |ω |, their locations may span from 1 to 3. Buyers at location 1 or 3 spend measure 0 of
search effort on d, while buyers at location 2 spend measure

|d|
|ω |

of search effort on d. The

total measure of search effort on d conditional on the buyer having |ω | as the scope length
is an integral of effort from location 1 to 3, which can be expressed as
Z |d|
i
0

|ω |

di +

Z |ω |
|d|
|d|

|ω |

di +

Z |d|+|ω |
|d| + |ω | − i

|ω |

|ω |

di = |d|, ∀|ω |, |d|.

(A.19)

This conditional measure does not rely on the scope length. So, the unconditional total
measure of search effort on d is d times the total number of potential buyers, i.e., nb (d) =

|d|nb .
The number of matches on the arc d equals to
M(s(d), b(d)) = |d|ϕnνs n1b−ν , ∀d.

(A.20)

Potential buyers with scope ω will only search within its scope, so, the probability of meeting a seller is

b(ω ) =

M (ns (ω ), nb (ω ))
ns ν
=ϕ
≡ b,
nb (ω )
nb

(A.21)

which is a constant and does not depend on the scope of the buyer (Point 3). The probability for a potential seller to meet a buyer is

s = lim

|d0 |→0

n  1− ν
M (ns (d0 ), nb (d0 ))
=ϕ b
,
n d ( d0 )
ns

(A.22)

which is also a constant. Plugging the matching probabilities b(ω ) and s into problem
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(1.13) derives the solution of firms’ R&D success rate.
i∗ (ω, m) = {

1
γ
[ X (ω )(1 − (1 − θ )b) B(m) + (1 − X (ω ))sθ (σH B(m H ) + σL B(m L ))]} ρ ,
(1 − σ ) χ

(A.23)
which only depends on the firm’s production scope and production ability (Point 5).
The firm’s value at the innovation stage, D (ω, m, z; z) is then

D (ω, m, z; z) = B(m)z̃ + [

ζ
(1 − σ ) ρ ∗
χi (ω, m)1+ρ + b(1 − θ ) B(m)γ + rEv2 (m′ ) g ζ +λ ]z̃.
1+ρ

(A.24)
D (ω, m, z; z) is larger when ω is closer to the center for any given length of ω if the following condition is fulfilled

(1 − (1 − θ )b) B(m) − sθ (σH B(m H ) + σL B(m L )) > 0,

(A.25)

i.e., the value of a within-scope patent is larger than an out-of-scope patent.52 firms will
always choose to span symmetrically around its center. The length of the firm’s production
scope (|ω |) is determined by problem (1.16),
i∗ (ω, m) X ′ (|ω |)[(1 − (1 − θ )b) B(m) − sθ (σH B(m H ) + σL B(m L ))]γ = µ|ω |ι .

(A.26)

The solution to equation (A.26) is just a function of m, i.e, |ω ∗ (m, z; z)| = Ω(m) (Point 4).
The number of buyers of each type, (nbH , nbL ), are the share of firms in each type that do
not get an innovation output matching their production scope. The total number of buyers
52 This

condition is easily satisfied. The calibrated model confirms this condition holds true.
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is the summation of the buyers of the two types. They can be expressed as (Point 7)
nbH = α H (1 − i∗ (ω ∗ (m H ), m H ) X (ω ∗ (m H )));

(A.27)

nbL = α H (1 − i∗ (ω ∗ (m L ), m L ) X (ω ∗ (m L )));

(A.28)

bb = nbH + nbL .

(A.29)

The number of sellers are the share of firms that successfully innovate, but the output falls
outside of their own production scope
ns = α H i∗ (ω ∗ (m H ), m H )(1 − X (ω ∗ (m H ))) + α L i∗ (ω ∗ (m L ), m L )(1 − X (ω ∗ (m L ))). (A.30)

The value of the firm at the beginning of the period, V (m, z; z), can be expressed as
V (m, z; z) = D (Ω(m), m, z; z) − C e (ω; z) ≡ v1 (m)z̃ + v2 (m)z̃,

(A.31)

where

v1 ( m ) = B ( m );
v2 ( m ) = [

(A.32)

ζ
µ|Ω(m)|1+ι
ρ
χi∗ (Ω(m), m)1+ρ + b(1 − θ ) B(m)γ + rEv2 (m′ ) g ζ +λ −
].
1+ρ
1+ι

(A.33)
Since both v1 (m) and v2 (m) are only functions of m, the value function, V (m, z; z), is consistent with the conjecture (Point 6).
The representative household’s problem can be expressed as
W ( a; z) = max
u(c) + βW ( a′ ; z)
′

(A.34)

c,a

s.t., c + a′ =

1
a + Π,
r

where a is the asset holding of the household in the current period;
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(A.35)
1
r

is the capital return

rate, where its relationship with the capital cost, r̃, is r̃ =

1
r

− 1 + δ; Π is the total profit of

firms in this economy. Because all firms are owned by the household, the total profit is a
part of the household’s income. Solving the problem derives the following relationship on
consumption across periods,
c′
β 1
= ( )ϵ.
c
r

(A.36)

ζ

Since consumption grows at the same rate, g ζ +λ , as the total output, and the interest rate is
fixed over time, we have (Point 2)

r=

β
gϵζ/(ζ +λ)

.

(A.37)

The growth rate of the employment-weighted-average innovation level of the economy, g,
can be expressed by the following equation according to the definition,

g≡

α H m H zH ′ + α L m L zL ′
.
α H m H zH + α L m L zL

(A.38)

In the balanced growth path equilibrium, the ratio of the innovation level of firms with
high production ability to that of the firms with low production ability should be stable
across periods, i.e.,
z
zH ′
= H ≡ o,
′
zL
zL

(A.39)

where o is a constant. Then (A.38) implies that

g=

zH ′
z ′
= L .
zH
zL

(A.40)

Equations in (A.40) show that the growth rate in the innovation level of the aggregate
economy is the same as the growth rate of firms across types.
The change in the average innovation levels of high- and low-type firms consists of two
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components.
1) There is a reshuffling of firms at the beginning of each period because of the transition
of production ability.
2) Firms update their innovation level through R&D or trade of patents.
The average innovation level of each type of firms after the transition of production ability
but before the innovation stage in this period can be expressed as follows,
α H q HH zH + α L q LH zL
;
α H q HH + α L q LH
α q z + α H q HL zH
≡ L LL L
.
α L q LL + α H q HL

zHr ≡

(A.41)

zLr

(A.42)

Firms update their innovation level in the R&D or trading process following the law of
motion described in (1.1). So, the growth rate of each type of firms in this process (denoted
as g H and g L ) depends on the share of them that successfully create an intellectual output
that matches their scope and the share that successfully buy a patent on the market.

gH ≡

z
zH ′
= 1 + [i∗ (ω ∗ (m H ), m H ) X (ω ∗ (m H )) + (1 − i∗ (ω ∗ (m H ), m H ) X (ω ∗ (m H ))mb )]γ
;
zHr
zHr
(A.43)
′

gL ≡

z
zL
= 1 + [i∗ (ω ∗ (m L ), m L ) X (ω ∗ (m L )) + (1 − i∗ (ω ∗ (m L ), m L ) X (ω ∗ (m L ))mb )]γ
.
zLr
zLr
(A.44)

Using the relationship zH ′ = g H zHr and plugging equations (A.39), (A.41), (A.42), (A.43)
and (A.44) into the first equation in (A.40) derives the solutions for g and o through the
following system of equations,
g H (α H q HH + α L q LH 1o )
;
α H q HH + α L q LH
g H (α H q HH o + α L q LH ) α L q LL + α H q HL
.
o=
α H q HH + α L q LH
g L (α L q LL + α H q HL o )

g=

(A.45)
(A.46)

Since all of the other variables and parameters are fixed in the equation system, the solu-
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tions of g and o are indeed both constants (Point 1).

A.2.2

Characterization of Proposition 2

There exists a symmetric balanced growth path of the form
1. The employment-weighted growth rate of the aggregate productivity defined by,

R R ′ ′′
RR ′
m z dF (m′ , z′ )/
m dF (m′ , z′ )
RR
g= R R
,
mz′ dF (m, z)/
mdF (m, z)

(A.47)

is a constant.
2. The interest factor r = β/gϵζ/(ζ +λ) ; the rental rate on capital r̃ = gϵζ/(ζ +λ) /β − 1 + δ.
3. The odds of a successful match for a potential buyer, b j (ω ), and for a potential seller, s j , on the
market of each type (basic or applied) of patents, only depend on the total number of patent buyers
j

n

j

and sellers on that market, i.e., b j (ω ) = ϕ( njs )ν , s j = ϕ( bj )1−ν , where j ∈ { a, b}.
nb

ns

4. The production scope of each firm spans symmetrically around the center, and the length of the
scope depends only on the production ability of the firm, i.e., |ω (m, z; z)| = Ω(m).
5. The success rates of applied and basic research do not depend on the firm’s innovation level, z, or
the economy-wide innovation level, z, i.e., i j (ω, m, z; z) = i j (ω, m), j ∈ { a, b}.
6. The value function V (m, z; z) is linear in z̃ and z̃, i.e., V (m, z; z) = v1 (m)z̃ + v2 (m)z̃, where
z̃ = z/zλ/(ζ +λ) , z̃ = zζ/(ζ +λ) .
j

j

j

7. The number of buyers of both types (nbH , nbL ) and the number of sellers (ns ) for j ( j ∈ { a, b})
type of patents are
j

j

nbH = α H (1 − i j∗ (ω ∗ (m H ), m H ) X j (ω ∗ (m H ))), nbL = α H (1 − i j∗ (ω ∗ (m L ), m L ) X j (ω ∗ (m L )));
(A.48)
j

ns = α H i j∗ (ω ∗ (m H ), m H )(1 − X j (ω ∗ (m H ))) + α L i j∗ (ω ∗ (m L ), m L )(1 − X j (ω ∗ (m L ))).
(A.49)
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8. The buying price and the expected selling price of a j-type ( j ∈ { a, b}) patent is
r

j

pb (m, z; z) = θ ( Am +

gλ/(λ+ζ )

E[v1 (m′ )|m])γ j z̃;

j

j

nbH

j
pb (m H , z; z) +
j
nb

ps (z) =

(A.50)

nbL
j
nb

j

pb (m L , z; z),

(A.51)

where A is a constant.

A.2.3

Proof of Proposition 2

Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1. One difference is that the profit of
each type of firms now have four possible cases. 1) The firm gets both applied and basic
R&D output (either through own innovation or purchasing them from the market). The
profit in this case is π (m, z ab ; z) = Am(z̃ + γ a z̃ + γb z̃). 2) The firm gets only applied R&D
output. The profit is π (m, z a ; z) = Am(z̃ + γ a z̃). 3) The firm gets only basic R&D output.
The profit is π (m, zb ; z) = Am(z̃ + γb z̃). (4). The firm gets neither R&D output. The profit
η

is π (m, z; z) = Am(z̃). A = ζ ( r̃ ) ζ +λ [(α H m H + α L m L ) g]− ζ +λ . for all the four cases.
η

λ

Then, from the Nash bargaining problem between the buyer and the seller, it can be derived that for a j-type patent ( j ∈ { a, b}), the buying price can be expressed as
j

pb (m; z) = θB(m)γ j z̃,

(A.52)

where B(m) = [ Am + rE(v1 (m′ )) g− ζ +λ ]. The selling price is then
λ

j

j

ps = [

nbH
j
nb

j

B(m H ) +
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nbL
j
nb

B(m L )]θγ j z̃.

(A.53)

The optimal success rate of j-type R&D ( j ∈ { a, b})
i j∗ (ω, m) =

{

1
γj
j
j
j
j
j
j
ρ,
[
X
(
ω
)(
1
−
(
1
−
θ
)
b
)
B
(
m
)
+
(
1
−
X
(
ω
))
s
θ
(
σ
B
(
m
)
+
σ
B
(
m
))]}
H
L
H
L
(1 − σ ) χ j

(A.54)
which also only depends on the firm’s production scope and production ability.
The length of the firm’s production scope is determined by the following equation,

∑

′

j

j

i j∗ (ω, m) X j (|ω |)[(1 − (1 − θ )b j ) B(m) − s j θ (σH B(m H ) + σL B(m L ))]γ j = µ|ω |ι .

j∈{ a,b}

(A.55)
The solution to the equation above is still just a function of m.
The growth rates of each type of firms in the R&D and search and matching stages are
respectively
gH ≡

zH ′
zHr

∑

=1 +

j

[i j∗ (ω ∗ (m H ), m H ) X j (ω ∗ (m H )) + (1 − i j∗ (ω ∗ (m H ), m H ) X j (ω ∗ (m H ))mb )]γ j

j∈{ a,b}

z
;
zHr

(A.56)

gL ≡

zL ′
zLr

=1 +

∑

j

[i j∗ (ω ∗ (m L ), m L ) X j (ω ∗ (m L )) + (1 − i j∗ (ω ∗ (m L ), m L ) X j (ω ∗ (m L ))mb )]γ j

j∈{ a,b}

z
.
zLr

(A.57)
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Still, the growth rate in the social innovation level and the ratio of the innovation levels
between high- and low-type firms are constants and equal to
g H (α H q HH + α L q LH 1o )
;
α H q HH + α L q LH
g H (α H q HH o + α L q LH ) α L q LL + α H q HL
o=
.
α H q HH + α L q LH
g L (α L q LL + α H q HL o )

g=

A.3
A.3.1

(A.58)
(A.59)

Further Explanation on Calibration
Estimation of the Matching Elasticity

This section displays the estimation results of the elasticity in the matching function of
the patent trading market. The first three columns use raw numbers, while the last three
columns use patent citation-weighted numbers. The numbers are summed at the 6-digit
NAICS code level in columns (1) and (4); at the 4-digit NAICS code level in columns (2) and
(5); at the 2-digit NAICS code level in columns (3) and (6). In all columns, the summation
of the two coefficients is close to 1, suggesting that the matching function is close to being
constant-return-to-scale. The coefficient of the number of sellers, which corresponds to the
matching elasticity(ν), is in the range of 0.598-0.821. The calibration then sets the value of
ν as 0.70.
Ln(Number of Matches)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Raw
Citation-Weighted
0.598*** 0.693*** 0.780*** 0.604*** 0.694*** 0.821***
(0.006)
(0.012)
(0.049)
(0.006)
(0.012)
(0.050)
0.0713*** 0.105*** 0.291*** 0.0698*** 0.102*** 0.222**
(0.008)
(0.018)
(0.089)
(0.008)
(0.018)
(0.090)
20000
5700
500
20000
5700
500
0.873
0.936
0.984
0.871
0.935
0.983
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1)

Ln(Num. of Sellers)
Ln(Num. of Buyers)
Observations
R-squared

Table A.1: Estimation of the Elasticity in the Matching Function
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A.3.2

Calibration of the Extended Model

This section describes the calibration process and performance of the extended model. The
step size and the cost function parameters of basic and applied research, {γ j , χ j , ρ j }, and
the two probability functions, X j (.) ( j ∈ { a, b}), are calibrated together with other parameters in the baseline model. Table A.2 shows the results. The step size ratio of the two
types of research adopts the value in Akcigit et al. (2021); the scale parameter of applied
research cost is normalized to be 1. The within-scope probability function for basic and
applied research are estimated by the method described in the baseline model respectively
on a sample of patents from basic research and a sample of patents from applied research
or development. The estimated functions suggest that when the industry number of a
firms is not too large, it is harder for basic research output to match the firm’s production
compared to applied research. The step size of applied research, γ a , the scale of basic research cost function, χb , and the elasticity of the cost function of the two types of research,
1 + ρ a and 1 + ρb , are pinned down by matching the moments of the model with the moments of data in the initial balanced growth path (1981-1985), together with the parameters
of the management cost function, the matching efficiency, and sellers’ bargaining power,

{µ, ι, ϕ, θ }. In the calibration, the annual growth rate is mostly affected by γ a ; the basic
research share and R&D cost to domestic sales ratio of firms with high and low production
ability are mostly governed by χb , 1 + ρ a , and 1 + ρb .
The extended model is then recalibrated to the ending balanced growth path. In this
process, parameters corresponding to the four mechanisms, {ϕ, θ, σ, µ, ι, γ a , χb , ρ a , ρb }, are
changed to match the data moments in 1996-2000.
The model fit of the two balanced growth paths are shown respectively in Table A.3 and
Table A.4. Overall, the model matches the data well.
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Parameter
Priori Information

Description

Value

Identification

γb
γa
χa

Step size ratio
Applied R cost, scale

1.6
1

Akcigit et al. (2021)
Normalization

Estimation
X a (ω )
X b (ω )

Applied R, within-scope Prob.
Basic R, within-scope Prob.

e−3.837 ∗ |ω |0.602
e−4.944 ∗ |ω |0.932

Regression
Regression

Model
γa
χb
1 + ρa
1 + ρb

Applied R step size
Basic R cost, scale
Applied R cost, elasticity
Basic R cost, elasticity

1.46
5.33
1.90
1.29

Growth rate
Basic research share,
R&D cost/sales
ratio (H and L)

Table A.2: Parameter Values of the Extended Model

Targets
Economic growth rate(1981-1985)
R&D cost/sales of H firms(1981-1985)
R&D cost/sales of L firms(1981-1985)
Basic R Share of H firms(1981-1985)
Basic R Share of L firms(1981-1985)
Avg. number of industries of H firms(1981-1985)
Avg. number of industries of L firms(1981-1985)
The share of patents transacted(1981-1985)

Data
3.05%
3.62%
2.83%
4.20%
3.73%
11.81
1.92
30.9%

Model
3.05%
3.62%
2.83%
4.20%
3.73%
11.81
1.92
30.9%

Table A.3: Model Fit for Key Moments in the Initial Balanced Growth Path

Targets
Economic growth rate(1996-2000)
R&D cost/sales of H firms(1996-2000)
R&D cost/sales of L firms(1996-2000)
Basic R Share of H firms(1996-2000)
Basic R Share of L firms(1996-2000)
Avg. number of industries of H firms(1996-2000)
Avg. number of industries of L firms(1996-2000)
The share of patents transacted(1996-2000)

Data
3.34%
3.15%
6.71%
4.61%
11.46%
6.31
1.61
44.1%

Model
3.34%
3.15%
6.71%
4.61%
11.46%
6.31
1.61
44.1%

Table A.4: Model Fit for Key Moments in the Ending Balanced Growth Path
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A.4
A.4.1

Additional Empirical Results
Placebo Tests–Results

This section presents the regression results of the placebo tests described in Section 7.5.
The goal is to check whether there are pre-trends in firms’ production scope. The new
dummy that segments the pre-CAFC sample is defined as post2. Table A.5 is corresponding to the DiD regression in Equation 1.30 running on the pre-CAFC sample. The first
two columns insert the post2 dummy in the regression instead of the year-fixed effects; the
last two columns control the year-fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) control the state-level
characteristics compared to columns (1) and (3). The coefficient of the interaction term is
either positive or very small in absolute magnitude. None of the coefficients is statistically
significant. Table A.6 is corresponding to the DDD regression in Equation 1.31 running on
the pre-CAFC sample. The state and time controls in each column are the same as Table
A.5. Both the coefficients of the triple interaction and the interaction between the invalidation rate and the post2 dummy are insignificant, confirming there is no pre-existing trend.
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Dependent Variable

Ln(Number of Industries)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Invalidation Rate*Post2
0.0206
0.000678
-0.00194
(0.014)
(0.013)
(0.012)
Ln(Employment)
0.0529*** 0.0526***
0.0527***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Post2
-0.0690*
(0.040)
Ln(Real GDP)
0.0321
-0.0194
(0.020)
(0.023)
Effective Federal Tax Rate
-3.567*
-2.193
(1.918)
(1.504)
Effective State Tax Rate
-1.747*
-1.156
(0.914)
(0.716)
Federal R&D Tax Credits
0.665***
-0.219
(0.133)
(1.616)
State R&D Tax Credits
-0.276**
-0.298***
(0.121)
(0.083)
Year-fixed Effects
NO
NO
YES
YES
Firm-fixed Effects
YES
YES
YES
YES
Observations
131000
131000
131000
131000
R-squared
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.97
Standard errors are clustered in the circuit court region by the post dummy
level, shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1)
0.00196
(0.013)
0.0539***
(0.003)
0.0134*
(0.007)

Table A.5: Placebo Test-DiD Regression Results

143

Dependent Variable

Ln(Number of Industries)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
High_treat*Invalidation Rate*Post2
0.00965
0.00894
0.011
0.0121
(0.038)
(0.038)
(0.038)
(0.039)
Invalidation Rate*Post2
0.00177
0.0204
0.000479 -0.00213
(0.012)
(0.014)
(0.012)
(0.012)
High_treat*Post2
-0.0094
-0.00877
-0.00935
-0.00908
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.020)
Ln(Employment)
0.0539*** 0.0530*** 0.0526*** 0.0527***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Post2
0.0136*
-0.0686
(0.007)
(0.040)
Ln(Real GDP)
0.0321
-0.0193
(0.020)
(0.023)
Effective Federal Tax Rate
-3.555*
-2.186
(1.915)
(1.506)
Effective State Tax Rate
-1.741*
-1.152
(0.912)
(0.716)
Federal R&D Tax Credits
0.665***
-0.206
(0.133)
(1.615)
State R&D Tax Credits
-0.276**
-0.298***
(0.121)
(0.083)
Year-fixed Effects
NO
NO
YES
YES
Firm-fixed Effects
YES
YES
YES
YES
Observations
131000
131000
131000
131000
R-squared
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.97
Standard errors are clustered in the circuit court region by the post dummy level,
shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.6: Placebo Test-DDD Regression Results
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APPENDIX B
S UPPLEMENTARY M ATERIAL FOR C HAPTER 2
B.1

Proofs

B.1.1

Competitive Equilibrium with Undirected Advertising

Proof of Proposition 1 (Advertising). Plugging these solutions for at and ad , given by the first
line of (2.10), into the objective function (2.8) gives
Π( p; q) = [( p − γ)S( p)]α/(α−1) Υ(q),

(B.1)

where
Υ(q) ≡ (1 + qα/(1−α) )ϕ1/(1−α) (α1/(1−α) − αα/(1−α) )
1
1
= (1 + qα/(1−α) )( )1/(α−1) ( )α/(α−1) (α − 1) > 0.
ϕ
α
Now, consider two firms charging two different prices, p′ and p′′ , in the set P . It must
transpire that Π( p′ ; q) = Π( p′′ ; q), which can only be true if [( p′ − γ)S( p′ )]α/(α−1) = [( p′′ −
γ)S( p′′ )]α/(α−1) . But then from (2.10), the solutions for at and ad must be the same.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Pricing). It’s trivial to see from (2.16) and (2.21) that p and p are increasing in r, γ, and q–note that Υ(q) is decreasing in q. Last, p falls with (1 − t), as is
immediate from (2.21).

Proof of Proposition 3 (Price Distribution). An exponentiation of equation (2.23) implies that

P( p) =

1
( p − τ )[tI ( p; τ ) + (1 − t) I ( p; τ )]
ln{
}.
a
p−γ

(B.2)

The result follows by noting that tI ( p; τ ) + (1 − t) I ( p; τ ) = 1, when p ∈ [ p, p(τ )], and
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tI ( p; τ ) + (1 − t) I ( p; τ ) = 1 − t, when p ∈ [ p↑ (τ ), p]. Last, since there are no firms that
price in the range [ p(τ ), p↑ (τ )] the distribution function is flat over this interval.

Proof of Proposition 4 (Number of Varieties). Suppose that some consumption good i is not
produced. A producer could enter the variety, charging the maximum price, p, while
advertising in the amounts at and ad . All high-type consumers receiving an ad would buy
this good. The resulting level of supra-normal profits is

( p − γ)( at + ad )(1 − t) − A( at ) − A(qad ) − r >
( p − γ)( at + ad )e−a (1 − t) − A( at ) − A(qad ) − r = 0. (B.3)
On the righthand side of the above equation e−a = S( p) is the odds that a firm selling
another variety at price p will make a sale. These positive profits violate the zero-profit
condition.

Proof of Proposition 5 (Consumption/Leisure). To conserve on notation let c = c(τ ), l = l (τ ),
and pc = p(τ ). Focus on the first-order condition (2.34), which can be rewritten as53
κ
θ τ
= (1 − θ )
.
c pc
κl + (1 − κ )mρ l 1−ρ
|{z} |
{z
}
MC

(B.5)

MB

The above first-order condition can be represented diagrammatically, as shown in Figure
B.1. The lefthand side of (B.5) represents the marginal cost of leisure (MC). This is increasing in l, so the marginal cost curve is upward sloping. On this, note that both c and pc are
decreasing in l by (2.32)–recall that prices are ordered from the lowest to the highest. The
53 The righthand side is the marginal utility of leisure, l. Note that the marginal utility of media goods, m,
has the symmetric form
(1 − κ )mρ −1
(1 − α ) ρ
> 0.
(B.4)
κl + (1 − κ )mρ

Taking the derivative of this with respect to l also gives the cross partial given in (B.6). That is, if leisure is an
Edgeworth-Pareto complement with media goods, then media goods are an Edgeworth-Pareto complement
with leisure.
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righthand side is the marginal benefit of leisure (MB). The righthand side is decreasing in
l so the marginal benefit curve is downward sloping.

Figure B.1: Leisure, l, is determined at the point where the marginal benefit and marginal
cost curves intersect. The diagram shows what happens when the number of leisure goods
increase from d to d′ .
1. To demonstrate the proposition’s first point that leisure, l, will increase with the number of media goods, m, note that
dMB
κ (1 − κ ) l 1− ρ
= − ρ (1 − θ )
mρ−1 > 0, as ρ < 0.
dm
[κl + (1 − κ )mρ l 1−ρ ]2

(B.6)

The marginal cost curve will stay in position, because it is not a function of m.
2. If leisure, l, increases with the free provision of media goods, then work effort, h(τ ),
and income, τh(τ ), must fall. This leads to a drop in regular consumption, c. To
show that regular consumption, c, is increasing in the level of skill, τ, convert the
first-order condition (B.5) for l into one for c by using the budget constraint (2.2). For
a skilled person this will read
κ
θ τ
Rc
Rc
= (1 − θ )
. (B.7)
c pc
κ [1 − e − (1/τ ) 0 pi di ] + (1 − κ )mρ [1 − e − (1/τ ) 0 pi di ]1−ρ
(For the unskilled person just set τ = 1 and e = 0.) The lefthand side is the marginal
benefit of regular consumption, c, while the righthand side is its marginal cost. The
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marginal cost curve rises in c while the marginal benefit curve declines in c. Here an
increase in τ decreases the marginal cost of consumption, while it raises the marginal
benefit. Hence, c will increase.
3. Last, to establish that work effort for the skilled, h(τ ) = 1 − l − e, is increasing in the
cost of education, e, return to equation (B.5). Note that the marginal cost of leisure
rises with e because c = C (h(τ ),τ ) will be smaller at any given level of l by (2.32)
because h(τ ) = 1 − l (τ ) − e. The righthand side is unaffected by e.

B.1.2

Efficiency of the Undirected Advertising Equilibrium

To conserve on notation, let the subscript 1 denote an allocation for the unskilled person and 2 the skilled one. The informationally-constrained planning problem (2.39) then
rewrites as

max

c1 ,c2 ,at ,ad ,n,l1 ,l2

ξt(1 − θ )
at
a
ρ
ln[κl1 + (1 − κ )[n( + d )]ρ ]
ρ
ζ
ψ

at
a
(1 − t)(1 − θ )
ρ
ln[κl2 + (1 − κ )[n( + d )]ρ ] , (B.8)
+ (1 − t)θ ln c2 +
ρ
ζ
ψ
| {z }

ξtθ ln c1 +

=m

subject to

(1 − t)(1 − e−(at +ad )n ) − (1 − t)c2 = 0,

(B.9)

and

t(1 − l1 ) + (1 − t)τ (1 − l2 − e) − tγc1 − (1 − t)γc2 − n[ A( at ) + A(qad ) + r] = 0.

Attach the Lagrange multiplier ω to the first constraint and the one λ to the second.
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(B.10)

The first-order conditions are:
1
= λγ,
c1

(B.11)

1
= ω + λγ = λ(ω/λ + γ),
c2

(B.12)

ξθ

θ

ξt(1 − θ )

(1 − κ )mρ−1 n/ζ
(1 − κ )mρ−1 n/ζ
+
(
1
−
t
)(
1
−
θ
)
ρ
ρ
κl1 + (1 − κ )mρ
κl2 + (1 − κ )mρ
+ (1 − t)ωne−(at +ad )n = λnA1 ( at ),
(B.13)

ξt(1 − θ )

(1 − κ )mρ−1 n/ψ
(1 − κ )mρ−1 n/ψ
+
(
1
−
t
)(
1
−
θ
)
ρ
ρ
κl1 + (1 − κ )mρ
κl2 + (1 − κ )mρ
+ (1 − t)ωne−(at +ad )n = λnqA1 (qad ),
(B.14)

ξt(1 − θ )

(1 − κ )mρ−1 ( at /ζ + ad /ψ)
(1 − κ )mρ−1 ( at /ζ + ad /ψ)
+
(
1
−
t
)(
1
−
θ
)
ρ
ρ
κl1 + (1 − κ )mρ
κl2 + (1 − κ )mρ
+ (1 − t)ω ( at + ad )e−(at +ad )n = λ[ A( at ) + A(qad ) + r],

(B.15)
ρ −1

ξ (1 − θ )
and

κl1

= λ,

(B.16)

κl2
= λτ.
ρ
κl2 + (1 − κ )mρ

(B.17)

ρ

κl1 + (1 − κ )mρ
ρ −1

(1 − θ )

Following Negishi (1960), the question asked is whether or not there is a competitive equi-
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librium with the set of taxes and subsidies specified by (2.42), (2.43), (2.44), and (2.45)
that shares the planning problem’s allocations for c1 , c2 , at , ad , n, l1 , and l2 . If so, then the
competitive equilibrium with the proposed tax-cum-subsidy scheme is (informationallyconstrained) Pareto optimal.
Before proceeding to proving that the competitive equilibrium with the proposed tax-cumsubsidy scheme is Pareto optimal, motivated by (B.14), conjecture that the subsidy on each
media goods, s, is

s = [ξt(1 − θ )

(1 − κ )mρ −1
(1 − κ )mρ −1
+
(
1
−
t
)(
1
−
θ
)
]/λ.
ρ
ρ
κl1 + (1 − κ )mρ
κl2 + (1 − κ )mρ

(B.18)

Using (B.16) and (B.17) it can be seen that the righthand side of this expression collapses
so that
s=

(1 − κ )mρ −1 1
1
[ t ρ −1 + (1 − t ) τ ρ −1 ]
κ
l
l
2

1

(1 − κ ) m ρ −1
(1 − κ ) m ρ −1
=t
(
)
+ (1 − t) τ
(
) .
κ
l (τ )
κ
l (τ )

(B.19)

This subsidy per media good is equivalent to subsidizing traditional and digital advertising at the rates s/ζ and s/ψ. The proportional price reduction on generic goods, r, implies
that

(1 − r ) p(τ ) = γ [cf (2.42)].

(B.20)

Proof of Proposition 6 (Informationally-Constrained Efficiency). To start with focus on the consumption/leisure allocations, while assuming that the solutions for advertising and the
number of firms agree in both situations. To show that the planning problem with the
specified planning weight ξ can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with the proposed subsidy-cum-tax policy, let
ω
+ γ = (1 − r ) p.
λ
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(B.21)

Using this together with equations (B.12) and (B.17) gives the skilled consumer’s first-order
condition in the competitive equilibrium. Under both regimes c2 = 1 − e−(at +ad )n . This,
along with the consumption/leisure first-order condition, implies that the solution for the
skilled person’s leisure, l2 , will be the same in both scenarios. Analogously, using (B.20)
in conjunction with equations (B.11) and (B.16) gives the unskilled consumer’s first-order
condition. Then, the labor-market-clearing condition (2.38) implies the unskilled person’s
consumption, c1 , is the same. So, the allocations for c1 , c2 , l1 , and l2 from the planning
problem can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with the proposed subsidy-cumtax policy.
Now turn to advertising. In the competitive equilibrium, p − γ = A1 ( at ) + f − s/ζ and
p − γ = A1 (qad ) + f − s/ψ. Rewriting equation (B.13) while using the formula for s and
adding f to both sides yields
s/ζ + (1 − t)(ω/λ)e−(at +ad )n + f = A1 ( at ) + f .

(B.22)

Using formula (2.43) for the fine on advertising, f , then gives
s/ζ + (1 − t)(ω/λ + rp)e−(at +ad )n = A1 ( at ) + f .

(B.23)

Noting that ω/λ = (1 − r ) p − γ leads to
s/ζ + (1 − t)( p − γ)e−(at +ad )n = A1 ( at ) + f

(B.24)

p − γ = A1 ( at ) + f − s/ζ,

(B.25)

or

because (1 − t)( p − γ)e−(at +ad )n = p − γ. This is the first-order condition for at in a competitive equilibrium. Similarly, from equation (B.14) it can be seen that
s/ψ + (1 − t)(ω/λ)e−(at +ad )n + f = qA1 (qad ) + f ,
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(B.26)

implying
p − γ = qA1 (qad ) + f − s/ψ.

(B.27)

This is the efficiency condition for digital advertising, ad , that arises in the competitive
equilibrium. Therefore, the competitive solutions for at and ad , under the proposed subsidycum-tax policy, satisfy the planning problem.
Last, move on to the number of firms. Multiply (B.13) by at /λ and (B.14) by ad /λ and then
sum the resulting equations to get
s( at /ζ + ad /ψ)n + (1 − t)(ω/λ)n( at + ad )e−(at +ad )n = nat A1 ( at ) + nqad A1 (qad ), (B.28)

where formula (B.18) for s has been used. Similarly, multiply (B.15) by n/λ and subtract
the result from the above equation to obtain

at A1 ( at ) + qad A1 (qad ) = A( at ) + A(qad ) + r.

(B.29)

Finally, multiplying the efficiency conditions (B.25) and (B.27) for traditional and digital
advertising by at and ad , respectively, and then summing the two equations while making
use of (B.29) gives

( p − γ)( at + ad ) = at A1 ( at ) + qad A1 (qad ) + ( at + ad ) f − s( at /ζ + ad /ψ)

(B.30)

= A( at ) + A(qad ) + r + ( at + ad ) f − s( at /ζ + ad /ψ).
This is the zero-profit condition for a firm when there is both a subsidy for media goods
provision and a fine on advertising. This implies that the solution for n from the planning
problem will be shared by the competitive economy with the proposed subsidy-cum-tax
policy.

Suppose now that there is only one type of consumer/worker. Without loss in generality,
let this be the high type. For this specialized case just a subsidy on media goods is required
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in the amount
s=

(1 − κ )mρ −1 1
τ ρ −1 .
κ
l

(B.31)

2

Proof of Corollary 3 (Single agent economy). The proof is a straightforward modification of
the previous proof. When there is only the high-type person, the first-order conditions
(B.11) and (B.16) no longer appear, so disregard them. Now, set ω/λ + γ = p. Using this
together with equations (B.12) and (B.17) gives the consumer’s first-order condition in a
competitive equilibrium. To complete things, set f = r = t = 0. Then parrot the remaining steps in the above proof (ignoring the ones for the unskilled person) while using the
revised formula for s.

B.1.3

Recovering Tax and Subsidy from the Planning Problem

The tax-cum-subsidy scheme that renders the competitive equilibrium efficient can be recovered from the solution to the planning problem. First, the subsidy on digital advertising, s, can be calculated from (2.44) using the planning problem allocations for at , ad , l (τ ),
l (τ ), and n.
Second, the proportional price reduction, r, and the fine on advertising, f , are immediate
from (2.42) and (2.43), if the prices p(τ ) and p are known. To recover these two prices,
from the competitive equilibrium it transpires that

1 − S( p(τ )) = 1 −

p−γ
p(τ ) − γ

= c1 [equations (2.26) and (2.36)],

(B.32)

which implies
p(τ ) =

p−γ
1 − c1

+γ =

e−a (1 − t)( p − γ)
+ γ,
1 − c1

(B.33)

where the term on the far right follows from substituting out for p − γ using (2.21). Next,
from the two consumer’s problems, in the competitive equilibrium with the proposed tax-
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cum-subsidy scheme, it transpires that
p(τ ) = Ξp,

(B.34)

where
Ξ≡(

c2 κl (τ ) + (1 − κ )mρ l (τ )1−ρ
.
)
c1 τ [κl (τ ) + (1 − κ )mρ l (τ )1−ρ ]

(B.35)

Substituting the second formula for p(τ ) into the first one for p(τ ) then gives

p=

γ (1 − ∆ )
γ (1 − ∆ )
and p(τ ) = Ξ
,
Ξ−∆
Ξ−∆

(B.36)

e − a (1 − t)
.
1 − c1

(B.37)

where
∆≡

Since a, c1 , c2 , m, l (τ ), and l (τ ), are known from the planning problem so are Ξ and ∆.
Finally, by modifying (2.36) and (2.37), the lump-sum taxes levied on the unskilled and
skilled, t(τ ) and t(τ ), read as

t(τ ) = 1 − l (τ ) − (1 − r ) a( p − γ){ln[

p(τ ) − γ
γ
γ
]−
+
}/a
p−γ
p(τ ) − γ
p−γ

(B.38)

and

t ( τ ) = τ [1 − l ( τ ) − e]

−(1 − r ) a( p − γ){ln[
−

p(τ ) − γ
γ
γ
]−
+
}/a
p−γ
p(τ ) − γ
p−γ

(1 − r ) a ( p − γ )
p−γ
γ
γ
{ln[
]−
+
}/a,
1−t
p↑ (τ ) − γ
( p − γ) p↑ (τ ) − γ)

where
p↑ (τ ) − γ =
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p(τ ) − γ
.
1−t

(B.39)

B.2

Calibration

To solve the model values for the following parameter values are needed: θ, κ, ρ, γ, r, α,
ϕ, ζ, ψ, q, e, t, and τ. The idea is to pin down values for r, α, q, ζ, ψ, θ, κ, ρ, and e by
using data on markups, the advertising-to-consumption ratio, the click-through rate on
digital advertising, the increase in the ratio of spending on digital versus traditional advertising, and the rise in time spent on leisure using media goods by non-college-educated
and college-educated persons. Out of the remaining parameters, t and τ can be assigned
values directly from the data. The last two parameters, γ and ϕ, are normalized to 1. As
will be seen, at the calibration point the calibration procedure will determine a value for n.
The steps in the procedure are as follows:
1. Calibrating α. Two facts are used to do this, namely the average markup, MARKUP,
and advertising’s share of consumption, A2C. These facts are taken to apply for the
whole period in question, and therefore for the year 2018.
(a) A formula for α. In the model all firms have the same advertising expenses, zero
profits, and hence revenue net of production costs. Focus on the firms charging
the lowest price, p. To start with, equation (2.9) implies

( p − γ) at = ϕαaαt and ( p − γ) ad = ϕαqα aαd .

(B.40)

( p − γ)n( at + ad ) = αn[ A( at ) + A(qad )].

(B.41)

This gives

Dividing through by total sales, t[1 − l (τ )] + (1 − t)τ [1 − l (τ ) − e], then results
in

( p − γ)n( at + ad )
n[ A( at ) + A(qad )]
=α
t[1 − l (τ )] + (1 − t)τ [1 − l (τ ) − e]
t[1 − l (τ )] + (1 − t)τ [1 − l (τ ) − e](B.42)
=α × A2C S ,
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where it should be noted that sales equal consumption expenditure in the model.
Therefore,
α=

( p − γ) a
1
×
.
A2C t[1 − l (τ )] + (1 − t)τ [1 − l (τ ) − e]

(B.43)

To use this formula, values are needed for a, p − γ, 1 − l (τ ), and 1 − l (τ ) − e.
The latter two quantities come from the consumer side of the calibration; that is,
the model’s predictions for 1 − l (τ ) and 1 − l (τ ) − e at the 2018 calibration point,
as shown in Table 2.2. Information on the average price markup, MARKUP, is
used to solve for a and p − γ.
(b) Using the MARKUP to determine a and p − γ. This will involve solving three
equations in three unknowns, as discussed now. In the model the average price
markup, is given by

MARKUP

=

R p(τ )
Rp
pB( p) P1 ( p)dp + (1 − t) p(τ ) pB( p) P1 ( p)dp
1 p
E[ p]
=
R p(τ )
Rp
γ
γ
B( p) P1 ( p)dp
B( p) P1 ( p)dp + (1 − t)
p

=

p(τ )

1 t[1 − l (τ )] + (1 − t)τ [1 − l (τ ) − e]
.
γ 1 − t[( p − γ)/( p(τ ) − γ)] − (1 − t)e−a

(B.44)

The numerator follows from (2.38) since this is proportional to aggregate spending. The denominator is proportional to aggregate consumption and follows
from (2.36) and (2.37). Next, the labor-market-clearing condition (2.38) implies
that

γ[tc(τ ) + (1 − t)c(τ )] + a( p − γ) = t[1 − l (τ )] + (1 − t)τ [1 − l (τ ) − e], (B.45)

since n[ A( at ) + A(qad ) + r] = a( p − γ) by the zero-profit condition. Solving
out for c(τ ) and c(τ ) using (2.36) and (2.37), while noting that B( p(τ )) = ( p −
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γ)/[ p(τ ) − γ], then yields

γ [1 − t(

p−γ
p(τ ) − γ

) − (1 − t)e−a ] + a( p − γ) = t[1 − l (τ )] + (1 − t)τ [1 − l (τ ) − e].
(B.46)

Last, p(τ ) must solve

a( p − γ){ln[

p(τ ) − γ
γ
γ
]−
+
}/a = 1 − l (τ ).
p−γ
p(τ ) − γ
p−γ

(B.47)

Equations (B.44), (B.46), and (B.47) represent a system of three equations in three
unknowns, which can be used to find a solution a, p − γ, and p(τ ) predicated
upon the observed markup, MARKUP, and the labor allocations for 2018 at the
calibration point reported in Table 2.2.
2. Calibrating the fixed entry cost, r. Since all firms earn zero profits, zero in on firms
selling at the lowest price, p. Their zero-profit condition gives
r = ( p − γ)α/(α−1) (1 + qα/(1−α) )ϕ1/(1−α) (α1/(1−α) − αα/(1−α) ) > 0,

(B.48)

where p, γ, q, and α have all been previously determined.
3. Calibrating the cost of advantage of digital advertising, q, for the years 2003, 2010, and 2018.
These can be recovered from the observed ratio of digital ad spending to traditional
ad spending, D 2 T, for the years 2003 and 2018. For the year 2010 an interpolated
value is used for D 2 T. To see this, from (2.5), (2.7), and (2.11) it is apparent that
A(qad )
qa
= ( d )α = (qqα/(1−α) )α = qα/(1−α) = D 2 T.
A( at )
at

(B.49)

q = ( D 2 T )(1−α)/α ,

(B.50)

Therefore,

where α is known from the first step.
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Calibrating the preference parameters, θ, κ, ρ, the cost of an education, e, and the click-through
rate on traditional advertising, ζ. This is done by solving problem (2.50) which tries to match
up the model’s predictions for leisure versus 6 observations on leisure from U.S. data for
non-college- and college-educated people for the years 2003, 2010, and 2018. Central to
this data matching problem is the first-order condition
τ
κ
θ
= (1 − θ )
, for τ ∈ {τ, τ }.
c(τ ) p(τ )
κl (τ ) + (1 − κ )mρ l (τ )1−ρ

(B.51)

The quantity of digital media goods consumed, nad /ψ, and the price of the last good consumed, p(τ ), are quantities that can be recovered from the information produced in Steps
1 to 3, conditional upon values for 1 − l (τ ) and 1 − l (τ ) − e. The quantity of traditional
media goods consumed, nat /ζ, depends upon the click-through rate, ζ, for which there is
no information available. So, ζ must be calibrated. The model’s leisure quantities, lt (τ )
and lt (τ ), come from calibrating θ, κ, ρ, e, and ζ so as to match up, as close as possible, the
model’s predictions for leisure, lt (τ ), with the stylized facts from the data, LEISURE t (τ ) for
t = 2003, 2010, and 2018, and τ = {τ = non-college, τ = college}.

B.3
B.3.1

Model Extension
Growth in TFP

First, it will be shown that given the assumptions in the main text the economy will follow
a balanced growth path. Second, the results for the model when TFP is allowed to change
are presented in Tables B.1 and B.2. To begin with, to incorporate technology advance in
the household sector rewrite tastes as

θ ln(

Z v
0

ci di ) +

(1 − θ )
ln[κ (zl )ρ + (1 − κ )(
ρ
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Z m
0

m j dj)ρ ],

(B.52)

where z represents a technological progress in the home sector. This is easy to justify using
household production theory. Next, as assumed in the text, let

(1/γ′ )/(1/γ) = (1/ϕ′ )/(1/ϕ) = r/r′ = v′ /v = z′ /z = g > 1.

(B.53)

Then, there will exist an balanced growth path with the following properties:
1. The price markup at the lowest price, p − γ, grows at the rate 1/g < 1–this is actually a decline. This fact follows from equation (2.16) and the assumption that

(1/ϕ′ )/(1/ϕ) = r/r′ = g. From (2.21) the markup at the maximum price will grow
at this rate too, provided that advertising per variety is constant. By eyeballing (2.29)
it is then apparent that p(τ ) follows a similar time path–on this note that the lefthand
side of (2.29) will now be multiplied by v, which grows at rate g so that va( p − γ) is
constant.
2. The above implies that the price distribution shifts to the left by the factor 1/g.
3. The first-order condition (2.9) for advertising shows that at and ad will remain constant when both p − γ and ϕ shift by the factor 1/g.
4. The number of media goods, m, will grow at rate g. This follows from the righthand
side of equation (2.30), which should now be multiplied by v. On this, note that

( p − γ)/(αϕ) will be constant.
5. The lefthand side of the labor-market clearing condition still holds, since aggregate
consumption c(τ ) + (1 − t)c(τ ) will grow at the rate g due to the expansion of varieties, while γ expands at 1/g. Likewise, A( at ) + A(qad ) + r grows at rate 1/g, which
will be offset by an increase in the number of firms from n to gn. Therefore, the
number of firms per variety, n, remains constant.
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C ALIBRATED PARAMETER VALUES FOR THE M ODEL WITH TFP G ROWTH
Parameter Values
Description
Identification
Consumers
θ = 0.3499
Consumption weight
Data, Eq (2.50)
κ = 0.0076
Weight on leisure, CES
Data, Eq (2.50)
ρ = −4.9896
Elasticity of substitution
Data, Eq (2.50)
t = 0.65
Low-type fraction
Data
τ = 2.3506
High-type productivity
Data
e = 0.0953
Cost of skill
Data, Eq (2.50)
Firms
γ/γ′ = 1.0053 ≡ g
Annual Growth in TFP
Data
γ03 = 1, γ10 = g7 , γ18 = g15
Marginal production cost
Assumed
r03 = 0.0028, r10 = r03 g7 , r18 = r03 g15 Entry fixed cost
Data, Eqs (2.47) (2.48)
7
15
v03 = 1, v10 = g , v18 = g
Varieties
Assumed
Advertising
α = 3.0148
Cost elasticity
Data, Eqs (2.47) (2.48)
ϕ03 = 1, ϕ10 = g7 , ϕ18 = g15
Constant
Assumed
q03 = 12.0920, q10 = 5.9132
Efficiency of digital adv.
Data, Eq (2.49)
q18 = 2.3302
ψ = 0.025
Click-through rate, digital
Data
ζ = 0.4410
Click-through rate, traditional Data, Eq (2.50)
Table B.1: The parameter values that result from the calibration procedure for the model
with TFP growth.
6. Last, with above utility function the first-order condition for leisure is
τ
θ
κzρ l (τ )ρ−1
, for τ ∈ {τ, τ }.
= (1 − θ ) ρ
c(τ ) p(τ )
κz l (τ )ρ + (1 − κ )mρ

(B.54)

Therefore, if c(τ ) grows at rate g and p(τ ) by the factor 1/g, then the lefthand side
will be constant. The righthand side will also be constant because m and z both grow
at rate g. Thus, l (τ ) will be constant.

B.3.2

Hybrid Model

The results for the hybrid model are presented in Tables B.3 and B.4. In the hybrid model
all digital advertising is directed while all traditional advertising is undirected. See the
main text for more detail.
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D ATA TARGETS
Description
U.S. Data
Income ratio
1.98
Markup, 2018
1.07
Advertising/consumption, 1919-2019 0.022
Digital/traditional advertising
2018
0.282
2010
0.070
2003
0.024
Leisure
Non-college, 2018
0.6523
College, 2018
0.6110
Non-college, 2010
0.6501
College, 2010
0.6130
Non-college, 2003
0.6412
College, 2003
0.6073

Model with TFP Growth
1.98
1.07
0.022
0.282
0.070
0.024
0.6520
0.6115
0.6505
0.6124
0.6411
0.6074

Table B.2: The data targets used in the calibration exercise and the corresponding numbers
for the model with TFP growth.

C ALIBRATED PARAMETER VALUES FOR THE H YBRID M ODEL
Parameter Values
Description
Identification
Consumers
θ = 0.3497
Consumption weight
Data, Eq (2.50)–anl.
κ = 0.0073
Weight on leisure, CES
Data, Eq (2.50)–anl.
ρ = −4.9731
Elasticity of substitution
Data, Eq (2.50)–anl.
t = 0.65
Low-type fraction
Imposed
τ = 2.3185
High-type productivity
Data, Eq (2.50)–anl.
e = 0.0924
Cost of skill
Data, Eq (2.50)–anl.
Firms
γ=1
Marginal production cost
Normalization
r = 0.0026
Entry fixed cost
Data, Eq (2.50)–anl.
Advertising
α = 3.0074
Cost elasticity
Data, Eq (2.50)–anl.
ϕ=1
Constant
Normalization
q03 = q10 = q18 = 1.0
Efficiency of digital sector
Imposed
s03 = 0.03, s10 = 0.09, s18 = 0.29 Size digital sector
Data, Eq (2.50)–anl.
ψ = 0.025
Click-through rate, digital
Data
ζ = 0.4285
Click-through rate, traditional Data, Eq (2.50)–anl.
Table B.3: The parameter values that result from the calibration procedure for the hybrid
model.
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D ATA TARGETS
Description
U.S. Data
Income Ratio
1.98
Markup, 2018
1.07
Advertising/consumption, 1919-2019 0.022
Digital/traditional advertising
2018
0.282
2010
0.070
2003
0.024
Leisure
Non-college, 2018
0.6523
College, 2018
0.6110
Non-college, 2010
0.6501
College, 2010
0.6130
Non-college, 2003
0.6412
College, 2003
0.6073
EV
Non-college
College

Hybrid Model
1.98
1.07
0.022
0.282
0.070
0.024
0.6525
0.6108
0.6503
0.6126
0.6408
0.6080
2.0%
2.8%

Table B.4: The data targets used in the calibration exercise and the corresponding numbers
for the hybrid model.
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APPENDIX C
S UPPLEMENTARY M ATERIAL FOR C HAPTER 3
C.1

Proofs

C.1.1

Proof of Proposition 1

Proof. Consider a general problem where entrepreneurs can get funding from both the
bank and VC. The contract is specified by capital provided by the bank and VC, k B and
kVC , the claimed shares by the bank and VC, ζ B and ζ VC , and internal capital provided by
the entrepreneur in the success and failure cases, k es and k e f .
V g ( x, θ, a) =

max

k B ,kVC ,k es ,k e f ,

σ[

Z

u(cs ) + βψEV ( x, θ ′ , a′s )dΦ(ϵ)]

f

ζ B ,ζ VC ,{ci ,ai′ }i=s

+ (1 − σ)[u(c f ) + βψEV ( x ′ , θ ′ , a′f )]
s.t.

cs + a′s = (1 − ζ B − ζ VC )[ f (v)ϵπ ( x, k B + kVC + k es )] + (1 + r ) âVC − (r + δ)k es
c f + a′f = (1 + r ) a − (r + δ)k e f

( IC ) : v ∈ arg max σζ VC f (v̂)π ( x, k B + kVC + k es ) − (r + δ)kVC − wv̂

(C.1)

v̂

( PCB ) : σζ B f (v)π ( x, k B + kVC + k es ) − (r + δ)k B ≥ 0
( PCVC ) : σζ VC f (v)π ( x, k B + kVC + k es ) − (r + δ)kVC − wv ≥ 0
0 ≤k es , k e f ≤ a
k B , kVC , a′s , a′f ≥ 0
If the optimal contract satisfies k B

> 0 and kVC

> 0, denote the contract as

∗ , k ∗ , k ∗ ); denote the optimal VC effort in of the IC constraint as v∗ .
(k∗B , k∗VC , ζ B∗ , ζ VC
es e f
∗ , k ∗ , k ∗ ). The IC constraint implies
Consider another contract (0, k∗B + k∗VC , 0, ζ B∗ + ζ VC
es e f

v′ = [

∗ ) Zϕπ ( x, k ∗ + k ∗ + k ∗ ) 1
σζ ∗ Zϕπ ( x, k∗B + k∗VC + k∗es ) 1−1 ϕ
σ (ζ B∗ + ζ VC
es 1−ϕ
B
VC
]
> [ VC
]
= v∗
w
w
(C.2)
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The PC constraints are both satisfied.
We have
∗
∗
(1 − ζ B∗ − ζ VC
) f (v′ )π ( x, k∗B + k∗VC + k∗es ) > (1 − ζ B∗ − ζ VC
) f (v∗ )π ( x, k∗B + k∗VC + k∗es ) (C.3)

This implies the total consumption and savings is higher in the new contract at each ϵ
realization if the firm succeeds. Since in the case of failure, it is always optimal to choose
zero capital injection, i.e., k e f = 0. So, the total consumption and savings are equal if the
firm fails. So, V g is not optimized when k B > 0 and kVC > 0.

C.1.2

Proof of Proposition 2

Proof. Since internal capital incurs no benefit but only cost in the failure case, k e f is always
zero. Then, the maximization problem of V B ( x, θ, a − o1 ) is equivalent to maximizing the
entrepreneur’s returns in the case of success, i.e.,
max π ( x, k B + k es )+(1 + r ) a −
k B ,k es

(r + δ )
k B − (r + δ)k es
σ
(C.4)

s.t. 0 ≤k es ≤ a
kB ≥ 0
The first-order conditions (FOCs) in the interior solution can be shown as follows

[k es ] : π2′ ( x, k B + k es ) = r + δ

(C.5)

r+δ
σ

(C.6)

[k B ] : π2′ ( x, k B + k es ) =

The FOCs imply that the marginal benefit of internal financing is the same as external
financing, while the marginal cost is lower. Solving the Kuhn-Tucker condition of this
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problem derived the following optimal solution



k es = a, k B = Ksub ( x ) − a
if a < Ksub ( x )



k es = a, k B = 0
if Ksub ( x ) ≤ a < Kopt ( x )




 k es = Kopt ( x ), k B = 0
if a ≥ Kopt ( x )
1

λ

ησ

(C.7)

1− λ

where Ksub ( x ) = x 1−η −λ ( wλ ) 1−η −λ ( r+δ ) 1−η −λ is the sub-optimal capital level of the firm if all
1

λ

η

1− λ

funding comes from the bank. Kopt ( x ) = x 1−η −λ ( wλ ) 1−η −λ ( r+δ ) 1−η −λ is the optimal capital
level of the firm if all funding comes from internal assets. Since the capital cost of internal
fund is lower than that of external fund, Kopt ( x ) > Ksub ( x ) for each idea quality level.

C.1.3

Proof of Proposition 3

Proof. The FOC of the incentive constraint (IC) derives

σζ f ′ (v)π ( x, kVC + k es ) = w

(C.8)

So,

v=[

Zϕσζπ ( x, kVC + k es ) 1−1 ϕ
]
w

(C.9)

Plugging the solution of v into the participation constraint (PC) derives
1
1
ϕ ϕ
(σζZ ) 1−ϕ ( ) 1−ϕ π ( x, kVC + k e ) 1−ϕ (1 − ϕ) − (r + δ)kVC ≥ 0
w

The participation constraint (PC) must be binding if
entrepreneur’s utility increases in kVC as

∂π
∂kVC

η
(1−λ)(1−ϕ)

(C.10)

< 1.This is because the

> 0, while the net profit of venture capital

decreases in kVC when kVC is large. More specifically, define the net profit of VC as H, i.e.,
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1

ϕ

1

ϕ

H = (σζZ ) 1−ϕ ( w ) 1−ϕ π ( x, kVC + k e ) 1−ϕ (1 − ϕ) − (r + δ)kVC . It can be shown,
If

η
∂H
< 1,
< 0 when kVC is large.
(1 − λ)(1 − ϕ)
∂kVC

(C.11)

So, the entrepreneur can always increase kVC to the point where (PC) is binding. In this
process, the entrepreneur’s utility keeps increasing.
The binding (PC) inplies
1
ϕ ϕ
(σζZπ ( x, kVC + k e )) 1−ϕ ( ) 1−ϕ (1 − ϕ) = (r + δ)kVC
w

(C.12)

The equity share of VC, ζ, and the unobservable effort, v, can then be derived as functions
of the capital investment of VC.

ζ=

[(r + δ)kVC ]1−ϕ
(1 − ϕ)1−ϕ ( wϕ )ϕ (σZπ ( x, kVC + k es ))

(C.13)

ϕ(r + δ)kVC
(1 − ϕ ) w

(C.14)

v=

The positive relationship between the effort and capital investment of VC shows that capital injection of VC incentivizes effort. The entrepreneur’s problem can be rewritten as
V VC ( x, θ, a) =

max

kVC ,k es ,k e f ,

σ[

Z

u(cs ) + βψEV ( x ′ , θ ′ , a′s )dΦ(ϵ)]

f

{ci ,ai′ }i=s

+ (1 − σ)[u(c f ) + βψEV ( x ′ , θ ′ , a′f )]
s.t.

cs + a′s = Z (

ϕ(r + δ)kVC ϕ
(r + δ ) ϵ
) ϵπ ( x, kVC + k es ) −
k
(1 − ϕ ) w
(1 − ϕ)σ VC

+ (1 + r ) a − (r + δ)k es
c f + a′f = (1 + r ) a − (r + δ)k e f
k es , k e f ≥ 0, a′s , a′f ≥ 0
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(C.15)

Since internal capital incurs no benefit but only cost in the failure case, k e f is always zero.
In the case of no synergy shock, the maximization problem of V VC ( x, θ, a) is equivalent to
maximizing the entrepreneur’s returns in the case of success, i.e.,
max Z (

kVC ,k es

r+δ
ϕ(r + δ)kVC ϕ
) π ( x, kVC + k es ) −
k + (1 + r ) a − (r + δ)k es
(1 − ϕ ) w
(1 − ϕ)σ VC
(C.16)

s.t. 0 ≤k es ≤ a
kVC ≥ 0
The first-order conditions (FOCs) in the interior solution can be shown as follows
ϕ (r + δ ) ϕ ϕ ′
) k π = r+δ
(1 − ϕ)w VC 2
ϕ ( r + δ ) ϕ ϕ −1
r+δ
ϕ
[kVC ] : Z (
) [ϕkVC π + kVC π2′ ] =
(1 − ϕ ) w
(1 − ϕ ) σ

[k es ] : Z (

(C.17)
(C.18)

The left-hand side of the FOC with regard to kVC captures the marginal benefit of VC’s capital injection, while the right-hand side captures the marginal cost. Compared to the case
ϕ −1

of no VC involvement, the marginal benefit in this case has an additional term, ϕkVC π,
which captures the role of incentivizing effort; the marginal cost is a combination of pure
capital cost (same as bank financing),

r +δ
σ ,

and the cost of hiring venture captalists,

1
1− ϕ .

Although the marginal cost of external financing is higher than that of internal financing,
the extra role of VC investment encourages households to ask for capital involvement of
VC even whey they have not used up their own assets.
If there is random synergy shock, households have a stronger motive to use VC’s capital
due to risk aversion.
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